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Endorsements
“This is an original and rigorous exploration of key categories that define both 
the genealogy and development of humanitarianism. By presenting the dy-
namics and paradoxes of the humanitarian domain in a dictionary form, the 
protagonists of the humanitarian enterprise can see more clearly the underly-
ing factors at work through the tensions that affect the sphere of action. It is 
through informed reflections and syntheses like this dictionary that controver-
sies can become dialogue. This dictionary is indispensable for correctly con-
textualising and interpreting one of the major political and moral phenomena 
of the contemporary world.”
– Mariella Pandolfi, Professor of Anthropology Emeritus, University of Montreal
“This interdisciplinary dictionary on keywords in the field of humanitarianism 
is indispensable in today’s world.”
– Laura Nader, Professor of Anthropology, University of California at Berkeley
“A strategic selection of sharply focused and neatly concise yet at the same 
time valuably connotational sketches of some key terms—and principles and 
ethics—of humanitarian intervention and aid, each entry with a few refer-
ences for further study added. Excellent.”
– Raymond Apthorpe, Royal Anthropological Institute, London, and the Univer-
sity of Cambridge
“The title of the volume downplays its important contribution. The 107 entries 
provide not only a succinct overview of many of the critical and controversial 
concepts of humanitarianism, but also a mapping of the shifting ground on 
which humanitarianism sits. Concise enough to be valuable to those entering 
the field, while nuanced enough to be a reference for those in the field.”
– Michael Barnett, University Professor of International Affairs and Political Sci-
ence, George Washington University
“Humanitarianism is a field which depends heavily on terms of art. Knowing 
the key concepts in the field—their history, their resonances, their connec-
tions to specific policies and practices—is important for anyone who wants to 
work in or on humanitarianism. This dictionary is more than just a collection 
of definitions. Written by some of the leading scholars of humanitarianism, 
this is an essential map of all the key ideas in the field.”














































































































































































































































This dictionary comprises 107 entries, each one covering a key term in the 
broad humanitarian field. The entries are between 600 and 800 words long, 
followed by selected references. The dictionary is designed as a compass for 
navigating the conceptual universe of humanitarianism in a way that is both 
immediate and rooted in the major debates in the field. Since at least the mid-
nineteenth century, humanitarian relief has spread worldwide to become a 
global salvific narrative that today is captured in the notion of “humanitarian-
ism”—whereby the suffix “ism” embodies a whole set of beliefs, practices, cat-
egories, discourses, and procedures that, although flexible and apt to change 
quickly, are recognizable as “humanitarian.” Humanitarianism is manifested in 
a plurality of actions, movements, and ethics, which are different in their forms 
of implementation and expression and yet are coherent in their idealistic in-
tentions. While these intentions build on core humanitarian principles such as 
“Neutrality,” “Independence,” “Humanity,” and “Impartiality” (see dictionary 
entries) they go beyond these to define a modern redemptory attitude that is 
expressed in forms of compassion and government. Indeed, humanitarianism 
is not simply a reaction to crisis but a vast, articulated, evolving, and multiscale 
mesh of different actors, politics, and structures. It is a modality of intervention 
in the world (with the aim of improving it), a global ethos that is driven by a 
call to address human needs in extraordinary, unbalanced, or unequal circum-
stances. As such, it constitutes a consistent and important feature of moder-
nity, its history intertwined with ideas and practices of salvation, civilization, 
and liberation (see, for example, the dictionary entries for “Missionary,” “Anti-
slavery,” “Religion,” “Charity,” and “Decolonization”).
That a short entry is not enough to fully address issues such as “Technology,” 
“Genocide,” “Rule of law,” “Gift,” “Food,” “Innocence,” “Sentiments,” or “Sover-
eignty” cannot be denied. Yet we resisted the (academic) temptation to trans-
form the dictionary into a more traditional chapter-length book. The humani-
tarian literature is extensive, with a plethora of analyses that aim to unravel, 
criticize, define, and rethink humanitarianism. What is missing, however, is a 
more intuitive toolkit for practitioners, students, and researchers, a compre-
hensive dictionary that can be an entry point into the complex arena of hu-
manitarianism. This dictionary maps contemporary humanitarianism and it 
also explores its potential future articulations. It clearly shows the difficulty in 
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trying to delimit the humanitarian field and create rigid conceptual and practi-
cal boundaries between what is and what is not related to humanitarianism.
By balancing actual humanitarian trends with their legacy, the dictionary 
spans the history of humanitarianism and its ongoing reconfiguration. It serves 
a broad readership by providing informed access to the extensive humanitari-
an vocabulary. The list of contributors includes experts and scholars spread 
across continents and disciplines (anthropology, sociology, geography, politi-
cal science, law, international relations, history, and philosophy). Such an in-
terdisciplinary and intersectoral scope mirrors the relevance of humanitarian-
ism today, which brings humanitarian keywords to the forefront of national 
and international politics, academic debates, and grassroots movement initia-
tives, as well as formal and informal networks of volunteers and activists.
Certainly, the list of keywords included in the dictionary is temporary, or, 
perhaps more accurately, arbitrary. Some readers might be surprised by the 
inclusion of certain entries, while others may wonder why some are absent. 
The selection process followed a participatory approach: after the initial selec-
tion of approximately 60 entries by the editor, contributors were invited to sug-
gest additional keywords in an open conversation about conceptual limits, 
challenges, and links. As the list of contributors and keywords continued to 
expand, some entries were redefined, others merged, and some were entirely 
rethought. A clear, delimiting factor—which of course influenced the whole 
editorial project—is that humanitarianism’s English vocabulary has been used 
as the lingua franca. While this is consistent with the fact that English is the 
dominant language of humanitarianism globally, a future project on vernacu-
lar humanitarian vocabularies would greatly enrich the literature.
Building on their own expertise, discipline, and professional background, 
each contributor decided to prioritize some specific aspects or understanding 
of keywords/entries. The various angles adopted by individual contributors re-
flect the diverse spectrum of knowledge traditions and practices that converge 
in the humanitarian field. The tension between technical and critical readings 
of keywords is retained in order to express the intrinsic difficulty of merging 
them in humanitarian practice. The variety of the dictionary confirms that hu-
manitarianism remains an elusive term, and yet it impacts different spheres of 
life and the collective imagination.
Overall, the interdependence of keywords creates a conceptual framework 
that provides meaning to the multiple aspects of humanitarianism; and the 
dictionary offers various exploratory paths. For instance, readers interested 
in the field of medical humanitarianism will find several connections among 
entries such as “Global health,” “Medical neutrality,” “Vulnerability,” “Epidem-
ic,” “Quarantine,” “Mental health,” and “Trauma.” Similarly, “Displacement,” 
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“Camp,” “Refugee,” “Borders,” “Migration,” “Shelter,” and “Livelihoods” provide 
instances of continuity and cross-reference, and so do “Humanitarian war,” “Re-
sponsibility to protect,” “Postwar reconstruction,” and “Humanitarian soldier.” 
At the same time, keywords will allow readers to follow less explored paths as 
they consider new connections between different concepts and practices.
A dictionary that condenses the broad articulation of humanitarianism is 
open to several uses. A reader interested in “Human rights,” for example, may 
find it useful to have, in a single book, the chance to read about concepts such 
as “Utopia,” “Universality,” “Human dignity,” “Transitional justice,” and “Moral 
responsibility.” Readers who want to explore the professional realm of humani-
tarianism will rely on the intersection of entries such as “Expatriates,” “Advo-
cacy,” “Training,” “Evaluation,” “Professionalization,” “Safeguarding,” “Account-
ability,” and “Risk assessment.”
Clearly, some entries relate more directly to academic debates, while others 
have a policy-oriented and pragmatic value. However, it is hoped that each 
entry will be informative and will also provide critical food for thought. As a re-
sult, the dictionary is like a road junction that has multiple possible directions: 
traveling along some of these routes will consolidate readers’ knowledge, while 
taking others will bring them to new understandings of humanitarianism.
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Accountability
The word “accountability” shares its etymological roots with “accounting”: the 
Latin word accomptare means “to account”; in turn this derives from com-
putare, “to calculate,” and putare, “to reckon.” Various dictionaries now define 
accountability as a fact, condition, quality, or state of being accountable and/
or responsible, especially meaning an obligation or willingness to accept re-
sponsibility and to be liable to be called to account.
In humanitarian settings, the notion of accountability can have different 
interpretations. Generally, it is used to describe functioning and transparent 
relations between people and institutions involved in a humanitarian action, 
including governments, international and national organizations, civil society 
organizations, and private companies. The term underlines the responsible 
use of power in an unbalanced setting where humanitarian actors have signifi-
cant power over populations affected by crisis and emergency. In such con-
texts, accountability is seen as a key element through which affected popula-
tions can fully benefit from humanitarian response and relief operations 
(Roberts 2018).
Accountability can include both top-down and bottom-up approaches. In 
addition to organizations’ accountability towards donors, upward accountabil-
ity mechanisms are gaining attention thanks to the surge in locally contextual-
ized ownership and the community focus of development processes and aid, 
and through the overall rights-based approach to relief projects (Van Zyl and 
Claeyé 2018; Murtaza 2012; O’Leary 2017). In such a realm, accountability can 
be seen as a moral imperative ensuring the sustainability of humanitarian 
interventions.
Accountability has gained larger attention in humanitarian actions since 
the 1990s, with the expansion of humanitarian aid mechanisms and after 
shortcomings in response to high-profile emergencies, including the Rwandan 
genocide in 1994 and the 2004 tsunami in Asia (Rose, O’Keefe, Jayawickrama, 
and O’Brien 2013; Chynoweth, Zwi, and Whelan 2018). Yet accountability is not 
a new concept in humanitarianism, and historically can be seen as having cor-
relations with wartime welfare provisions, particularly in the humanitarian ac-
tions undertaken by the United States and United Kingdom. For example, in 
aiming to maintain relief agencies’ efficiency during World War ii, the Govern-
ment of the United States sought regulation of their fundraising (Dijkzeul and 
Sandvik 2019).
Accountability is embodied through various frameworks, agreements, per-
formance assessments, audits, codes of conduct, standards, and reports, such 
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as the Core Humanitarian Standard (chs) on Quality and Accountability (chs 
Alliance, Group urd, and Sphere Project 2014) and yearly Humanitarian 
 Accountability Reports (chs Alliance 2018, latest edition at the time of writ-
ing). Such documentation facilitates monitoring, evaluation, and standardiza-
tion of accountability, reinforcing transparency through which institutions 
showcase compliance or non-compliance to previously set standards for hu-
manitarian action.
Criticisms of accountability include the usage of short-term solutions and 
functionality at the cost of long-term strategic processes that support sustain-
able social and political changes (Ebrahim 2003). The division between locally 
owned and non-locally owned intervening organizations raises a further ques-
tion about the consistency of accountability mechanisms (Van Zyl and Claeyé 
2018). Using numbers (quantifying) to describe social phenomena in order to 
support accountability efforts can also oversimplify, homogenize, and neglect 
the surrounding social structures, so this approach has to be complemented by 
qualitative analysis of the social setting (Merry 2016).
Salla Turunen
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Advocacy
Advocacy refers to the act of advocating for something, often on behalf of 
someone. It derives from the Latin advocatus, meaning “to plead in favor of.” 
The Old French term avocat refers to a “barrister, advocate, spokesman” (On-
line Etymology Dictionary), yet the term has evolved to become a common 
term not just in the context of courts of justice, but also more broadly to desig-
nate the activities of groups or individuals who advocate for societal change. In 
the wake of European colonization and overseas work of evangelization, and 
as a precursor to modern forms of human rights or humanitarian advocacy, 
religious organizations were the first to engage in “long-distance advocacy”—
the advent of the anti-slavery movement is the best-known example (Stamatov 
2013).
Today, humanitarian organizations engage in advocacy campaigns to raise 
awareness about ongoing crises and urgent needs and to ensure funding for 
their activities. Humanitarian advocacy is both about raising public awareness 
of emerging crises and to increase funding, but can also be about advocating 
for certain types of responses. As the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs puts it, “advocacy means communicating the 
right messages to the right people at the right time” (ocha). Yet here lies part 
of the dilemma around humanitarian advocacy, as more vocal and critical 
messages about ongoing crises, responsibilities, and appropriate responses 
may also compromise the organization’s access to their assistance targets. 
While some non-governmental organizations (ngos) are more vocal and out-
spoken about appropriate responses, other ngos carefully balance their public 
communication to safeguard their access to the crisis-affected area.
More broadly, this relates to what is often seen as a division of labor be-
tween human rights organizations and humanitarian organizations: the first 
focus their efforts on raising awareness around violations and injustice, while 
humanitarian actors focus on the provision of basic aid and maintaining or 
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obtaining humanitarian access through a strict respect of the principle of neu-
trality. More specifically, this also relates to an assumption that humanitarian 
action is seen as something distinct from social movements, although this as-
sumption can be questioned.
For Médecins Sans Frontières (msf), advocacy is about bearing witness, 
which is the core foundation of its existence: the organization was set up in 
reaction to the position of discretion established by the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross (icrc) in the face of what had been witnessed during the 
war in Biafra (1967–70). More specifically, “neutrality” for msf means being 
non-partisan, but should not prevent its members from testifying what they 
have seen (hpg 2007). These two positions, of msf and the icrc, are still il-
lustrative of the balancing act operated by many humanitarian organizations 
involved in providing aid in conflict-affected regions.
The question of humanitarian neutrality and the need for advocacy became 
particularly charged at the height of the international response to the Darfur 
conflict (2004–09), and crystallized around the accusations of genocide com-
mitted by the government in Khartoum against the non-Arab population in 
the western province of Sudan. The question of providing humanitarian relief 
to the population in Darfur also quickly became a question of how to protect 
civilians and take measures to address the conflict (hpg 2007). There was al-
ready a division of labor between the most vocal activists who were carrying 
the advocacy campaign to bring President Omar al-Bashir to the International 
Criminal Court (icc), usually from Western capitals, and the humanitarian or-
ganizations with operations in Darfur (Jumbert 2015). Yet after the icc indict-
ment against the President in March 2009, several humanitarian organizations 
were expelled from Darfur on the grounds of having collaborated with UN 
investigators.
The idea that there is a clear distinction between humanitarian action and 
more engaged activist advocacy may lead to the overseeing of important initia-
tives that do not fall under the traditional understanding of humanitarian ac-
tors as large international ngos with headquarters in the Global North and 
mainly operating in the Global South. Local ngos in crisis-affected regions 
may often provide humanitarian relief and basic services, while also filling a 
role of advocating for societal change. Religious charities are another example 
of organizations that provide humanitarian relief in a broader value-based and 
religious framework. New volunteer initiatives to support refugees in Europe, 
in the wake of the refugee reception crisis in Europe in 2015, also often contain 
strong elements of advocacy to improve reception conditions for these refu-




apolitical and merely as providing basic aid are nevertheless often seen as tak-
ing a political stance through these acts.
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Anti-slavery
The organized fight against slavery is arguably the pioneering form of humani-
tarianism aimed at alleviating the suffering of distant strangers—those not 
considered members of one’s own local/national community or religion, yet 
imagined as part of a common humanity (Barnett 2011; Blackburn 1988). Before 
the 18th century, individual activists argued against specific types or circum-
stances of slavery or even, rarely, against slavery as such. However, the move-
ment that arose in 18th-century England aiming to destroy the slavery of dis-
tant people appears to be the first formal collective endeavor, building on the 
recent invention of the voluntary association and the expansion of the public 
sphere. Its motives and methods presaged much of what would follow as hu-
manitarianism grew, and its long-term effectiveness was demonstrated first in 
the country-by-country outlawing of the Atlantic slave trade, then by the end 
of legal colonial slavery, and eventually by the abolition of legal slavery by ev-
ery independent country in the world. Yet its work is unfinished, because the 
end of legal slavery did not extinguish the demand for coerced labor, which the 
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anti-slavery movement continues to fight today (Miers 2003; Anti-Slavery In-
ternational 2019).
In aims and methods, the anti-slavery movement is the archetype of what 
Michael Barnett (2011) has called “alchemical” humanitarianism, aspiring to 
remove the fundamental cause of suffering, although minor offshoots of the 
movement did deliver relief in the form of food, supplies, and/or services to 
the recently freed or unjustly enslaved. In pursuit of fundamental change in 
laws and enforcement, anti-slavery organizations conducted research, rallied 
public support, and lobbied governments, relying on the force of their argu-
ments augmented by public opinion to sway those in the political sphere.
From the beginning of the movement, the controversies besetting anti- 
slavery were those that have also attended other humanitarian groups. Critics 
have argued that activists’ energies would be better expended on helping those 
who suffered locally or nationally, have questioned the truthfulness of the 
movement’s pleas for public support, and posited that activists’ motivations 
were selfish, such as the desire for moral superiority, ego satisfaction, ca-
reerism, enrichment, or power. Like all humanitarians, the activists believed 
that their work would help the targets of their work lead better lives, but many 
questioned this premise by predicting or showing how many would be worse 
off. Some articulated the more general concern that humanitarians were in 
some way the dupes of the powerful or the unknowing agents of an exploit-
ative system. Regarding anti-slavery, these concerns found their most influen-
tial proponent when Eric Williams (1944) postulated that the anti-slavery ac-
tivists, no matter how well intentioned, were carrying out the task required by 
burgeoning industrial capitalism as it destroyed older forms of labor to make 
way for the freely contracted labor of an exploited proletariat. Although Sey-
mour Drescher (1986, 2009) and others undermined the particulars of this ar-
gument, humanitarianism’s origins in modern capitalist societies and its pres-
ence as a part of a globalized capitalist order has suggested to some that 
anti-slavery, like humanitarianism in general, is not only a feature of the mod-
ern world but also serves the system’s needs by ameliorating its worst effects, 
distracting participants from pervasive exploitation or justifying its operation.
The original targets of anti-slavery groups were the slave systems of their 
own countries, remedying the wrongs of which their countries were guilty. 
Once their own legal slave systems were dismantled, the universality of their 
principles refocused their fight on other sovereign states, a pattern only ampli-
fied as colonial possessions achieved independence. This led to charges of 
 paternalism and neocolonialism, particularly as the end of legal slavery meant 




 exploitation. The anti-slavery movement has tried to deal with these concerns 
by forming partnerships with groups in other countries.
International anti-slavery organizations, like humanitarian groups general-
ly, have multiplied over time, from a handful of organizations in the early 
19th century to at least 189 of the 1041 anti-slavery groups listed by End Slavery 
Now (www.endslaverynow.org); the remaining 852 groups focus on slavery 
within their own countries, though many receive international funding. A re-
definition of their activities from ameliorative to rights-oriented also parallels 
changes in humanitarianism generally over the past few decades.
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Atrocity
Dictionary definitions of the word “atrocity” point to acts of extreme cruelty, 
brutal actions typically involving violence or bodily injury, shockingly bad and 
ferocious deeds. Mass cruelty and acts aiming to destroy a particular group 
of people have arguably been a part of human behavior since ancient time. 
Atrocities and mass-scale ethnic enmity were also present in the medieval 
world, and are extensively described in religious texts, including the Bible. 
World history has often been propelled forward by instances of carnage, when 
the destruction of people on a mass scale has been sought (Kiernan 2007). 
However, the language of atrocity only entered the public discourse in the En-
lightenment era when an intensified fascination with suffering  prompted a 
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surge in “humanitarian” thinking and action. At the time, the modern dis-
course of human rights was not yet familiar, but the language of atrocity char-
acterized discussions on violations of the human body during war and colonial 
violence as well as on the suffering of famines and slavery (Twomey 2012; Sli-
winski 2011).
Modern politics and advanced technology intensified mass atrocities. In 
the 21st century, the human community has come to acknowledge, name, 
and seek to prevent and prosecute atrocity crimes. In humanitarian contexts, 
starting from the mid-20th century, atrocity—mass atrocity or mass atrocity 
crimes—has come to indicate political violence that violates international hu-
man rights, humanitarian laws, and conventions aiming to protect people from 
heinous acts of violence. Therefore, the concept of atrocity is today referred to 
as crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. Atroc-
ities are seen as acts of extreme mass violence, brutal instances that shock 
the public conscience are condemned by the international community, and 
are seen to constitute a moral obligation to prevent, intervene, and to protect 
the victims and punish the perpetrators (Kiernan 2007; Brudholm 2018).
The contemporary legal conventions and laws on mass atrocity are prod-
ucts of contemporary history, responses to the bloody events of two world 
wars. In the aftermath of World War ii, and as a response to the atrocities 
of the Holocaust, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide was signed (UN 1948). In the document, genocide 
is defined as “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” The convention defines and 
condemns genocide as a mass atrocity. It was followed by the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols (icrc 2014), which describe 
and condemn war crimes and seek to protect soldiers, military personnel, 
and civilians during wartime and occupation. The legal term “crimes against 
humanity” was developed during the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals 
(1945). Crimes against humanity are “acts that are deliberately committed as 
a part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian or an 
identifiable part of a civilian population” (icc 1998, Article 7). The concept 
of ethnic cleaning—a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious 
group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population 
of another ethnic group from certain geographic areas—was defined in the 
final report (1994) by a United Nations commission of experts looking into 
the violations of international humanitarian law during the wars in the for-
mer Yugoslavia (UN 1994).
In most of the Cold War cases, mass atrocity was condemned by the interna-
tional community, but the prevention of atrocities was often hindered by the 
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norms of non-interference. The end of the Cold War, and the massacres in 
Rwanda and in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, prompted a renewed concern to 
protect human beings against mass violence (Bellamy 2012).
Although the prevention of mass atrocity is currently a major concern of 
international politics and humanitarianism, atrocity crimes continue to be 
perpetrated by state and non-state actors. Furthermore, what is recognized as 
an atrocity, and politically treated as such, still remains ambivalent. In addi-
tion to global power politics and political co-option, acknowledgement of 
atrocity is also dependent on attention, mediation, and visibility, and some 
incidents of mass violence garner more concern than others. Visibility and vi-
sual proof have been pivotal in the recognition and confirmation of atrocious 
events, as some events are seen as more atrocious than others (Sliwinski 2011). 
Given the dominant role of visual evidence, when there is no visual testimony, 
no picture of an atrocity, it becomes more difficult to recognize the occurrence 
and extent of atrocities (Sontag 2003).
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When digital data sets are too large, too complex, or are generated too fast to 
process by humans or ordinary software, they are called Big Data. Such data 
sets may be polluted by significant amounts of noise, contain false informa-
tion, or inflict ethical or privacy issues. If the processing capacity needed to 
extract meaningful and actionable information from the material is in place, 
Big Data offers great potential for humanitarian practices (Burns 2014; Whip-
key and Verity 2015). Big Data may reveal insights that would previously have 
been expensive or difficult to obtain. The data may be collected or extracted 
with the aim of mapping people’s movement, estimating populations, identify-
ing urgent needs in disasters, or predicting the spread of diseases.
Crowdsourced Big Data is sometimes disputed owing to the problem of rep-
resentativeness. When information is retrieved from mobile phone messages 
or social media posts after a major disaster, there logically tends to be a bias in 
the data sets, which misses disconnected, illiterate, or remote affected popula-
tions. Crowdsourcing of Big Data is today seen as a supplement to other sourc-
es of information. In the immediate aftermath of major disasters, social media 
and microblogs are flooded with information. Speed is therefore often seen as 
the most obvious advantage of crowdsourcing such data. Responding organi-
zations are normally aware of the differences in coverage received when soci-
eties with varying access to communication tools are involved.
Various data attributes are highlighted here: volume, variety, velocity, verac-
ity, and value are keywords commonly used to discuss characteristics of Big 
Data (Castillo 2016; Prasad, Zakaria, and Altay 2018).
Large volumes of data lead to challenges in retrieving, storing, indexing or 
searching the data. Several strategies exist to address these challenges, includ-
ing crowdsourcing or distributed computing, and Machine Learning tech-
niques. The task may be to categorize or geolocate text-based messages posted 
during disasters. It may be to identify tracks, camps, dwellings or disaster af-
fected areas from satellite images. Crowdsourcing has been used to analyze big 
data sets for health or education programs, during refugee crises or after major 
disasters.
Machine Learning may be trained to select data with specific characteristics 
that are relevant for the purpose of the search. The clustering may also be 
 unsupervised, applied when the desired outcome is clustering of similar data. 
There is increased interest in the field of Machine Learning algorithms trained to 
identify features in aerial imagery. The aim is to support situational awareness, 
damage assessments and decision-making from a distance. Machine Learning 
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is used to identify flooding, damage to buildings or infrastructure, camps, and 
dwellings from satellite imagery, drone images, or aerial imagery.
The variety of data in Big Data sets harvested from sources such as social 
media or satellite imagery poses challenges for categorization of the data. Un-
structured messages may contain information relevant for multiple humani-
tarian clusters frequently used to organize the response. A message may also 
warn about dangers, or spread rumors or false news, but even this information 
could be of value to decision-makers.
Velocity is sometimes a major feature of Big Data. Messages posted on social 
media immediately after a sudden onset disaster can contain vital information 
for situational awareness. Harvesting relevant pieces from fast approaching in-
formation streams can be handled by live processing and filtering. In some 
situations, the benefits of immediacy will be favored over accuracy, which is a 
challenge in live processing. Batch processing is a common technique to “slow 
down” the analysis of fast approaching data, giving the time to identify valu-
able bits of information, thereby increasing accuracy and deleting irrelevant or 
false information.
Several approaches exist to address the veracity of information. Verification 
may be achieved through various methods, some of them with their origins in 
journalism. Identifying the author of the information, the location from where 
it was sent, and the content itself is a common approach. Images can be back-
traced to identify whether they have been previously published. Stories can be 
checked by trusted onsite agents, or one may rely on a particular source trusted 
owing to its reputation or official status. In microtask processing, such as the 
classification of messages or defining the content of imagery, a common prac-
tice is to demand that multiple contributors arrive at the same conclusion be-
fore a classification is accepted as true.
The value aspects of Big Data cover both the compilation and the use of au-
tomatically generated information, such as mobile phone locations or call 
data. Such data is sometimes used in innovative time- and resource-saving pro-
cesses, with ethical decisions being made that may be disputed. During the 
2014 Ebola pandemic, pressure was put on telecom providers to release call 
detail records (cdrs). The aim was to try and predict the spread of the disease 
and even to support the tedious process of contact tracing. According to Sean 
McDonald (2016), cdrs were released to international donors from Guinea and 
Sierra Leone, while Liberia resisted all attempts to release such sensitive data.
The United Nations Centre for Humanitarian Data in The Hague has be-
come a hub for humanitarian data, where organizations are encouraged both 
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Borders
Humanitarian action has a fundamental cosmopolitan essence. From the 
abolitionist movements against slavery in the 18th and 19th centuries, to 
transnational aid and interventions in contexts of conflict and disasters, hu-
manitarianism has always dealt with borders. Since its inception, Western 
humanitarianism has not only transcended national borders but also directly 
challenged them through the concept of universal humanity. The human, as 
a formative category, was considered beyond any racial or national boundar-
ies (Calhoun 2008). The creation of Médecins Sans Frontières is an example 
of a humanitarian organization that directly refutes borders and challenges 
national sovereign power (Redfield 2013).
More recently, the term “humanitarian borders” was introduced by William 
Walters (2011) to depict the reinscription of the border as a space of humanitar-
ian government. The humanitarian border is defined as “a complex assemblage, 
comprising particular forms of humanitarian reason” (Walters 2011: 142) and is 
dedicated to the processes of governing borders and populations on the move. 
It includes a disparate array of governmental, non-governmental and supra-
governmental actors, such as national police forces and coastguards, the Unit-
ed Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization 
for Migration, international and local humanitarian organizations, and diverse 
technologies of monitoring and control. According to Walters, the humanitar-
ian border is a recent development that is closely related to the  securitization 
and advanced migration control that prevails in the contemporary world. 
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The academic discussion on it cuts across disciplines such as anthropology, ge-
ography, and migration and border studies, among others.
Humanitarian practitioners themselves can be described as mobile cosmo-
politans who travel across borders to provide assistance in humanitarian cri-
ses. However, such activity does not eradicate borders, but is in fact grounded 
on historically inscribed hierarchies of mobility and their underlying imperial 
logics, which determine freedom of mobility for some groups and restrictions 
for others. Humanitarianism itself delves into processes of reterritorialization 
through the demarcation of specific territories as “humanitarian zones.” Hu-
manitarian government, therefore, performs sovereign power in contexts of 
“emergency,” and redefines borders as zones affected by humanitarian crisis 
(De Lauri 2019).
Nowadays, border areas globally are increasingly humanitarianized, as the 
proliferation of border control and the emergence of humanitarian hubs illus-
trate. The increased securitization of borders and the emergence of a complex 
surveillance apparatus are key elements of contemporary repressive and re-
strictive migration regimes (Fassin 2011). The humanitarian border emphasizes 
precisely the nexus between humanitarianism and securitization, protection 
and surveillance, care and control. The humanitarianization of the borders il-
lustrates that the violence of sovereign borders coexists with the governing 
logics of humanitarianism. The case of the European reception migration/ref-
ugee “crisis” is an example of how the crisis frame has become the ground for 
even more restrictive and punitive border practices, exemplified in the “hotspot 
approach,” introduced by the European Union (eu) in 2015 to address “excep-
tional migratory flows” (European Commission 2015) and the expansion of 
processing and registration centers on the borders of the eu and its neighbor-
ing countries. The crisis has thus been a critical point both for the harshening 
of the eu migration and border regimes and the humanitarianization of the 
European borders. Another example is United States President Donald Trump’s 
mobilization of humanitarian categories to legitimize his politics of bordering 
along the United States–Mexico border (Dunn 2019).
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Camp
The camp is a technology of care and control that has been historically used in 
connection with a variety of forms of confinement, examples being concentra-
tion camps for soldiers and other prisoners and quarantine camps to prevent 
the spread of disease or pests. More recently, camps have become the critical 
device in the management of modern humanitarian crises, “temporary” solu-
tions to accommodate either refugees or internally displaced persons (idps). 
Some scholars emphasize the historical transition at the end of World War ii, 
when “certain key techniques for managing mass displacements of people first 
became standardized and then globalized” (Malkki 1995: 497). Of the approxi-
mately 70 million individuals forcibly displaced worldwide, around 2.6 million 
people live in official camps (unhcr 2019). Camps are set up as the most suit-
able solution for the management of the displaced, especially those who can-
not find alternative accommodation elsewhere. Even though host states and 
the large network of humanitarian organizations involved in the management 
of camps often have different and even contradictory mandates, organization-
al cultures, and interests, all seem to converge on the idea that  disenfranchised 
people are best managed and controlled in camps. As such, two major prem-
ises seem to underlie their functioning and determine the objectives of this 
spatial regime: (1) displaced populations are a transitory phenomenon of crisis 
and disorder and are thus only temporarily relevant, and (2) human nature is 
best served in a sedentary setting.
© Luigi Achilli, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004431140_008
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
15Camp
<UN>
The discourse on (refugee) camps has traditionally cast the camps as spaces 
of exception where people are settled, controlled, disciplined, and visualized 
through humanitarian categories and programs. As Liisa Malkki states: “the 
segregation of political affiliations and identities, medical and hygienic pro-
grams and quarantining, ‘perpetual screening’ and the accumulation of docu-
mentation on the inhabitants of the camps, the control of movement and 
black-marketing, law enforcement and public discipline, and schooling and 
rehabilitation were some of the operations that the spatial concentration and 
ordering of people enabled or facilitated” (Malkki 1995: 498). Critical scholar-
ship insists that the humanitarian system has extended a double-edged privi-
lege in the camp: it has kept the destitute alive, educated most, and given jobs 
to some, but it has also created definitions and categorizations—such as “reg-
istered” and “non-registered”—that have minimized displaced numbers and 
ignored all those outside these definitions (Harrell-Bond 1999). Studies have 
highlighted how, through the imposition of specific forms of hierarchical orga-
nization, humanitarian agencies coordinate the life of populations living in 
camps around a rational planning of daily life, but often in contempt of former 
social realities and historical contest.
Even though they are conceived as short-term solutions, camps have the 
tendency to become permanent and can undergo a process of urbanization 
and infrastructure development (Agier 2002). Houses of several stories replace 
tents and shelters, and new roads are often established through the camps or 
around the perimeter. Scholars have explored the practices of everyday life and 
spatial forms of resistance through which camp dwellers reappropriate the 
space of the camp. Studies have documented how humanitarian camps, for 
their inhabitants, cease to be associated exclusively with negative images—
helpless people, passive victims, raw humanity, and so on—and become pri-
mary references upon which they reconstruct their identity, their sense of his-
tory, their social, cultural, and political views. A body of ethnography on 
Palestinian studies, for example, shows how—60 years after their settlement 
in the first camps—Palestinian refugees have gone beyond bureaucratic and 
humanitarian labels and have rewritten the camp’s space, reproducing the Pal-
estinian culture and land inside the administrative and physical camp bound-
aries (Achilli 2015; Bisharat 1994).
However, camps are not only established by governments or international 
organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu-
gees in the Near East. At times, activists, volunteers, non-governmental organi-
zations, and displaced groups themselves have developed unofficial camps to 
provide shelter and facilitate service provision, and also as hubs for political 
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activism and militancy as alternatives to overcrowded camps, or simply be-
cause official camps do not exist. A case in point was the unofficial refugee 
camp of Calais, overlooking the Strait of Dover in the northeast of France, 
which in 2016 reached an approximate population of 10,000 people—mostly 
asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Sudan, the Middle East, and the Horn of 
 Africa. The settlement, dubbed “the Jungle,” was established by volunteers and 
grassroots organizations in response to the lack of institutional support, but 
soon became a space where activists, migrants, and volunteers could exert 
pressure on the United Kingdom’s border policies and denounce French police 
brutality (Agier 2018; Sandri 2018).
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Capacity Development
“Capacity” is understood as the ability of people, organizations, and society 
to  successfully manage their affairs. “Capacity development” is the process 
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whereby these actors as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt, and 
 maintain capacity over time. “Promotion of capacity development” refers to 
what outside partners—domestic or foreign—can do to support, facilitate, or 
catalyze capacity development and related change processes.
Capacity development thus involves much more than enhancing the knowl-
edge and skills of individuals. It depends crucially on the quality of the organi-
zations in which they work. In turn, the operations of particular organizations 
are influenced by the enabling environment—the structures of power and in-
fluence and the institutions—in which they are embedded. Capacity is not 
only about skills and procedures, it is also about incentives and governance. 
Capacity building is thus not just a neutral and technical issue, it is also a high-
ly sensitive political issue.
Country capacity is the key to development performance, and therefore also 
to efforts to accelerate economic growth, reduce poverty, and achieve the Sus-
tainable Development Goals. This applies to both generic capacities (e.g. the 
ability to plan and manage organizational changes and service improvements) 
and specific capacities in critical fields (e.g. managing response to a humani-
tarian crisis) (oecd 2006).
Capacity development is a major challenge for humanitarian actors. In re-
views of aid effectiveness, the development of capacity is invariably recog-
nized as one of the most critical issues for both donors and recipients in coun-
tries of intervention.
In May 2016, the World Humanitarian Summit emphasized the importance 
of a localized response to humanitarian crisis—although the concept of “lo-
cal” was poorly elaborated (Apthorpe and Borton 2019). Despite the clear im-
portance of local actors and the growing role of “grassroots humanitarians,” the 
international humanitarian system was built by and for international actors, 
multilateral organizations and international non-governmental organizations 
(ngos). The complexity of modern crises called for a review of this approach. 
National governmental disaster management agencies and other relevant min-
istries, local humanitarian responders, ngos, and Red Cross or Red Crescent 
societies are now seen as key pillars of an overall humanitarian response. 
This has led to a renewed emphasis on direct support to local humanitarian 
actors—financial and in strengthening institutional capacities (icva 2015; 
oecd 2017).
Humanitarian aid was largely exempted from the principles of aid effective-
ness that were developed after the adoption of the United Nations Millennium 
Goals and culminated with the 2005 Paris Agenda for Aid Effectiveness. A cen-
tral pillar of this agenda was to empower and strengthen local institutions and 
to channel funding directly to them. The 2016 Humanitarian Summit was an 
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effort to address some of these issues. However, progress since then has been 
modest, especially in relation to “localized response.” There is still insufficient 
focus on empowering local communities and local organizations and on pro-
viding capacity-building support. An early study—Eroding Local Capacity—
examined the interplay between international and local actors operating in 
the humanitarian arena in Africa (Juma and Suhrke 2002). This study noted 
that although all sides emphasize the need to build local capacity for humani-
tarian action, the results are not substantial. Even long-term, semi-permanent 
emergencies have generated little local capacity to assist and protect the vic-
tims of violence, displacement, and related deprivations. In some cases, what-
ever local capacity did exist has been overwhelmed by the international aid 
presence (Bank, Hulme, and Edwards 2015). Multiscale capacity-building proj-
ects in humanitarian logistics and access to technology (Breman, Giacumo, 
and Griffith-Boyes 2019) are further key challenges for national and interna-
tional humanitarian organizations and donors.
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Care is central to the humanitarian endeavor. The International Committee of 
the Red Cross emerged in response to the absence of professional care for 
wounded soldiers after the battle of Solferino in 1859. While the provision of 
health care in emergencies remains central to the humanitarian enterprise 
(Feldman 2017), the notion of what humanitarian care is and who can legiti-
mately provide it has broadened. Humanitarian care now includes a complex 
array of protection of civilian populations, including food aid, shelter, educa-
tion and vocational training, protection from sexual exploitation and abuse, 
legal aid, and, increasingly, humanitarian workers’ “self-care” and wellness.
As ideal humanitarian practice, care builds on the imperatives to do no 
harm and to assist according to need in a humane, impartial, and neutral man-
ner. Faith-based humanitarian organizations straddle these principled ap-
proaches to care and the specific religious duties and obligations of Islam, 
evangelical Christianity, and Judaism, for example. Rights-based humanitarian 
organizations seek to base their provision of care on social justice and human 
rights principles. At the same time, contemporary ideas of humanitarian care 
are deeply intertwined with the historic legacies of Western colonialism and 
the civilizing and paternalistic impetus of the military, missionary, and com-
mercial arms of the colonial regimes deployed to provide various forms of care 
(Barnett 2011). Further, they are influenced by the domestic trajectories of poor 
management and culturally rooted conceptualizations of how individuals are 
deemed deserving or undeserving of care (Piven and Cloward 2012).
Critical scholarly contributions focus on humanitarianism as contested re-
gimes of care and its nexus with control, in particular the linkage between 
care, migration management (Ticktin 2011) and the enforcement of borders 
(Williams 2015). Recently, the turn to resilience and remote management has 
produced yet another version of “humanitarian care” with aid and protection 
tailored to help populations in crisis care for themselves (Duffield 2016). An 
important part of this is the deployment of surveillance and tracking technolo-
gies to measure, map, and quantify movements, social interactions, and con-
sumption, such as drones or wearables. This trend towards “technologizing 
care” and the digitization and datafication of care practices in the humanitar-
ian cyberspace (Sandvik 2016) engenders important reconceptualizations of 
the meaning of care, as well as new regimes of care and intervention, such as 
care for the “digital body.”
© Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004431140_010




While the understanding of care needs and practices as gendered, racial-
ized, and stratified are well integrated into humanitarian programming, 
 important blind spots remain, an example being how the term “vulnerability” 
is mostly associated with women at the cost of making men’s suffering and 
care needs invisible (Sandvik 2018).
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Celebrities
Stories of the suffering of global others are today regularly mediated by ce-
lebrities. Entertainment stars, film, rock, tv celebrities, and philanthropic 
billionaires feature in non-governmental organization (ngo) advertisements 
with the aim of raising awareness about humanitarian issues on the news 
and in television shows and speak at international summits advocating for a 
more just world. Modern global humanitarianism is dependent on spectacles 
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that bring the suffering of distant others to the awareness of the surrounding 
world. Celebrity advocacy acts as a communicative arrangement that aims to 
bridge the gap between the global core areas of vulnerability (i.e. the crisis 
areas of the Global South) and the populations of the Global North, between 
those who suffer and those who watch from a distance (Chouliaraki 2013). 
The humanitarian global political North–South dynamic is aptly embodied 
by Western celebrities acting as the exemplar global do-gooders in the cri-
sis areas of the Global South. However, celebrity philanthropy is not solely a 
Western practice, as for example, the humanitarian endeavors of Bollywood 
stars in India (Pramod 2015) as well as  Chinese hiv/aids heroes (Hood 2015) 
exemplify.
Celebrity faces first entered the Western humanitarian imaginary in the 
1950s, when the United Nations started using glamorous stars, such as Danny 
Kaye and Audrey Hepburn, as “goodwill ambassadors” and “messengers of 
peace.” Since the 1980s, many admired, wealthy, and Western elite individuals 
have saturated the humanitarian visibility and lent a photogenic face to issues 
of transnational solidarity. Celebrities such as Angelina Jolie, Madonna, Bono, 
George Clooney, Oprah Winfrey, and Bill Gates have become the most visible 
characters speaking for the global needy and poor. Moreover, in addition to 
acting as the marketing tools of ngos, celebrities today organize spectacular 
media events, establish their own charities and humanitarian projects, and 
have made their way higher up into the circles of diplomacy and international 
political power (Yrjölä 2014; Chouliaraki 2013; Wheeler 2011).
Celebrities have certainly played a role in drawing public awareness to 
humanitarian issues and have indeed succeeded in popularizing some oth-
erwise neglected episodes in human events (Cooper 2008). Nevertheless, ce-
lebrity humanitarianism has received critique from a number of directions. 
Much research has raised concerns about the mobilizing ability, added val-
ue, and emancipatory potential of celebrity humanitarianism, and numer-
ous studies have drawn attention to the ethical problems embedded in such 
activity.
One central critique has been that celebrity humanitarianism does not chal-
lenge the root causes of the injustices and inequalities that humanitarianism 
seeks to redress in the first place. Rather, it has been argued that the celebrity 
humanitarianism of recent decades merely serves to legitimate and promote 
neoliberal capitalism and global inequality, and it is therefore quite destructive 
for the Global South (Kapoor 2012). Global politics and its ties of celebrity hu-
manitarianism together with global North–South relations in general have also 
been considered in many studies (Richey 2015). Celebrity humanitarianism 
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has been seen as consolidating stereotypical imaginaries of the global others, 
namely of Africa and its “childlike” populations, unable to help themselves 
without the assistance of wealthy, powerful, and exceptional celebrity human-
itarians. Colonial undertones are clearly evident in the celebrity humanitarian 
narrative (Yrjölä 2014). Therefore, in many ways, conventions of celebrity hu-
manitarianism encapsulate the problematics of the global humanitarian sys-
tem and its inherent hierarchical global political arrangement. Celebrity hu-
manitarianism is thus an effective lens for scrutinizing contemporary global 
politics.
Today, the endeavors of the wealthy, mostly white, and beautiful privileged 
elite individuals speaking on behalf of populations in vulnerable positions and 
living in poor conditions is perhaps more often met with cynicism, and it 
seems that many are increasingly viewing the credibility of celebrity humani-
tarianism with suspicion. The egotistical White Savior Complex (Cole 2012) 
inherent in celebrity humanitarianism, the global inequality and hierarchy di-
rectly evident in the celebrity logic, may even today, in the age of rising media 
literacy, be at risk of backfiring on the celebrity-driven campaigns and causes. 
The hypocrisy evident in the activism of influential elites who have themselves 
benefited from the globally unequal system and hierarchy poignantly reveals 
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Charity
Charity, from the Latin caritas, is the voluntary giving of help to those in need. 
Seen as the “queen of virtues,” the term carries a broad semantic meaning and 
is often understood as a practice of love that establishes a link between 
God and humans, therewith constituting a ground of unity among humankind 
( Agrimi and Crisciani 1998). Over the course of history, charity has changed 
from the acts of wealthy individuals and mission societies, to the rise and pro-
liferation of major foundations and social networks that complemented the 
role of the welfare state in the 20th century. However, small, individual givers 
still continued their “good work” and served as the backbone of religious char-
ity. After World War ii, a large range of development and humanitarian actors 
began to dominate this evolving landscape, which turned into a competitive 
marketplace. The act of charity itself is seen as a precursor of institutionalized 
and bureaucratized forms of humanitarian aid and continues to exist in mul-
tiple alternative forms of gift-giving, such as philanthropy, alms, orphanages, 
lotteries, and other types of charitable fund-raising activities. In this classical 
sense, charity is usually provided by individuals or collectives to those not re-
lated to them and implies basic supplies such as money, clothes, health care, 
shelter, and food, but also bodily substances such as blood. Furthermore, be-
nevolent activities, such as visits to prisons, giving advice, spending time with 
homeless people, and educating orphans, can be considered “charity.”
In contrast to secular forms of aid, however, the notion of charity still carries 
strongly religious connotations and refers to different, often overlapping, reli-
gious strands. Jonathan Benthall points out that non-Western forms of charity 
were disregarded until recently when historians and anthropologists began 
studying forms of gift-giving in Islam, Buddhism, or Hinduism, and “deprovin-
cialized” Western assumptions about the “universalism” of Christian chari-
ty  (Benthall 2018). Practices comparable with the Christian doctrine of 
diakonīa, the assumption that anything done for the hungry, homeless, sick, or 
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 imprisoned carries a devotion to God, can be found in several non-Western 
religious traditions, although with different connotations. In the Islamic chari-
table foundation of zakat, the rules of alms-giving to the poor is the primary 
purpose. For instance, in her ethnography on Muslim alms-giving in contem-
porary Egypt, Amira Mittermaier explores the contractual foundations of char-
ity as a kind of “trading with God,” which paradoxically promises an increase in 
wealth through donating money (Mittermaier 2013). While several works on 
Muslim forms of charity have shown how religious giving can be framed as a 
means for socio-economic redistribution and development, others underline 
the ethical transformation experienced especially among members of the 
 upper class. In her work on middle-aged volunteers in Anatolia, Hilal Alkan-
Zeybek shows that charity challenges the hierarchical order of social strata. 
When members of the educated upper class encounter “the needy” face to face 
and therefore cross the racially and class-specific bodily boundaries, they alter 
their discriminatory dispositions (Alkan-Zeybek 2012).
Slightly different but still comparable dimensions of charity are explored by 
Katherine A. Bowie in Buddhist Thailand, where both givers and recipients of 
charity may have an interest in the inequalities that are established or con-
firmed through this socio-economic practice. Merit-making, the definition of 
who may provide and who may receive charity, can simultaneously protect the 
status quo of the elite and provide relief for the beneficiaries, who may even 
execute social pressure on the upper classes (Bowie 1998). In contemporary 
New Delhi, Erica Bornstein follows the motives and perceptions of philanthro-
pists who build temples, give dān (a form of religious donation in Hinduism), 
construct orphanages, and orchestrate the reception of Hindu temples. She 
problematizes a clear-cut distinction between unofficial and ad hoc forms of 
gift-giving and the works of non-governmental organizations and other insti-
tutions, and suggests understanding charity as the relational, affectual, and 
dynamic aspect of the gift, which complements a rights-based form of social 
welfare (Bornstein 2012).
In our contemporary mediatized world society, charity media events, also 
called “charitainment,” turn distant suffering to domestic audiences. These 
mega-spectacles of staged journeys of elite heroism can function as principal 
motivators but also increase the commodification and secularization of char-
ity. From this perspective, the role of charity celebrities is conceptualized as a 
form of cultural capital of the most wealthy, which contributes to a simplified, 
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Children
Nearly 400 million children worldwide lack access to essential health care ser-
vices, 264 million do not go to school, and, as of the end of 2017, 31 million have 
been forcibly displaced through war, violence, natural disasters, and other cri-
ses (unicef 2018, 2019). The world’s leading child-focused aid agencies that 
deal with these major issues include unicef, Save the Children, Plan Interna-
tional, and Defence for Children International. A large number of big, medi-
um, or small national and local organizations also have the protection of chil-
dren as their main goal.
Images of suffering children capture the moral imperative of humanitarian 
action. Moving photos of starving babies, walking skeletons with distended 
stomachs, have become iconic since the Nigerian–Biafran war, one of the first 
televised conflicts in contemporary history. As a quintessential embodiment of 
victimhood, decontextualized images of childhood vulnerability articulate 
specific aesthetics, emotions, and politics that trigger feelings of compassion, 
mobilize donors’ solidarity, and persuade public opinion of the need for im-
mediate lifesaving actions, including those of a military nature. In popular 
imagination, saving children’s lives encapsulates the essence of humanitarian-
ism (Malkki 2015). Child-focused aid agencies operate in contexts of emergen-
cy (e.g. war, natural disaster, extreme poverty) to provide protection and care 
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services to children in a number of interlinked fields, from children’s health 
and education to child development and well-being. Displaced children, traf-
ficked children, malnourished children are special targets of humanitarian 
protection. Child soldiers, street children, and child workers, on the other 
hand, exemplify a category of victims whose “stolen childhood” is addressed 
through humanitarian programs of rehabilitation and social integration.
The modern project of saving “distant children” can be traced back to 19th-
century missionary work, British philanthropy, and the emergence of a roman-
tic conceptualization of “childhood” as a time of innocence in Europe. The first 
child rights document ever adopted by an intergovernmental organization, the 
1924 League of Nations’ Declaration of Children’s Rights, was drafted by Eglan-
tyne Jebb, a British social reformer best known as the founder of Save the Chil-
dren. The 1959 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child, subse-
quently replaced by the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (crc), 
departs from Jebb’s original text and incorporates insights from (Western) de-
velopmental psychology, dictating that “children” are persons under 18 years of 
age, demarcated from adults by a series of psychobiological characteristics 
that are universally valid (Boyden 1997). The crc marks a pivotal moment for 
humanitarian child protection as the first legally binding international treaty, 
which provides for the rights of children in several fields. However, the crc is 
deeply entangled in the civilizational trajectories of Western modernity and 
sets out a Eurocentric standard of childhood that at times contrasts with local 
cultural notions of “childhood” and children’s material conditions in contexts 
outside Europe and North America (Hart 2006). When asked about their rights, 
for example, street children in Johannesburg talk about the right to safely cross 
roads, beg, and work (Swart-Kruger and Chawla 2002); in Ethiopia, girls protest 
against non-governmental organizations (ngos) that define their rights in 
terms of autonomy and individual success, arguing that they have duties and 
moral responsibilities towards others as well (Nieuwenhuys 2001); in Thailand, 
“children” and “adults” are not locally construed as fixed age categories but as 
hierarchical concepts varying according to the interlocutor’s social status (Bo-
lotta 2017).
The predominance of psychological frameworks of child development in 
humanitarian practice can have the effect of obscuring the historical, econom-
ic, and political determinants of children’s struggles, while their “deviancy” 
from the established standard of innocence is mainly interpreted as the result 
of parental abuse and/or backward beliefs. The crc is thus in danger of har-
nessing long-standing colonial imaginaries of the North–South divide, where 
the adult/Northerner offers help to the infantilized/Southerner (Burman 2017).
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The developmental formulation of children as dependent and not yet fully 
formed humans extends the temporal horizon of humanitarianism beyond the 
space of immediate crisis, making childhood the point of convergence between 
short-term emergency responses and long-term development endeavors. Social 
scientists contend that these are cultural politics of future-making for the trans-
fer of Western social values, technologies, and professional forces (Scheper-
Hughes and Sargent 1998). As a result, child humanitarian policy has become 
the locus of fierce ideological battles over the political future of childhood: reli-
gious groups, ngos, development agencies, and nation states compete at all 
levels to define what childhood (and society’s future) is and should be.
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The concept of civil society originates in Cicero’s notion of societas civilis, itself 
a development of Aristotle’s idea of koinonia politike (political community). 
The contemporary use of the term can be directly linked to modern European 
thought and refers to a “dense network of groups, communities, networks, and 
ties that stand between the individual and the modern state” (Kenny 2007). It 
is commonly understood as the “third sector” of society, distinct from the state 
and market. According to the World Health Organization, civil society refers to 
the arena of collective action around common interests, purposes and values. 
Although its institutional forms are normally described as distinct from those 
of the state, family and market, the boundaries between state, civil society, 
family and market are always blurred and negotiated. Civil society includes 
different spaces, actors and institutional forms, “varying in their degree of for-
mality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organiza-
tions such as registered charities, development nongovernmental organiza-
tions, community groups, women’s organizations, faith-based organizations, 
professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, 
business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups” (who 2007). The Unit-
ed Nations (UN) considers partnerships with civil society crucial for advancing 
the organization’s ideals and helping to support its work (www.un.org). The 
UN view reflects a general attitude in the humanitarian sector to use the no-
tion of civil society in a vague sense and, at the same time, as a means to imple-
ment grounded interventions via local partners.
The “third sector” has grown rapidly since the 1990s. What many defined as 
the “global associational revolution” of the aid industry was linked to at least 
three main elements: a widespread crisis of the state in providing welfare and 
protection, the growth in number and scale of organized private and voluntary 
actors (also stimulated by new information and communication possibilities), 
and the impact of neoliberalism (Salamon et al. 1999). Notwithstanding this 
rapid growth and the consolidation of the idea of a “global civil society,” the 
very notion of civil society continues to bear a certain degree of ambiguity and 
remains open to questions regarding its proper definition and the different 
ways in which it has been applied in various times and places (Foley and Ed-
wards 1996). Civil society has been used, for example, to promote political and 
economic transition in former communist countries as well as to promote de-
mocracy and human rights in fragile states (Roy 2005). Critiques also empha-
size the ways in which global civil society increasingly “represents a retreat 
from universal rights and reinforces official donor government policies disci-
plining populations” (Pupavac 2005: 45).
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Civil Society – Civil–military Cooperation
Another key question is whether it makes sense to distinguish “civil” from 
“political” society. Different groups in civil society, from interest groups to reli-
gious organizations, are constantly mobilized for political goals. A rigid dis-
tinction between political and civil groups can be misleading. Therefore, the 
notion of civil society is intrinsically ambivalent as it does not make it clear 
when the “civil” becomes the “political” (Foley and Edwards 1996).
Beyond semantics, some see civil society, or global civil society, as a humani-
tarian actor itself, which is essential in order to claim a right to humanitarian 
assistance (Miglinaité 2015), while others remain skeptical about the universal-
istic nature of the term and its propensity to make the roles, capacity, and in-
tentions of different social groups, organizations, and other collectivities in-
volved in humanitarian settings less evident.
Antonio De Lauri
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Civil–military Cooperation
Since the 1990s, military operations and warfare organization have become in-
creasingly bureaucratized. This shift is associated with the changing objectives 
of and expectations from military interventions, in terms of the desired politi-
cal order, state-building, civil society formation, and so on. The new era has 
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inspired more ambitious political projects to deal with conflict situations, 
“fragile” and “rouge” states, humanitarian crises, natural disasters, or other 
threats to international peace and security. The international interventions in 
Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor in the late 1990s proved to be failures, both in 
terms of operationalizing coordination between government departments of 
the intervening nations and in their cooperation with international organiza-
tions and humanitarian agencies, in response to dire humanitarian situations 
and in order to establish control over the socio-political circumstances of con-
flicts on the ground (Macrae and Leader 2000). States, especially the US and 
the UK but also many other European states including Denmark, the Nether-
lands and Belgium, learned from the experiences in the Balkans and started 
introducing new mechanisms of coordination among ministries and govern-
ment entities for effective and prompt policy response to crises, and to impose 
effectively the desired geopolitical order during and after the crises (Gordon 
2006). The changing stance of the United Nations (UN) regarding when and 
how to get involved in military interventions, especially after the UN Transi-
tion Assistance Group (untag) was deployed in Namibia (1989), was parallel 
to that transformation at nation-state level.
The growing involvement of the UN in peace-building during conflicts 
in the 1990s reflected a new era of protracted conflicts, or a new perception 
of crisis situations as “chronic insecurity.” The “post-conflict” discourse then 
became obsolete in governing “weak” or “failed” states in the post-Cold War 
era. Still limited in Bosnia and Kosovo and redesigned for more sophistica-
tion in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), civil–military cooperation (cimic) 
has since become an integral part of humanitarian interventions that require 
intervening states’ civilian capacities to engender local consent for interven-
tion and to facilitate humanitarian operations in conflict regions (Ankersen 
2008). cimic activities have been transformed from conventional West-
ern strategies of “winning the hearts and minds” of the people of occupied 
lands to building legitimacy among local communities for occupation and 
the  implementation of highly controversial projects of reconstruction, gover-
nance, state-building, and development (Goodhand 2013). cimic is essentially a 
security-oriented notion that sees a necessity for bureaucratized and coordi-
nated operations of various groups of military and civilian actors to achieve 
the desired political order and build local consent in extremely volatile and 
hostile circumstances of insecurity (Jackson and Stuart 2007). While the na-
ture of cimic is determined by intervening nation-states’ political and military 
cultures and institutional capacities, the idea is to define the articulation and 




cimic has been endorsed by Western governments because it provides se-
curity and opens up and defends safe spaces for humanitarian operations dur-
ing and after conflicts and other crisis situations. However, cimic agendas 
have become closely integrated with the so-called stabilization, recovery, de-
velopment, and state-building programs that are highly political in their na-
ture and might have long-term priority for the intervening armies over imme-
diate humanitarian concerns. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (prts) in 
Afghanistan were the first extensive trial of the new cimic policies of inter-
vening armies (e.g. the United States (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), Nor-
way, Denmark) (Goodhand 2013; Jackson and Stuart 2007). The military- 
dominated implementation of the prt strategies contradicted cimic premises 
about the role of civilian agencies and local communities in the narrative, and 
underlying assumptions about the pacifying role of aid, reconstruction, and 
development embedded in the narrative proved to be Eurocentric and empiri-
cally groundless (Goodhand 2013).
Military personnel and their mindset have leverage over decision-making 
about and implementation of civilian and humanitarian aspects of cimic 
plans, and the civilian cimic activities might be reduced to observation and 
information extraction from local communities about actual and potential 
signs of threats to security. This is especially relevant in chronic or extreme 
insecurity situations, such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. nato and powerful national armies (e.g. those of the 
US, the UK, and Germany) have been particularly criticized for instrumental-
izing civil–military cooperation in their operations for their military interests, 
and forging an image in the public imagination that confuses war-making 




Ankersen, C. ed. (2008) Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations: Emerging 
Theory and Practice. Routledge.
Goodhand, J. (2013) Contested Boundaries: ngos and Civil-Military Relations in 
 Afghanistan. Central Asian Survey, 32(3): 287–305.
Gordon, S. (2006) Exploring the Civil-Military Interface and Its Impact on European 
Strategic and Operational Personalities: “Civilianisation” and Limiting Military 
Roles in Stabilisation Operations? European Security, 15(3): 339–361.
3�
<UN>
Civil–military Cooperation – Communication
Jackson, M., Stuart, G. (2007) Rewiring Interventions? UK Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams and Stabilization. International Peacekeeping, 14(5): 647–661.
Macrae, J., Leader, N. (2000) Shifting Sands: The Search for “Coherence” between Political 
and Humanitarian Responses to Complex Emergences. Humanitarian Policy Group 
(hpg) Report 8. Overseas Development Institute.
Communication
Communication comes from the Latin word communicare, to “make some-
thing common” or “share,” and it means to share information between people 
and transfer information from one place to another. Humanitarian communi-
cation refers to a specific form of communication (related to humanitarian 
crises, relief operations, and so on), and to communication during humanitar-
ian emergencies.
Humanitarian communication occurs when humanitarian actors, from 
non-governmental organizations (ngos) to international organizations, com-
municate (i.e. through campaigns, appeals, and stories) to create awareness 
and encourage response to humanitarian crises. It is a form of communication 
that aims to establish emotional relationships and reactions, and its purpose is 
to mobilize interest and/or action. In this sense, humanitarian communica-
tion defines a form of “proxy humanitarianism” that can mobilize the use of 
celebrities, “humanitarian ambassadors,” and so on (De Lauri 2016). Lilie 
 Chouliaraki defines humanitarian communication as “the rhetorical practices 
of transnational actors that engage with universal ethical claims, such as com-
mon humanity or global civil society, to mobilize action on human suffering” 
(Chouliaraki 2010: 108). She argues that it is a form of communication that cre-
ates and reproduces ethical and political relationships to distant others, and 
thus informs both the ways in which we witness the vulnerability of these oth-
ers and the ways in which we are invited to feel, think and act towards them 
(Chouliaraki 2006, 2010).
There are ethical dilemmas and academic analyses surrounding the field of 
humanitarian communication (Nolan and Mikami 2012), especially in relation 
to the choice of images, texts, and sound used in such communication. Com-
municators have a responsibility to ensure that all narratives reflect and pro-
tect the dignity of those portrayed.
Humanitarian communication also refers to systems or ways of sharing in-
formation and collaboration and interaction during emergencies. Information 
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communication technologies (icts) and mobile phones have become defining 
components of 21st-century humanitarian response operations. icts deter-
mine the ways in which people collect and share information, connect and 
interact with each other and the world, and the ways people work together 
during humanitarian emergencies. The internet and mobile connectivity have 
enabled real-time communication. Applications based on this connectivity 
have revolutionized when and how we communicate. Humanitarian organiza-
tions, agencies, and individuals within a variety of areas in the emergency do-
main are pioneering efforts, exploring strategies, and finding best practices in 
humanitarian communication. They cooperate with private corporations and 
voluntary technical organizations to access basic data and resources, and to set 
up comprehensive information infrastructures.
The ability for everybody who is connected to engage in humanitarian com-
munication during crises creates new opportunities and challenges. When a 
crisis strikes, affected communities and the diaspora tend to rapidly set up 
their own communication rooms using mobile apps or social media to ex-
change more or less qualified information.
There are no accepted definitions or requirements for how one should apply 
traditional humanitarian principles to communication to be able to call it hu-
manitarian communication.
Three criteria have been identified (Raymond, Card, al Achkar 2015) as deci-
sive and required for communication activities to be considered truly 
humanitarian:
1. Those engaging in communication are either crisis-affected populations 
or organizations, or those assisting the affected populations.
2. The communication activities uphold the four core humanitarian prin-
ciples of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.
3. The fundamental purpose of humanitarian communication activities 
must be to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain and protect hu-
man dignity during and in the aftermath of the crisis.
ict-supported humanitarian communication, like all humanitarian commu-
nication, needs guidelines to handle ethical dilemmas (Meier 2015). Our digital 
reality is allowing communication to evolve at an incredible speed, with pos-
sibilities and opportunities for more and better communication, but it also 
increases the risk for misuse of information, especially in situations of vulner-
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Corruption
There has been a dramatic increase in the volume, cost, and length of humani-
tarian assistance provision since 2007, in large part because of the protracted 
nature of crisis (ocha 2017). Humanitarian interventions are, for different rea-
sons, more prone to corruption than regular development assistance and inci-
dents of corruption more often go unreported (ti 2010). Paul Harvey (2015) 
argues that humanitarian aid agencies are reluctant to talk about corruption in 
the fear that it could undermine public support for aid in donor countries, as 
well as impact local aid relations and increase tension within societies.
Humanitarian interventions take place when there is a need to respond to 
an urgent or accumulated need for humanitarian assistance to support victims 
of conflicts and disasters and to save lives, as well as to negotiate access to and 
upholding of human rights. There are many types of interventions, ranging 
from responses to a natural disaster such as an earthquake or a flood, respond-
ing to an armed conflict that causes acute or consistent shortages of, for ex-
ample, food, water, and medicine, and engagement with warring parties of in-
fluential groups that might block delivery of aid or deny all or part of the 
population access to services. The urgency to reach groups in need of assis-
tance can lead to a larger willingness to accept a degree of corruption to get 
supplies to those in need. With large amounts of assistance shipped into 
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an  area in a short time, there are also more opportunities to siphon off 
assistance.
Corruption in humanitarian intervention occurs at all stages of the program 
cycle, from the targeting and registration process to the transport and distribu-
tion of relief aid, procurement, financial and staff management, and program 
monitoring and evaluations (U4 2009). There is a noted concern that interna-
tional agencies (and at times national ones) bring substantial resources into a 
resource-poor environment, often rapidly and with little in-depth knowledge 
of the environment. This leads to the risk of exacerbating existing endemic 
corruption and of resources being corruptly diverted (Walker and Maxwell 
2009).
The term corruption does not lend itself to one univocal definition, since it 
can refer to different causes, contexts and social dynamics (De Lauri 2013). Cor-
ruption in humanitarian assistance can take many forms. According to the U4 
Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4 2019), this extends beyond cash bribes 
and other forms of financial corruption. It can include the fraudulent diversion 
or theft of resources, the denial or granting of access to resources to serve po-
litical or military ends, extortion of affected populations, nepotism in recruit-
ment practices in aid agencies, and sexual exploitation of those (predominant-
ly women) seeking access to aid. The exact nature of corruption depends on 
the form of aid being provided, whether it is in cash or in kind and whether 
this is provision of shelter, food, health care, sanitation, longer-term infrastruc-
ture development, or all-encompassing support, such as in refugee camps.
Gender is a key dimension to understanding specific forms of corruption, 
which can then turn into sexual exploitation and abuse. In the short term, cor-
ruption compromises people’s access to basic services such as food, shelter, 
family planning, health, and education. This has long-lasting physiological, 
psychological, and social consequences, and compromises people’s opportuni-
ties for and prospects of social and economic empowerment (U4 2009).
Harvey (2015) argues that improving how corruption is tackled in humani-
tarian interventions matters because:
– corruption limits the scarce amount of aid reaching people who desperately 
need it;
– corruption is one of the main factors preventing better and more direct 
funding to humanitarian actors in developing countries;
– the perception of corruption undermines support for aid in donor 
countries.
Onsite monitoring of assistance provision deters and detects corruption, and 
that greater transparency in the information made available to local govern-




effective monitoring and genuine accountability (ti 2010). There is moreover 
some evidence that such downward accountability can empower beneficiaries 
to report corruption, if not restrained by hierarchical institutional policies, lo-
cal power structures, and cultural inhibitions.
A significant issue relates to the normative understanding of corruption 
that still predominantly characterizes international donors and anti-corrup-
tion agencies’ approaches, with a lack of grounded knowledge about the ways 
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Criminalization
Criminalization in the humanitarian space is a form of governance whereby 
national and supranational entities control and sanction humanitarian actors 
and affected populations. This includes criminalization processes, through 
which states, media, humanitarians, or citizens define particular groups and 
practices as criminal or as a crime, and the use of penal power to sanction vio-
lations of public law and harm to public welfare.
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In humanitarian discourse, the word “criminalization” is used broadly. It in-
cludes state-based penal practices and punishment imposed by courts, as well 
as civil penalties and administrative sanctions by national or supra-interna-
tional courts and regulative bodies. Administrative sanctions are disciplinary in 
nature and used when policy, procedure, or codes of conduct have been violat-
ed. Sanctions or punishments include monetary penalties, suspension or de-
motion, loss of authorization to operate, or confiscation of equipment import-
ed or used illegally. They can even involve the suspension of an employee found 
guilty of sexual misconduct, the expulsion of an international organization by 
the host country, or the confiscation of drones flown illegally in an emergency.
Socio-legal research has highlighted the blurred relationship between legal-
ity and illegality, and the co-constitutive relationship between processes of le-
galization and juridification and the rise of illegalities. This includes belief in 
“magical legalism”—the assumption that if an act or transaction is prohibited 
it either does not occur or it occurs as an anomaly (Sandvik 2011). Focus is given 
to how classifications, justifications, and enforcement practices originate, and 
through which moral and political projects they are enacted and changed over 
time (Schneider and Schneider 2008)—for example, legality claims in formal 
institutional settings, such as courts, or outside this structure. Legality claims 
refer to efforts to portray actions as legal or illegal regardless of how the law or 
elites address or see the actions (Cook 2011), and they also include framing ef-
forts to transform grievances into “criminal” injustices (Sandvik 2018).
The use of penal and quasi-penal legal approaches amounts to a series of 
sorting exercises involving the demarcation of the kind of activities that are 
legitimately accepted as humanitarian aid (not violating counterterror mea-
sures, bans on proselytizing); the permitted organization of aid activities (mea-
sures against money laundering and corruption); and the changing demarca-
tions of legitimate encounters among humanitarian practitioners and between 
practitioners and beneficiaries (involving bans on harassment, sexual exploi-
tation, and violence by humanitarian workers).
Normatively, from the perspective of the sector, this engenders a stratified 
conceptualization of criminalization as a narrative of decline of the humani-
tarian space—but importantly, also as a progress narrative that promotes the 
imperative to “do no harm.” As a narrative of decline that hampers access or the 
ability of actors to deliver “principled humanitarian aid,” criminalization in-
cludes counterterrorism measures and criminalization of local networks 
through “material support to terror” provisions, restrictive non-governmental 
organization laws and the merging of migration control and criminal justice, 
whereby organizations and professional and volunteer humanitarians are 




of displaced people’s self-protection mobility strategies, thereby perpetuating 
the criminalization of poor people and deviant male youths. Criminalization 
as progress narrative concerns the criminalization of wartime rape; the safe-
guarding (harassment, sexual exploitation, violence) against unlawful behav-
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Crisis
A humanitarian crisis is framed as “an event or series of events that represents 
a critical threat to the health, safety, security or wellbeing of a community or 
other large group of people, usually over a wide area” (Humanitarian Coali-
tion). Humanitarian crises can be the result of different causes such as natural 
catastrophes (an earthquake, a cyclone, a flood, a drought, etc.); human-driven 
actions (armed conflict, fire, etc.) or a combination of the two (famine, dis-
placement). Such classifications, however, are contestable, as natural events 
are not merely the result of natural processes. The effects of and responses to 
natural disasters are related to social inequalities and wider political and eco-
nomic processes.
Historian of concepts Reinhart Koselleck (2006) has followed the concep-
tual journey of the term “crisis” from classical Greece to contemporary times to 
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show how it has acquired an important place in everyday vocabulary and has 
become a catchword since the 19th century. The crisis frame significantly in-
forms our conceptual and epistemological imaginations. At the same time, cri-
sis is a “narrative construction” and a blind spot in the social sciences (Roitman 
2013: 11). Crisis justifies specific interventions at the micro- and macrolevel, as 
Janet Roitman’s work on the financial crisis has illustrated (Roitman 2013). 
Thus, the crisis vocabulary opens the ground for the detection, diagnosis, and 
specific therapeutic treatment of social phenomena.
A humanitarian crisis is considered a rupture to a presumed normalcy. It is 
defined as a disturbance to the ordinary state of affairs and as an exceptional 
and extraordinary situation. As such, it follows the logic of the “emergency 
imaginary” (Calhoun 2008). Life in crisis is suspended and replaced by a rule of 
rapid and unstable change and chaos. Like “humanitarian disaster” or “human-
itarian emergency,” terms often used interchangeably with “humanitarian cri-
sis,” the latter appears to be traceable to a specific historical moment in the 
course of events. For example, the European Commission has highlighted that 
the Syrian conflict has generated one of “the worst humanitarian crises since 
World War ii” (European Commission 2017). But it was only when more than 
1 million displaced people reached Europe’s shores in 2015 that this labeling 
took place, motivating humanitarian aid by the European Union and the for-
mation of a vast humanitarian apparatus. The year 2015 has thus come to be 
known as an exceptional moment in history and the time when the humani-
tarian crisis erupted.
It is not certain when the term “humanitarian crisis” gained currency in the 
humanitarian sphere, although researchers locate its rise to the Vietnamese 
boat people in the 1970s (Redfield 2013: 34). The humanitarian crisis frame de-
politicizes suffering and gives a moral anchor to it. Such a discourse shifts at-
tention away from the political and economic causes of crisis towards senti-
ments of pity and compassion. Moreover, saving lives or, more broadly, 
responding to a humanitarian crisis has a morally legitimizing effect. There-
fore, the crisis-thinking logic prepares the ground for what generally follows: 
the responses of humanitarian actors.
Defining a situation as a humanitarian crisis justifies humanitarian and 
military interventions (Fassin and Pandolfi 2010), allocates material and sym-
bolic resources, and mobilizes political responses. It is, in fact, the internation-
al humanitarian apparatus that defines a situation as a humanitarian crisis and 
calls for its treatment (Stockton 2004). At the same time, humanitarian images 
and the world media have a crucial role in locating, highlighting, and, 
 ultimately, defining specific contexts as affected by humanitarian crises. One 




 crisis and gained global attention through the images that circulated in inter-
national media (Heerten 2017).
It goes without saying that there remain crises that are undefined as such 
(Stockton 2004: 16) or chronic crises (Vigh 2008) that are not on the radar of 
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Decolonization
Decolonization—the process through which colonies gained independence—
has been formally successful largely thanks to the role of the United Nations 
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(UN) in the first two postwar decades. Shaking off the dominance of the for-
mer colonial powers in economic, social, and cultural relations and in the pro-
duction of knowledge is another matter. The inherent “coloniality” (Quijano 
2007) of the Western model is alive and well, an epistemological hegemony 
that permeates the network power of globalization (Grewal 2008) to the far 
corners of the earth. According to “coloniality” thinkers, this model positions 
itself as the only valid way of producing knowledge—and with this knowledge 
the “Western Code” becomes the hidden software of modernity (Mignolo 
2012).
Many authors have highlighted the connections between colonial adminis-
tration and humanitarian action (Duffield 2001; Fassin 2010). From the start of 
the 21st century or so, humanitarianism and humanitarian action have been 
the sites of scholarly analysis aimed at understanding the functions they per-
form in North–South relations, world ordering, and the promotion of liberal 
peace. While much has been uncovered about how political and humanitar-
ian agendas tend to reinforce each other, a deeper look into the nature and 
functions of humanitarianism—as a discourse, an ideology, a set of institu-
tions and professions, and as a political economy—reveals that it is still deep-
ly embedded in a system of knowledge that professes to be universal but is 
in reality an extension of European and Western worldviews (Donini 2010). 
This Western epistemic code still undergirds the processes through which the 
world is conceptualized, including both liberal and anti-capitalist critiques 
of the model, and therefore much of current humanitarianism. In the words 
of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001), non-governmental organizations 
(ngos) are “the mendicant orders of Empire” and the “capillary vessels” of 
globalization.
As long as the West was in ascendance, its dominance in the humanitarian 
sphere was broadly acceptable. Institutions largely financed by the West bur-
geoned, resulting in a kind of oligopoly formed by the UN agencies, key net-
works of international ngos, and oecd donors. This oligopoly has played a 
key role in setting the norms, discourses, and practices of present-day humani-
tarian action. Isomorphism has thrived: in order to join the club, aspiring non-
Western actors have had to accept rules, principles, and practices that are es-
sentially “of the North.” However, now that the East and other centers of power 
are rising, the West’s dominance is becoming more problematical. Many of the 
new or emerging powers have no obligation, nor perhaps the inclination, to 
conform to the parameters of the traditional humanitarian system. Indeed, 
they can, and often do, define “humanitarian” in their own terms. Current de-
bates on “localization,” meaning the direct funding of national and local ngos 
by bypassing the large international agencies, and on accountability to  affected 
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groups can be seen as attempts to shake off some of the top-down  dominance 
of the traditional humanitarian enterprise. However, growing contestation of 
humanitarian principles and practices coming from non-Western states, and 
instances of the rejection of the presence of international agencies when di-
saster strikes, are symptoms of a deeper delinking and/or affirmation of sover-
eignty. These trends could signal the emergence of more statist “Eastphalian” 
approaches to relief for those affected by conflict and crisis. The West, for its 
part, has also participated in undermining humanitarian principles through 
the global War on Terror by press-ganging international ngos into supporting 
political–military interventions or the use of anti-terror legislation to deny ac-
cess to or interaction with certain groups. Thus, organized humanitarianism 
that has grown in parallel with contemporary forms of Western capitalism may 
well have now reached its structural limits (Gordon and Donini 2016). Its pur-
ported universality is being questioned, and more “pluriversal” humanitarian-
isms are likely to emerge.
Antonio Donini
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Digital humanitarianism is humanitarian intervention conducted at a dis-
tance, sometimes without physical presence on the ground, through digital 
tools and often in an online, collaborative manner including citizen participa-
tion. It is technically a consequence of the rapid spread of mobile phones, in-
ternet connectivity, social media, and geographical information systems that 
enable a large number of individuals to effectively collaborate online. When a 
major crisis occurs, affected populations and concerned organizations turn to 
their mobile phones or to the internet to seek and to share information on the 
crisis. Digital humanitarianism developed as a way to describe the activity of 
volunteers and organizations who apply digital tools to capture this flow of 
online information, organize it, locate it, and verify its content. The collection 
and mapping of social media messages after the Haiti earthquake in 2010 is 
claimed to be the birth of digital humanitarian activity (Meier 2015). Countless 
humanitarian interventions by ad hoc groups of volunteers or by established 
organizations have been facilitated by the fact that affected populations are 
able to share information globally in real time, and concerned citizens are able 
to organize and act online. Open geographical information systems have made 
it possible to organize, visualize, and share such information, and the humani-
tarian community has adopted the value of information sharing both as a sup-
portive activity and as a humanitarian activity on its own (Burns 2014; Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative 2011).
In the early days of digital humanitarianism, activities were closely con-
nected to tools such as OpenStreetMap (osm), Ushahidi, or Sahana. osm is the 
“Wikipedia of maps”: an online community of volunteers digitally draws maps, 
including areas where no maps are currently available. The maps are created 
using available satellite imagery alongside the community on the ground, 
which provides place names and details to enrich the map. Similarly, Ushahidi 
is a platform created for online collaboration to visualize information from 
sms text messaging or social media messages by verifying, categorizing, and 
locating the information on a map. The Sahana platform was developed in a 
similar setting to allow for online information sharing and collaboration 
among a large group of users (Burns and Shanley 2012). A growing technical 
community and private companies engaging in humanitarian crises have led 
to ever new technologies being applied for humanitarian purposes.
The transition from in-kind to cash-based aid using digital devices and the 
introduction of biometric ids has led to the adaption of digital  humanitarianism 
to cover such activities. Drawing the line between humanitarian technology 
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and digital humanitarianism is a subject of dispute. The rapid increase in con-
nectivity and commercial interest in connecting the world and the subsequent 
digitalization of education, relief, and humanitarian services, are exposed to 
critical reflection. Connectivity and open sharing of information generate se-
curity risks because it is not always possible to monitor those using the online 
information and for what purpose (Sandvik, Gabrielsen Jumbert, Karlsrud and 
Kaufmann 2014). Others claim that digital humanitarianism, remote manage-
ment, and distant sensing help “to occlude the negative by headlining the 
problem-solving potential of technoscience” (Duffield 2016: 154). As techno-
optimists promote the new digital reality, others challenge the humanitarian 
adaptation of digital tools, and see them as a threat to true relief or develop-
ment and as tools for surveillance and oppression (Duffield 2016). In between, 
there is a broad horizon for exploring the effects, risks, and possibilities of new 
technologies adapted to a humanitarian landscape.
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Diplomacy
Providing ongoing access to humanitarian aid during conflict and complex 
emergencies has always been a major concern for policy-makers and 
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 humanitarian actors. Thus, humanitarian negotiations have historically been 
conducted in situations of extreme insecurity and unstable political condi-
tions to secure access, assistance, and protection for civilians (Mancini-Griffoli 
and Picot 2004; Pease 2016). The implicit, sometimes even hidden, practices of 
humanitarian negotiations (Magone, Neuman, and Weissman 2011) led to the 
concept of humanitarian diplomacy, which emerged in the early 2000s. Hu-
manitarian diplomacy is generally defined as persuading decision-makers and 
opinion leaders to act at all times and in all circumstances in the interest of 
vulnerable people and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian princi-
ples. It encompasses activities carried out by humanitarian actors in order to 
obtain spaces from political and military authorities within which they can 
function with integrity. These activities include, for example, arranging for the 
presence of humanitarian organizations in a given country, negotiating access 
to civilian populations in need of assistance and protection, monitoring assis-
tance programs, promoting respect for international law and norms, and en-
gaging in advocacy at a variety of levels in support of humanitarian objectives 
(Minear and Smith 2007). In this scenario, humanitarian diplomacy is under-
stood as a means to reach the most vulnerable people. Indeed, the commit-
ment to “leave no one behind” has been a key feature of discussions about the 
Sustainable Development Goals, and there is now a growing political consen-
sus that operationalizing “leave no one behind” is a crucial element of the 2030 
Agenda (Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment). However, a significant tension is embedded in humanitarian diploma-
cy. Diplomacy, for instance, is essentially about representation of one polity 
vis-à-vis another polity. Humanitarianism is about advocating for and helping 
people in need. Therefore, diplomacy is characterized by compromise and 
pragmatic dealings, whereas the public image of humanitarian action (which 
often contradicts what happens in practice) is the opposite: it is about working 
for ideals and universal principles regardless of the interests of specific politi-
cal actors.
The variety of humanitarian actors involved in complex emergencies and 
their competing priorities and goals produce different understandings and 
practices of humanitarian diplomacy. Its definitions and perceived content 
vary as widely as the number of organizations (or states) using the term and 
the humanitarian operations that they carry out. There is a significant differ-
ence between conceiving the idea of humanitarian diplomacy, using the term 
itself, and arriving at international recognition for its definition and agreement 
on how it should be conducted (Régnier 2011).
As massive humanitarian crises, such as those in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, 




meant to provide are increasingly the targets of parties within conflict. This 
leaves many people either trapped within the conflict or forced to flee along 
routes where they are in high risk of exploitation from trafficking, and where 
humanitarians have little or no access. The dangers that humanitarianism fac-
es today are the result of war zones and prolonged crises where civilian popu-
lations are the intended victims, where access is difficult, where aid workers 
are in danger of being perceived as a threat or a kidnapping target, and where 
their own physical safety is in doubt (Barnett and Weiss 2008). Access to hu-
manitarian aid is increasingly challenged in ways that also redefine the role of 
humanitarian actors and their diplomatic capacity. The character of violent 
conflicts is changing, and the politicization of access to aid has become an in-
tegral element of conflict itself (De Lauri 2018).
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Displacement
Displacement can be induced by war, conflict, environmental disasters, and 
other natural and human-made hazards. The humanitarian response to forced 
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displacement can be traced to the Eastern Mediterranean during the late 18th 
and early 19th centuries, when forced deportations of Tartars, Kurds, and As-
syrians were followed by the Armenian genocide that prompted the creation 
of the first professional, neutral, and non-denominational relief organizations 
(Watenpaugh 2015). This also included the creation of the first refugee camps 
catering for minority ethno-religious groups (White 2018). After World War ii, 
more than 12 million people (McLaren 2010) were categorized as displaced per-
sons, and the responsibility to aid them was assigned to the United Nations 
(UN) Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The displacement of Palestin-
ian refugees (1947–1948), was followed by the creation of the UN Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (unrwa). unrwa insti-
tuted a camp-based approach that would become an integral part of the hu-
manitarian response to later displacement crises (Peteet 2005). The humani-
tarian response has been especially marked in sub-Saharan Africa, where the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr) runs several refugee camps, 
criticized as being spaces under humanitarian government (Agier 2011), with 
the agency being seen as complicit with a strategy of humanitarian contain-
ment (Barnett 2001).
Although figures are uncertain, globally there are currently around 70 mil-
lion forcibly displaced people—with internally displaced persons (idps) the 
largest group (40 million), followed by refugees (26 million) and asylum seek-
ers (4 million). With many crises unresolved and protracted, almost three-
quarters of the displaced hail from just five countries: Afghanistan, South 
 Sudan, Myanmar, Somalia, and Syria (unhcr 2019). The Syrian displacement 
crisis (2012–present) is one of the largest, most complex and protracted hu-
manitarian emergencies today, with more than 6 million Syrians displaced as 
refugees and idps. Large sections of the Syrian refugee population are con-
fined indefinitely in what are conventionally considered fragile transit coun-
tries. Unable to resolve the displacement causes, host states and UN agencies 
are instead trying to deal with their consequences by instituting a develop-
mental approach to displacement.
Refugees and idps are similarly displaced, and often for the same reasons 
and causes, but move to different destinations. Most of the world’s refugees 
have been idps before crossing national borders, but only refugees are under 
international legal protection (World Bank Group 2017). Current research on 
forced displacement shows that the magnitude, scale, and timing depend on 
conflict intensity, duration, and scale, as well as regime type and conflict out-
comes. Migration routes, in turn, are influenced by security concerns, distance, 
and terrain type as well as information sourced through social networks and 
social media. Displacement is increasingly urban, with cities and towns 
Displacement48
<UN>
 becoming major sites of self-settled people, yet aid policies have not kept pace 
with this urban transformation. Indeed, the unhcr has only recently begun 
reorienting its work away from camps and towards urban contexts (Crisp, 
 Morris, and Refstie 2012).
Displacement is often followed by secondary migration to third countries. 
Mass displacement, such as the so-called European reception migration crisis 
(2014–2015), prompted eu member states to institute border closures, mari-
time surveillance, and new return agreements to curtail migrants’ mobility. 
Moreover, humanitarian aid is now accompanied by biometric registration 
measures that include iris and retina scans, which represent a shift towards a 
humanitarian securitization (Hoffmann 2017).
Disasters and climate change-related migrations are still less studied and 
understood than other forms of displacement, in particular as they combine 
with other factors such as poverty and persecution (Stapleton, Nadin, Watson, 
and Kellett 2017). The numbers, scale, and causes of climate-related displace-
ments are all uncertain. Current estimates include between 18–25 million peo-
ple affected by climate-related and other environmentally related hazards, 
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Doctrine
Approaches to humanitarian action are often referred to as doctrines, such as 
“the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.” A doctrine is “a belief or set of 
beliefs, especially political or religious ones, that are taught and accepted by a 
particular group” (Cambridge Dictionary 2019). As with legal and military doc-
trines, a humanitarian doctrine is more general than a policy, but more issue-
specific than a political ideology or scientific paradigm.
In a religious context, doctrines instruct the interpretation of foundational 
dogmas. This has three functions: (1) instructing the faithful in interpreting 
their sacred scriptures as guidance for thought and behavior; (2) preserving a 
religious tradition; and (3) defending the faith against misinterpretation and 
opposing views (Outler 2012). These functions resemble the roles of humani-
tarian “isms”—with the Dunantist doctrine of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (icrc) defined by Jean Pictet and colleagues in the 1960s as the 
current humanitarian orthodoxy (icrc 2015). Interpreting the “teachings” of 
Henri Dunant through the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, in-
dependence, voluntary service, unity, and universality, the icrc (1) provides 
guidance for how individuals should understand and realize their humanitar-
ian calling; (2) preserves the tradition of humanitarianism (as a “church”); and 
(3) defends this tradition against alternative accounts of humanitarianism and 
their shared anti-humanitarian adversaries.
The congregation of humanitarian doctrine(s) is not limited to the mem-
bers of humanitarian organizations. Adopted by politicians, lawyers, military 
generals, and individual citizens as a general framework for categorizing and 
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reacting to world problems, humanitarian doctrines have merged with politi-
cal, legal, military, and religious doctrines (De Lauri 2016; Fassin 2011).
There is a diversity of religious and secular humanitarian doctrines globally, 
as there has been throughout history (Barnett 2011). Each major humanitarian 
organization has developed its own variations of, or alternatives to, the Dunan-
tist orthodoxy as a way of defining its role and justifying its existence. There are 
also a set of more issue-specific doctrines cutting across these organizations, 
such as the recent doctrine of the “protection of civilians” defined by the Unit-
ed Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in its “Aide 
Memoire” (ocha 2016).
Essentially, these doctrines rarely stem from an isolated focus on humani-
tarian action, but reflect broader cultural and political outlooks. The Dunantist 
orthodoxy, for instance, was developed against the backdrop of Christian reli-
gion and political liberalism. Abstract formulations of humanitarian principles 
serve to disentangle the doctrine from these background conditions. The 
emergence of “new humanitarians” based on non-Western traditions nonethe-
less make the reliance on underlying cultural and political conditions more 
evident (Dennis and Zeynep 2015).
One may speak of more or less doctrinal approaches to humanitarian ac-
tion. Humanitarian practices are usually not about the specific realization of 
doctrinal objectives, but rather are pragmatic responses in highly diverse set-
tings outside the control of humanitarian actors. Likewise, international hu-
manitarian law is pragmatically balancing on an edge of power and self-inter-
est rather than enforcing a moral doctrine. Under these circumstances, strict 
doctrinal approaches may get in the way of efficiency, while more flexible doc-
trines may be needed in order to maintain legitimacy in the face of ethical di-
lemmas and political compromises. Strict doctrinal readings of humanitarian 
practices should therefore also be avoided, as too much emphasis easily can be 
put on the disagreements between different doctrines rather than on the ac-
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Documents
The word “document” originates from the Latin documentum, which means 
example, proof and lesson. In Medieval Latin, the word derives additional 
meaning from the verb docere, to show, teach, cause to know, and refers to an 
official written instrument or an authoritative paper. Historian Ben Kafka trac-
es the modern age of paperwork to the French Revolution and the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man, which guaranteed citizens the right to request a full ac-
counting of the government. An explosion of paper followed, documents be-
coming privileged vehicles to ensure the circulation of information and the 
stability of newly established state institutions (Kafka 2012). In addition to 
foundational documents, which define humanitarian organizations’ statutes 
and principles, corporate documents such as leaflets, reports, funding propos-
als, forms, and guidelines have come to occupy a ubiquitous presence in con-
temporary humanitarianism. As “paradigmatic artefacts of modern knowledge 
practices” (Riles 2006), documents embody the bureaucratization and institu-
tionalization of aid in the liberal humanitarian age that, according to Michael 
Barnett (2011), started in the 1990s. Together with the blurring of the boundar-
ies between military and humanitarian intervention that has followed the 
Cold War, this new age of humanitarianism is equally marked by the changing 
character of relief, as humanitarian organizations increasingly collaborate 
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with states as “implementing partners” in broader peace-building and recon-
struction efforts.
The financial windfall that these new forms of collaboration have triggered 
and the mission creep that has ensued (Waters 2018), have amplified donors’ 
requirements for greater accountability, effectiveness, and professionalism 
(Barnett 2005). Documents have therefore become unavoidable technologies 
of governance devised not only to ensure internal regulation—via the measur-
ing of impact, the standardization of rules, the streamlining of procedures, and 
the establishment of doctrines—but also to ensure donors’ control over aid 
delivery. Meanwhile, registration cards, lists of beneficiaries, and registries are 
commonly used as standard tools for governing “populations in need,” estab-
lishing an unequivocal “triage” between deserving “victims” and undeserving 
others (Fassin 2011).
As documents became key instruments of aid, humanitarian organizations 
have embraced the logic of audit to demonstrate their willingness to make 
themselves transparent, owing to the growing pressure to comply with inter-
national professional standards (Sphere, chs) that regulate the “humanitarian 
industry” (Weiss 2013) and the introduction of systems of accountability de-
rived from new public management principles. Aligned on externally defined 
benchmarks and impact indicators, documents are mobilized to produce mea-
surable transparency and legibility (Strathern 2000).
The imperative of “evidence-based programming,” far from being a neutral 
technicality, powerfully reshapes the everyday practices of humanitarian 
workers. As data collection becomes strategically important for aid organiza-
tions, humanitarians are gradually turned into data managers and analysts, 
compelled to translate relief operations into measurable outputs. Transformed 
into graphs and infographics, statistics become evidence of impact and effec-
tiveness, simultaneously keeping the many unquantifiable factors that con-
tribute to the alleviation of suffering out of sight.
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Donors
Some three-quarters of all humanitarian funding for aid is provided by 
a   relatively small number of, mainly Western, governments. The top three 
 governments—the United States (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), and Ger-
many—provide about 60 percent of this funding. The USA is the single largest 
contributor, providing around a third of the funding for such aid. Together, the 
European Union (eu) and eu member countries provide just over half of all 
government funding for global humanitarian aid (Development Initiatives 
2018, Willitts-King et al. 2018). Countries such as China (Hirono 2018) and India 
(Roepstorff 2015) currently play a growing role as global humanitarian actors.
Islamic funding for global humanitarian aid is also emerging. Countries 
such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, together with Tur-
key, are providing funding, and are among the top 20 government providers of 
humanitarian aid.
About a quarter of global humanitarian aid is provided by private donors. 
There are variations between years, with spikes likely driven by high-profile 
sudden-onset crises such as the Nepal earthquake or the Ebola outbreak. An 
estimated two-thirds of private funding comes from individuals, with the rest 
originating with trusts, foundations, or companies.
The donor agencies’ financial contribution is channeled through a variety of 
organizations and often passes through multiple levels of participants to reach 
the people affected by the crisis. Most government funding, some 60 percent, 
is disbursed through multilateral organizations, primarily United Nations 
(UN) agencies. The World Food Programme and the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees receive the bulk of this.
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Government funding is also channeled to the UN through the UN Of-
fice for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and its various pools. Pooled 
funds are intended to provide flexible funding that is responsive to changing 
needs and gaps in resourcing. They allow donors to contribute to collective 
humanitarian responses and can provide rapid assistance as emergencies 
develop. Two-thirds of the funding for the UN humanitarian pools is pro-
vided by five European donors (UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, and 
Norway).
The multilateral development banks—the World Bank, the African Devel-
opment Bank, and others—also play an increasingly important role in this 
area. They channel funds as humanitarian assistance, and provide financing 
beyond humanitarian assistance to countries affected by and at risk of crisis. 
They have a growing range of instruments and mechanisms that seek to pro-
vide crisis financing for preparedness, response, recovery, and reconstruction.
Government donors also provide some funding to non-governmental orga-
nizations (ngos) and international organizations, and global funds and ap-
peals managed by such organizations. Chief among these are the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. They manage two funds: one for main-
ly “natural” disasters and one that responds to conflict-related disasters.
Most of the private funding (90 percent) is directed to ngos and humanitar-
ian institutions such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Move-
ment. Some ngos, for example Médecins Sans Frontières, do not accept gov-
ernment funding.
Very little government funding is provided directly to local institutions and 
organizations in the countries and regions affected by humanitarian 
emergencies.
Some of the UN agencies and donor agencies have their own facilities for 
distributing humanitarian aid, but most rely on ngos and/or commercial ser-
vice providers, and some also—where possible—use local authorities to dis-
tribute the aid (Mowjee et al. 2017).
The main problems related to the role of donors are lack of coordination 
during humanitarian emergencies, political interests driving the flows of fund-
ing, and the consolidation of proper accountability mechanisms. Complexities 
associated to donors’ policies are also linked to the fact that humanitarian ac-
tion has become blurred as its goals have expanded to include more develop-






Development Initiatives (2018) Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2018. http://
devinit.org.
Hirono, M. (2018) Exploring the Links between Chinese Foreign Policy and Humanitarian 
Action Multiple Interests, Processes and Actors. Humanitarian Policy Group Working 
Paper, Overseas Development Institute.
Macrae, J. et al. (2002) Uncertain Power: The Changing Role of Official Donors in Hu-
manitarian Action. hpg Report 12, Overseas Development Institute.
Mowjee, T. et al. (2017) From Grand Bargain to Beneficiary. An Analysis of Funding Flows 
through the Humanitarian System. Humanitarian Policy Group Commissioned Re-
port, Overseas Development Institute.
Roepstorff, K. (2015) India as Humanitarian Actor. Convergences and Divergences with 
dac Donor Principles and Practices. In: Sezgin, Z., Dijkzeul, D. eds. The New Hu-
manitarians in International Practice. Routledge.
Willitts-King, B. et al. (2018) Measuring the Iceberg. The Opportunities and Limits of Bet-
ter Tracking of Resources beyond International Humanitarian Assistance. Humani-
tarian Policy Group Working Paper, Overseas Development Institute.
Education
In postwar and post-disaster contexts, national authorities, international orga-
nizations, and non-governmental organizations must provide children who 
have been displaced or are otherwise affected by restricted mobility, growing 
insecurity, lack of infrastructures, and/or qualified personnel and loss of liveli-
hood and families with access to schooling. Schools are not safe from direct 
attacks during times of armed conflict. For example, in rural areas, schools may 
be the only permanent structures, which makes them highly susceptible to 
shelling, closure, or looting. Local teachers may also become primary targets 
because they are considered important community members, they may hold 
strong political views, and they may embody the only form of government rep-
resentation in an isolated village. The destruction of education networks is one 
of the most severe democratic setbacks for countries affected by conflict. The 
deterioration and loss of basic education and professional skills normally takes 
years to replace, making the overall task of postwar recovery extremely diffi-
cult (Aguilar and Retamal 2009). As a basic principle, the 1989 Convention on 
Rights of the Child obliges “State parties [to] take all feasible measures to 
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 ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an armed conflict” 
and make primary education available and compulsory without limitation.
Education in emergencies has expanded as a subfield of expertise and hu-
manitarian assistance because of the high number of children affected by di-
sasters and wars. Education in emergency projects is often part of a larger pro-
gram encouraging social change and resilience at the community level.
According to international law, displaced refugee children can attend regu-
lar schools in host countries but very few are able to in practice. Some host 
governments refuse to make educational activities for refugee children avail-
able or even to allow humanitarian agencies to provide it (Aguilar and Retamal 
2009). Providing ongoing access to education in emergencies may range from 
transitional home-based education (Kirk and Winthrop 2007) to assistance in 
camps and schools in host communities to double schooling. Protecting chil-
dren’s right to education in emergencies requires attention to the full cycle of 
education from supporting families to rebuilding schools. Among other con-
cerns, education providers must take into account how to (re)integrate schools 
into larger societal institutional settings and how to restore trust through ac-
cess to the “ladder” of education. It is also important to convey life skills and 
values for health, gender equality, responsible citizenship, and environmental 
awareness, and provide protection for marginalized groups such as minorities, 
children with disabilities, and out-of-school adolescents (Sinclair 2007).
Although, in some contexts, agreements and procedures to guarantee ac-
cess to education exist, they often fail to ensure the quality of the teaching and 
learning process and the effectiveness of the education response (Gallano 
2018). Bottom-up participatory evaluations of education projects aim to iden-
tify the challenges of a complex emergency timescale, the production of 
knowledge, and the capacity to hold a child-centered perspective (Maclure 
2006). The latter implies attention and consideration not only to formal school-
ing but also to the informal educative processes that can play a significant role 
in society, especially in times of conflict (Anderson and Mendenhall 2006).
Antonio De Lauri and Karin Ask
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Emergency
Traditionally defined as an unexpected and serious situation requiring imme-
diate action to solve it, emergency is the primary reason for mobilizing hu-
manitarian actors to intervene in contexts affected by human-made or natural 
disasters. Employed in situations of human conflict, the notion of “complex 
emergency” first took place in Mozambique toward the end of the 1980s when 
aid to the displaced was needed (Calhoun 2008). It indicates a multiplicity of 
causes underlying emergencies, with the involvement of several actors, be-
yond just victim, and the need for an international response. Unlike natural 
disasters, complex emergencies “have a singular ability to erode and destroy 
the cultural, civil, political and economic integrity of established societies” 
(Duffield 1994: 3).
In more recent academic literature, the state of emergency is no longer in-
terpreted as a matter of fate, but rather as a geopolitical strategy to set out 
specific global achievements, and the historical result of longstanding eco-
nomic, political, and social failures. Thereby, most factors that give rise to 
emergencies are identifiable, even though largely dealt with by humanitarians 
as autonomous problems to which there is no solution but intervention. Hu-
manitarian work tends to approach emergencies as discontinuities, for which 
intervention and aid are the only strategies able to restore linearity and pre-
dictability. As such, emergencies delineate the temporal and spatial limits of 
crisis and risk and, therefore, shed light on the urgent character of humanitar-
ian action. Adopting a critical approach, emergency and general tendencies to 
interpret political processes as catastrophes have increasingly been studied as 
modalities of governance to preserve social and political order by establishing 
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“states of exception” that serve as repressive and control measures (Ophir 2010; 
Vazquez-Arroyo 2013). The idea of emergency has allowed interventionists to 
imagine a norm to which there should be an exception and a deviation from 
times of “normality.” The exceptional use of security measures protects the sta-
tus quo in the Global North and highlights threats and risks in the Global 
South. For these reasons, emergency has been prioritized in the mobilization 
of international resources vis-à-vis chronic vulnerabilities and social predica-
ments, to the extent that scholars have talked of the “tyranny of emergency” 
(Minear 2002). In international media and global politics, the idea of emer-
gency easily makes the headlines, and, therefore, its official declaration needs 
to be accurately considered as an important instrument of decision-making 
and the political organization of society.
Current concepts of protracted human displacement and consequent pro-
vision of long-term humanitarian assistance challenge emergency as the sine 
qua non condition for (both aid and military) humanitarian interventions, as 
international responses today continue when crisis becomes routinized. Like-
wise, while the concept of emergency has traditionally set the separation line 
between humanitarian and development practices, as well as short-term and 
long-term interventions, the increasing number of protracted crises has unrav-
eled how problematic the technical tendency is to assess the beginning and 
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An epidemic typically refers to a sudden increase in the number of cases of a 
disease above the normal expectation for a population in a particular time and 
area. Globally, epidemics of hiv/aids, various influenza viral strains, and viral 
hemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola garner the most attention from news media 
and responding organizations (e.g. the United States Centers for Disease Pre-
vention and Control, the cdc, or the United Nations World Health Organiza-
tion). Previously, the term “epidemic” only referred to a sudden increase of a 
contagious infectious disease in a population, but now it is used more broadly 
to include extraordinary increases in non-communicable diseases, such as 
type 2 diabetes and cancer in particular populations, and sudden increases in 
zoonotic diseases (meaning that they are caused by pathogens transmitted be-
tween humans and other animals, such as the West Nile virus), which are not 
contagious (cdc 2018).
In the more traditional definition of an epidemic as being caused by an in-
fectious agent, epidemics occur when something changes about either the 
population of infectious agents or the population of susceptible hosts. For this 
kind of an epidemic to take place, susceptible host species (such as humans) 
must exist in adequate numbers, and circumstances must cause enough sus-
ceptible hosts to become infected with the disease agent of concern.
Epidemics are caused by a variety of phenomena: the introduction of an 
infectious agent into an environment where it has not been before and/or 
where extant hosts lack adequate immune response; changes in transmission 
dynamics or the ecology of the host or agent population; the emergence and 
proliferation of genetic variants or mutations of the hosts or infectious agents 
that change susceptibility or immunity; or when the transmission dynamics or 
the population of infectious agents shift such that new or more susceptible 
hosts are exposed to the pathogen. Most contemporary epidemics, including 
recent epidemics of the Ebola virus, hiv, MERS-CoV, different influenza virus 
strains, anthrax, and so on, are zoonotic. Often, zoonotic diseases emerge in 
areas already beset by poverty and inequity (Gebreyes et al. 2014). The One 
Health paradigm is a framework that is often invoked to study and respond to 
epidemics of zoonotic disease and focuses on viewing diseases as they emerge 
and spread within multispecies ecologies (cdc 2019).
The term epidemic is often contrasted with the word endemic, which 
means the baseline number of cases of a disease that are usually present in 
a given population. Endemicity is the observed normal level of disease in a 
given population. For example, malaria is endemic in much of sub-Saharan 
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Africa; by contrast, Ebola has caused several epidemics in Africa but it is not 
currently endemic to African communities or countries. An infectious disease 
can continue to spread indefinitely in the absence of prevention or treatment 
interventions, and assuming that the level of a particular disease is not high 
enough to deplete the pool of susceptible persons. The term pandemic re-
fers to an epidemic that is spread over multiple regions of the world or con-
tinents. One example is the COVID-19 pandemic, caused by the SARS-CoV-2 
virus.
Recent debates in the fields of global health, medicine, and epidemiology 
focus on the best ways to predict, track, prevent, and control epidemics of in-
fectious disease. Some scientists are now pushing for better disease surveil-
lance systems, especially in low-income countries, as the best way to prevent 
outbreaks of disease. However, governments and non-governmental organiza-
tions in the health sector often commit few resources to the local infrastruc-
tural and educational resources necessary for disease surveillance. Instead, 
they mostly invest in technically sophisticated, but not socially or politically 
responsive, mathematical modeling tools that are designed to predict future 
outbreaks (Andersen 2018), or only invest in responses once epidemics emerge 
and threaten other countries. Funding for research often focuses on the devel-
opment and testing of new vaccines, treatments, diagnostics, and other forms 
of biotechnology that have the potential to generate private sector money, 
rather than on sustainable and local forms of labor, higher education, and ba-
sic laboratory equipment required of disease surveillance systems in impover-
ished communities (Andersen 2018; Kelly 2018).
As of today, social science literature on epidemics mostly entails studies of 
two infamous epidemics: hiv/aids and the Ebola virus. These studies point to 
how the sudden and narrow emergence of funding for epidemics (often of 
diseases feared by the general public in donor countries) can lead to inade-
quate funding to address broader and entrenched health inequities and gaps 
in basic primary health care that have long plagued the places where out-
breaks occur (Benton 2015). Rather than being neutral or limited in scope, epi-
demic control initiatives shape local social relations and political formations 
(Kenworthy 2017). International responses to disease epidemics are also fre-
quently examples of “vertical” or top-down and disease-specific global inter-
vention programs that can ignore, thwart, or overshadow local efforts to stem 
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Ethics
With the identity of humanitarian action as a moral endeavor, ethics is central 
to the study of humanitarianism (Slim 2015). The responsibility to provide hu-
manitarian assistance and abide with international humanitarian law brings 
up questions of ethics and moral responsibility, as do normative criticisms of 
the nature and effects of humanitarian efforts.
Ethics is concerned with the evaluation of attitudes and behavior based on 
a combination of ideas of values and reality. A distinction can be made be-
tween meta-ethics, normative ethics, applied ethics, and descriptive ethics. Meta-
ethics examines the theoretical foundations of ethics, such as the idea of deriv-
ing prescriptive implications from a notion of humanity in humanitarianism. 
Normative ethics evaluates ethical ideas, such as the adequacy of “humanity” as 
a principle of action. Applied ethics assesses attitudes and behavior in concrete 
practical contexts, such as the operationalization of a principle of humanity in 
refugee management. Ethics can also be studied in a descriptive sense by 
 examining the ethical ideas that people have, without evaluating whether 
these are true or false, right or wrong.
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When ethics is addressed in the context of humanitarian action, it is usually 
done in an applied sense with reference to the principles of international hu-
manitarian law, human rights, or the “humanitarian principles” of humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality, and independence (Pictet 1979). In line with operation-
al demands of aligning practices with these principles, the coherence of poli-
cies and practices with the principles are assessed and the justification of de-
parting from the principles is discussed.
The question of coherence relates to the dispute between so-called “Dunan-
tist” and “Wilsonian” approaches concerning the hierarchy between emergen-
cy relief based on humanitarian law and a broader development agenda based 
on human rights (Barnett 2011).
Departing from these principles is the subject of longstanding disputes be-
tween principled and pragmatic approaches—a dispute that overlaps with the 
distinction between duty-based ethics (deontology), evaluating behavior based 
on its motives, and consequentialist ethics (associated with utilitarianism), 
evaluating behavior on the basis of its effects (Baron, Pettit, and Slote 1997).
Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics, another approach to 
the ethics of humanitarian action concentrates on the qualities of humanitar-
ian workers and decision-makers (Löfquist 2017). This approach seems particu-
larly suited as guidance for action in situations where a multitude of identities, 
moral codes, and political considerations are at play.
Arguably, the hardest ethical questions pertain to the consequences of hu-
manitarian action. It is well documented that immediate relief may have ad-
verse effects. For instance, food relief may keep militias going and refugee 
camps can be exploited for the displacement of ethnic or political groups 
( Anderson 1999). Prominent examples include the assistance of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross in Nazi concentration camps and the mili-
tary strategic uses (instrumentalization) of humanitarian aid by nato in Af-
ghanistan (Donini 2012). According to consequentialist ethics, relief should be 
avoided if the benefits are outweighed by negative side effects. Still, it is highly 
controversial to allow for avoidable suffering with reference to such side 
 effects—in particular, when decisions involve a high degree of uncertainty and 
no realistic alternative exists for a humanitarian response.
A problem with the literature on ethics in humanitarian action is that it 
tends either to be internal to a discourse of humanitarian problems, principles, 
and solutions or to rely on unrealistic assumptions about alternatives, such as 
the absolute commitment of politicians to humanitarian objectives or the 
global redistribution of power and privilege. Ethics can have a constructive 
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Evaluation
“Evaluation” emerged in the 1990s as an important, now essential, element in 
the efforts to enhance the quality of humanitarian aid. An evaluation is typi-
cally defined as a systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or com-
pleted project, program, or policy, including its design, implementation, and 
results. An evaluation should provide useful and credible information that en-
ables the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making processes 
of recipients and providers of such aid.
The purpose of such evaluations is to improve ongoing or future projects, 
programs, and policies through the feedback of lessons learned and/or to pro-
vide a basis for accountability, including the provision of information to the 
public. The oecd Development Assistance Committee (dac) has identified 
five major evaluation criteria and developed a main standard for evaluation. 
These are:
– Relevance: the extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and 
policies of the target group, recipient, and donor;
– Effectiveness: a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its 
objective;
– Efficiency: this measures outputs—qualitative and quantitative—in rela-
tion to the inputs. It is an economic term that signifies the aid uses the least 
costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results;
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– Impact: the positive and negative changes produced by aid intervention, di-
rectly or indirectly, intended or unintended;
– Sustainability: this is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an 
activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.
The oecd dac has carried out its own studies of how evaluations are conduct-
ed by their members (e.g. oecd 2016) or synthesized evaluation findings con-
ducted by member countries on, for instance, how to respond to the refugee 
crisis (Ruaudel and Morrison-Métois 2017; oecd 2017). dac also maintains a 
searchable database of evaluations of development aid, including humanitar-
ian aid.
The dac criteria have been in place since the early 1990s and are widely used 
by many organizations and actors in the evaluation of development programs. 
They are reflected in policies and manuals, and in the terms of reference in a 
wide range of individual evaluations by development ministries, agencies, 
banks, partners, and non-governmental organizations (ngos), for example. 
The dac criteria consequently have a strong influence on current evaluation 
practice. In 2018, dac began a process of exploring how the evaluation criteria 
could be adapted to new scenarios, including humanitarian aid in complex 
and protracted crises, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
dac’s members are governments and intergovernmental organizations. 
Outside this framework there is another important network addressing evalu-
ations in the humanitarian sector: the Active Learning Network for Account-
ability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (alnap). alnap is a global 
network of ngos, United Nations agencies, members of the Red Cross/ Crescent 
Movement, donors, academics, and consultants dedicated to learning how to 
improve responses to humanitarian crises. It was set up in 1997 following the 
genocide in Rwanda and new demands for increased professionalization of 
the humanitarian sector. alnap was established in the belief that by improv-
ing the quality, availability, and use of knowledge and evidence from previous 
responses the system would perform better and be more accountable. alnap’s 
activities are managed and implemented through a Secretariat hosted by the 
Overseas Development Institute in London.
alnap maintains an online library—the biggest repository of lessons 
learned in the sector—and seeks to develop guidance on humanitarian evalu-
ation. In 2016, it released the Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Guide, which 
consolidated current knowledge about initiating, managing, and completing 
an evaluation of humanitarian action, offering a common reference point for 
humanitarian evaluators (alnap 2016).
The technical and professional quality of evaluations has steadily improved. 




policy level of donor agencies and implementing institutions. This is partly 
because evaluation reports are just one of several inputs into decision-making 
and these decisions can also be shaped by competing interests. Moreover, the 
need for rapid response in emergency situations often overrides attention to 
lessons learnt from evaluations. Participation (Rossignoli et al. 2017), capacity 
building (Vallejo and When 2016), and the role played by donors (Andersen, 
Bull and Kennedy-Chouane 2014) represent key aspects of humanitarian eval-
uations and may significantly affect their quality.
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Expatriates
Hundreds of thousands people work on an international assignment in coun-
tries where humanitarian, development, or peace-building interventions are 
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taking place for the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, and other international and non-governmental organizations. These 
people are commonly referred to as “expatriates,” professionals working out-
side their countries of primary residence for an extended period of time—for 
example, as project managers, logisticians, medical professionals, engineers, 
accountants, or security coordinators. The term “expatriate” is composed of 
the Latin words ex (out of) and patria (native country) and is mostly reserved 
for people involved in privileged forms of work migration that follow the flow 
of resources and materialities set free by the recurrent nature of global crisis. 
In terms of their salary, their mobility, and their protection, expatriate humani-
tarians are distinctive from national humanitarians—the professionals em-
ployed locally in the zones of intervention who constitute the vast majority of 
active humanitarians worldwide (Redfield 2012).
There are a number of studies on forms of expatriate culture(s) in humani-
tarian, developmental, and peace-building interventions, their situatedness in 
postcolonial continuities (Baaz 2005), the patterns of their mobilities (Redfield 
2012), their role as bureaucrats, brokers, and intermediaries (Mosse and Lewis 
2006), and questions of morals, ethics, and hierarchies surrounding the consti-
tution of their practices (Fassin 2011). The “mobile professionals” (Fechter 2007) 
employed in international intervention form a “community of practice” 
(Autesserre 2014) that is driven by a common set of values and a particular per-
spective on modernity. They often share similar educational and racial back-
grounds and trajectories (Benton 2016). The personal beliefs and motivations 
of expatriates underpin the field of practice of humanitarian intervention and 
are a formative feature of the humanitarian space as a whole. The presence of 
humanitarians in the zones of intervention also creates new forms of sociali-
ties. “Aidland” (Apthorpe 2013) is characterized by guest houses, bars, restau-
rants, shopping malls, and other such venues frequented predominantly by 
foreign humanitarians. As humanitarian space is co-constituted and embodied 
by expatriates working for international non-governmental organizations, 
those spaces equally become zones of humanitarian encounter (Smirl 2015).
The so called “expatriate bubble” is one of the key characteristics of ethno-
graphic studies on aid workers. The dynamics surrounding the everyday lives 
of international aid workers in the fields of intervention have been described 
as the “bunkerization” of expatriate communities. This perspective comple-
ments the view of the luxurious lifestyles of “mobile professionals,” while add-
ing to the picture mobility limitations, as evident in the classification of hu-







Apthorpe, R. (2013) Coda. With Alice in Aidland: A Seriously Satirical Allegory. In: 
Mosse, D. ed. Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in Interna-
tional Development. Berghahn.
Autesserre, S. (2014) Peaceland. Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of Interna-
tional Intervention. Cambridge University Press.
Baaz, M. (2005) The Paternalism of Partnership. A Postcolonial Reading of Identity in 
Development Aid. Zed Books.
Benton, A. (2016) African Expatriates and Race in the Anthropology of Humanitarian-
ism. Critical African Studies, 8(3): 266–277.
Fassin, D. (2011) Humanitarian Reason. A Moral History of the Present. University of 
California Press.
Fechter, A.-M. (2007) Transnational Lives. Expatriates in Indonesia. Ashgate.
Mosse, D., Lewis, D. (2006) Theoretical Approaches to Brokerage and Translation in 
Development. In: Lewis, D., Mosse, D. eds. Development Brokers and Translators: The 
Ethnography of Aid and Agencies. Kumarian Press.
Redfield, P. (2012) The Unbearable Lightness of Ex-Pats. Double Binds of Humanitarian 
Mobility. Cultural Anthropology, 27(2): 358–382.
Smirl, L. (2015) Spaces of Aid: How Cars, Compounds and Hotels Shape Humanitarian-
ism. Zed Books.
Financing
Financing humanitarian aid remains a major challenge. Governments have the 
primary responsibility to prepare for, respond to, and support recovery from 
crises in their own territories. However, many humanitarian and major pro-
longed crises take place in countries where domestic capacity and revenue 
sources cannot meet the scale of needs. International humanitarian assistance 
and development aid is therefore essential for alleviating suffering and ad-
dressing the longer-term developmental needs often underpinning and exac-
erbating crises.
The humanitarian system and its financing are under immense pressure 
from ongoing crises affecting over 200 million people in Syria, Yemen, South 
Sudan, Nigeria, and beyond. The gap between needs and funding continues to 
grow even while traditional donors—governments, foundations, and private 
funders—increase their grant funding to traditional emergency responders 
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such as the United Nations (UN), the Red Cross Movement, and non-govern-
mental organizations (ngos). The global humanitarian assistance budget 
keeps increasing and yet there is never enough “humanitarian money.” There 
are more crises, they are lasting longer, and humanitarian aid is covering more 
aspects than it ever has before (Development Initiatives 2018).
The World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 put the financing gap on the glob-
al agenda with the Report to the UN Secretary General from the High-Level 
Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2016). The gap still remains a major chal-
lenge. UN-coordinated appeals are central to a humanitarian response. Total 
funding received by UN-coordinated appeals increased by usd 2.4 billion to 
usd 14.9 billion, the largest volume of funding ever received. Despite this in-
crease, there was a funding shortfall of more than usd 10 billion against appeal 
requirements, the largest shortfall ever.
The biggest contributors of humanitarian aid to developing countries are 
also the main providers of development assistance reporting to the oecd’s De-
velopment Assistance Committee. All funding for humanitarian aid is allocat-
ed from the aid budgets of these donor countries. Over the last decade (2007–
2016), official humanitarian assistance has grown at three times the rate of 
official development aid. It has risen by 124 percent, from usd 8.7 billion to 
usd 19.5 billion, while overall development aid has grown by 41 percent, from 
usd 119 billion to usd 167 billion (oecd 2017).
There is a growing realization that there will never be enough quality mon-
ey to fund responses to humanitarian crises. The growing gap between demand 
and supply has led to an emphasis on the failures to adapt the humanitarian 
system, and what has been called a dysfunctional and inefficient financing ar-
chitecture (Scott 2015).
Several key issues and challenges are emerging in this debate. One is to im-
prove the predictability of funding. This should include more systematic mul-
tiannual funding commitments from donors. There is also a need to expand 
the financing pool for protracted crises. The various post-2015 processes pro-
vide many opportunities for improving coherence between humanitarian and 
development actors working in longer-term crises.
Crises in middle-income countries pose a special financing challenge, and 
the solution requires a paradigm shift about how to approach crises in these 
countries. Financing to meet crises in middle-income countries is a growing 
and complex problem: 53 percent of all humanitarian funds requested in 2015 
were for crises in these countries, and there was limited access to anything 
other than dedicated humanitarian budgets. Finally, there is a pressing need 
for the money to effectively reach those in need, and to increase the value for 
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money of humanitarian programming. Delivery of humanitarian aid needs to 
become more cost effective. The cost of delivering humanitarian aid varies 
greatly between different countries and institutions. This is exaggerated by 
tied aid and the use of Northern resources and institutions in the delivery of 
much humanitarian aid. Likewise, the prevalence of corruption also increases 
costs.
Beyond current reform efforts to make humanitarian crisis funding faster, 
more consistent, and more effective, there is a sense that donors need to move 
from grant-making to using a wider range of financial tools—and private fi-
nance has a part to play in new partnerships where grant funding can leverage 
investment finance (Willitts-King 2019).
There is also an appetite among traditional donors and foundations 
to   explore different uses of grant funding to attract greater capital input 
from   investors. New partnerships and financial instruments from across the 
 philanthropic–commercial spectrum could be used to address the challenges 
facing humanitarian financing. This has become known as innovative financ-
ing, and it opens up opportunities but also includes challenges, such as the 
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The right to food is protected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the Geneva Conventions, and therefore should be granted to every human 
being in every situation. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights introduced the concept of “adequate food” (Article 11) as one of 
the crucial rights to guarantee “an adequate standard of living.” This definition 
is further clarified in the “General Comment No. 12, The Right to Adequate 
Food,” which defines “availability, accessibility, adequacy and sustainability” as 
key elements in the right. The first definition of a “world food security  system … 
which would ensure adequate availability of, and reasonable prices for, food at 
all times” appeared in the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger 
and Malnutrition (udehm, section g). The United Nations has two agencies 
that grant access to food: the Food and Agriculture Organization (fao) and the 
World Food Program. These organizations work together with a variety of non-
governmental organizations (ngos) and other institutions. The main humani-
tarian issue related to food is famine. Following the 1974 famine in Bangladesh, 
the udehm was approved, and introduced the concept of Food Security (fs), 
which aims to guarantee access to food in any context. fs acquired global im-
portance during the famines in Ethiopia and the Sahel (1984–1985), whose rep-
resentation in Western media generated a massive food delivery (Edkins 2000). 
Amartya Sen (1983) defines famine as a reduction of “exchange entitlement” 
that someone has towards food, overtaking the traditional Malthusian ap-
proach that associated famines with a population growing faster than the food 
production capacity. Sen defines the “exchange entitlement” as the “set of all 
the alternative bundles of commodities” that someone “can acquire in ex-
change for what he owns.” Thus, famine happens when “the exchange entitle-
ment does not contain any feasible bundle including enough food” (Sen 1983: 
3). Alex de Waal (1997: 23) emphasizes how Sen contributed to “the institution-
alization and professionalization of fighting famine”: famines are defined as a 
technical problem produced by several (including natural) causes that can be 
solved by appropriate institutions. However, despite the effort of Sen to con-
nect famines to their political causes, humanitarian organizations could not 
fully deal with them, as exemplified by the Ethiopia famine of 1984–1985, when 
the responsibilities of the government had to be hidden to allow relief inter-
ventions (Edkins 2000). Moreover, humanitarian organizations narrowed the 
definition of famine as an “epidemic undernutrition” (de Waal 1997: 55), focus-
ing on food mainly as a source of nutrients and further depoliticizing the treat-
ment of famines. In the 1990s, in the wake of free trade agreements including 
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staple food, social movements connected to peasants’ organizations in the 
Global South drafted a critique of this approach and promoted the concept of 
“food sovereignty,” which connected the idea of “adequate food” to characteris-
tics such as “healthy and culturally appropriate” and “produced through eco-
logically sound and sustainable methods” (Declaration of Nyéléni 2007). This 
concept was partially taken into account by the fao and some governments in 
their development policies.
In the last two decades, humanitarian approaches towards food have been 
partially revised by the idea of a “relief development continuum” (Scott-Smith 
2018a: 668) and the frameworks of the Millennium Development Goals and 
Sustainable Development Goals. Following these debates, two approaches be-
came influential in fs policies: the idea of resilience as a clue for famine pre-
vention and the reliance on “Ready to Use Therapeutic Food” (rutf) as a stan-
dard remedy for malnutrition. Resilience emphasizes the need of communities 
to reduce vulnerability to external shock, diversifying the production and in-
creasing the capacity of local producers, so that they can quickly react, relying 
on humanitarian organizations only for some support. rutfs are pastes en-
riched with nutrients easy to administer to malnourished people, which is a 
quick solution that can potentially be applied to any context and can be han-
dled by local communities as they do not require heavy infrastructure or 
trained staff to be administered (Scott-Smith 2018b). However, the 2007–2008 
food price crisis made evident the difficulties in controlling the fluctuation of 
the markets and protecting the more vulnerable strata of society by promoting 
their “resilience.” The reactions to the famines in the Horn of Africa and Sahel 
in 2011 were also criticized as slow and incapable of reaching vulnerable groups 
(Save the Children and Oxfam 2012), while ngos and scholars criticized the 
“fetishization” of the rutfs as a sort of miraculous solution for any forms of 
malnutrition (Scott-Smith 2018b). Despite efforts to revise their strategies and 
assumptions, the main challenge for humanitarian institutions remains to bet-
ter contextualize food in its complex circuit of production and exchange on 
both global and local levels.
Valerio Colosio
References
Declaration of Nyéléni (2007) https://nyeleni.org/




Food – Foreign Aid
Edkins, J. (2000) Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid. University of 
Minnesota Press.
Save the Children, Oxfam (2012) A Dangerous Delay. The Cost of Late Response to Early 
Warnings in the 2011 Drought in the Horn of Africa. Joint Agency Briefing Paper.
Scott-Smith, T. (2018a) Paradoxes of Resilience: A Review of the World Disasters Report 
2016. Development and Change, 49(2): 662–677.
Scott-Smith, T. (2018b) Sticky Technologies: Plumpy’nut, Emergency Feeding and the 
Viscosity of Humanitarian Design. Social Studies of Science, 48(1): 3–24.
Sen, A. (1983) Poverty and Famines. An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford 
University Press.
Foreign Aid
Foreign aid can be defined as an international transfer of resources (capital, 
goods, or services) on a voluntary basis from one country or international orga-
nization (a donor) to another country (recipient). This transfer aims to benefit 
the population of a developing country in the form of either grants or loans. 
Foreign aid includes military, economic, or humanitarian international assis-
tance. The United Nations target for foreign aid is 0.7 percent of a donor coun-
try’s gross national income.
In the post-Cold War context, foreign aid combines humanitarian interven-
tion with political action and can be considered as a pillar of political humani-
tarianism. Humanitarian intervention was limited by the principle of non-in-
terference into the domestic affairs of the sovereign states in the post-1945 
bipolar world. In the multipolar world after 1991, foreign aid has become a 
product of the interventionist approach to international relations (Macrae and 
Leader 2000).
Foreign aid is based on the foreign policy interests of donors, embedded in 
humanitarian and development projects, and on the engagement between aid 
organizations and political authorities in times of crisis on issues of population 
access and aid distribution (Ehrenfeld 2004). Donor foreign policy interests 
vary from getting access to the country’s strategic natural resources in exchange 
for aid to reducing the number of refugees coming out of crisis zones. This 
means that, in some cases, the provision of foreign aid benefits the donor coun-
tries more than the recipients (Atlani-Duault and Dozon 2011). The dependen-
cy between the donor and recipient countries is indeed two way: “although 
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dependent on foreign aid, several countries in the Global South  significantly 
contribute to the prosperity of the Global North via interest payments, subcon-
tracts, exploitation of resources, and labor force” (De Lauri 2016: 3).
Aid organizations must negotiate on population access and aid distribution 
with political authorities in crisis countries to ensure that aid is delivered to 
non-combatants on a needs basis, regardless of which side of the conflict they 
belong to (Macrae and Leader 2000). The principles of neutrality and impar-
tiality of aid provision aim to ensure that aid cannot be used as a weapon of 
war by antagonistic parties, by blocking or cutting supplies to a political rival 
or enriching people in power through bribes, for example. This, however, is not 
always the case, and foreign aid can become yet another battlefield of conflict-
ing perceptions, identities, relationships, and interests between the donors, 
aid organizations, local authorities, and populations in need (Dunn 2012).
Foreign aid is highly political and thus closely related to the humanitarian–
development–security nexus, where separation between the apolitical (hu-
manitarian) and the political (development, security) no longer holds (Lewis 
2016). An emergency can evolve into a chronic humanitarian crisis, while an 
armed conflict can develop into a frozen or recurring military activity, both 
requiring long-term solutions, where humanitarian aid becomes development 
assistance (Atlani-Duault and Dozon 2011). Afghanistan and Iraq are examples 
of prolonged armed conflicts, whereas Vietnam and the Philippines are exam-
ples of countries with recurring natural disasters. In conflict zones, security is 
no longer considered in merely military terms but includes human, social, eco-
nomic, and environmental dimensions of aid programming as peace-making. 
Similarly, practices such as disaster risk reduction and risk management are 
now employed as part of development aid aimed at preventing future humani-
tarian crises and regulating the delivery of humanitarian assistance when a 
crisis occurs.
The intersections of humanitarian–development–security issues in for-
eign aid have paved the way for the term “complex emergencies” (Macrae 
and  Leader 2000). This idea has complicated an understanding of what a hu-
manitarian crisis is and what type of assistance it requires. The proliferation 
of  various tools to address crises has also contributed to the complexity and 
 compartmentalization of emergencies. Such a professionalization and bu-
reaucratization of aid has focused on predetermined programming solutions, 
rather than solutions stemming from the identified problems on the ground 
(Dunn 2012).
Because of these developments, academics and practitioners keep battling 
with the following questions: how to separate aid from political goals and to 
do more good than harm, how to better understand lived experiences of aid 
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Gender Empowerment
The concept of “empowerment” originates in the social movements that 
emerged in West Europe and North America in the late 1960s, notably those 
related to the rights of women and ethnic and sexual minorities. These move-
ments brought issues of gender, race, and ethnicity into the public realm in a 
collective attempt to resist assimilation policies inspired from “humanist” uni-
versalism. Self-empowerment was a means for those who had experienced dis-
crimination to boost their self-confidence and self-esteem in order to find the 
strength to devise their own path towards emancipation (Jennings 2001).
Women’s empowerment was a major motto of second-wave feminists after 
their realization that the egalitarian politics pursued by their predecessors had 
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failed to bring about positive change for women. This identitarian and com-
munitarian trend of second-wave feminism understood oppression as primar-
ily located in the “personal” private realm (Beauvoir 2015), the arena where 
self-deprecation took place and where sexual taboos (such as abortion or ha-
rassment) were kept secret. Consciousness-raising groups, following the “ped-
agogy of the oppressed” (Freire 2014), became a mode of subjective exploration 
of widely shared forms of stigmatization that had been silenced in public. 
Women’s empowerment involved a broad range of practices, including speak-
ing out about personal experiences and breaking taboos, building relation-
ships of solidarity among women (guided by the principle of “sisterhood”), or 
establishing spaces and institutions exclusively reserved to women. The uni-
versalist category of “human” was deconstructed to reintroduce two sexes 
(Fouque 1995), not only in philosophical and psychoanalytical terminology, 
but also in the grammar of everyday life practices.
Since the 1990s, international institutions, influenced by the capabilities ap-
proach to development (Sen 2011; Nussbaum 2011, 2001; Alexander 2008), have 
begun to use the notion of gender empowerment (rather than empowerment 
for women) in development policies and humanitarian actions. Gender em-
powerment was notably promoted in the United Nations (UN) Millennium 
Development Goals and then in the Sustainable Development Goals, where it 
is presented as a necessary step for a country to overcome obstacles associated 
with poverty and development.
Gender empowerment in the context of development entails policies aimed 
at ensuring women’s equal participation with men in decision-making process-
es and their inclusion in the economic sphere. In humanitarian emergencies, it 
involves strengthening the resilience of affected populations by empowering 
women and girls, portrayed in the literature as ideal victims and agents of 
change. “Empowerment hubs” established by UN Women for female victims of 
gender-based violence, for example, are conceived as places for girls and wom-
en “to come together, break social isolation, participate and show leadership” 
(UN Women 2018: 16). The ideal of femininity promoted in such projects is of-
ten one that embodies a specific form of subjectivity: self-driven, agentic, en-
trepreneurial. The “girl powering” of humanitarian aid has therefore to be 
placed in the broader context of the depoliticization and corporatization of 
humanitarianism (Koffman, Orgad, and Gill 2015), where responses to “emer-
gencies” are found at the individual level via “self-help” programs rather than in 
more political projects of redistribution and social justice (Billaud 2012, 2015). 
This focus on individual empowerment tends to overlook the various forms of 
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Genocide
From its very conception, the word genocide has been entwined with humani-
tarian concerns and the heavy legal, social, and moral obligation to act in the 
face of atrocity. Until 1944, genocide was “the crime without a name,” and in-
stead acts of genocide fell into the general categories of mass killing or crimes 
against humanity; but the systematic horrors of the Holocaust meant that 
these acts could no longer be ignored.
“Genocide” was coined by Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in his semi-
nal work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944). After experiencing the suffering 
of World War ii, Lemkin tirelessly advocated at the United Nations (UN) for 
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international and legal recognition of the crime of genocide. His efforts were 
instrumental to the adoption of the UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948 (Jones 2016).
Comprised of the Greek “genos” (meaning race or tribe) and the Latin “cide” 
(killing), genocide literally means the killing of a specific group of people 
(Lemkin 1944). Lemkin envisaged that genocide would also include the social, 
economic, and historical destruction of a group of peoples and would there-
fore encompass not only killing, but also eradication or removal. According to 
Lemkin, genocide “is intended … to signify a coordinated plan of different ac-
tions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national 
groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Lemkin 1944). 
Thus, its broad definition could include the eradication of language, destruc-
tion of historical monuments, or even the lack of memorialization of a signifi-
cant event in the history of a people. However, genocide, its meaning, and how 
the international community should respond are all subject to fierce academic 
and legal debate (Jones 2016; Short 2016).
Genocide is legally defined by the UN Convention (1948) as an “intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.” This 
could be achieved through killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, de-
liberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction 
of the group, imposing measures to prevent births, or forcibly transferring chil-
dren. One of the primary criticisms leveled at the convention is that it excludes 
cultural, indigenous, political, gender, and social groups from the legal defini-
tion of genocide, making it theoretically impossible to prosecute a perpetrator 
of genocide against these groups (Jones 2016; Short 2016). For an act to be con-
sidered genocide in the legal setting, there needs to be demonstrable intent to 
destroy. This often creates a legal stumbling block as documents proving intent 
very rarely exist, and, if they do, are veiled with neutral terminology or relevant 
information is redacted (Power 2003).
The 1948 convention was aimed to legally bind the signatories into acting in 
the face of atrocity. However, the lack of consensus about when an act consti-
tutes genocide and the lack of political will to intervene in the affairs of an-
other country often translates in practice to a lack of agreement about when or 
how to intervene or provide support (Annan 1998).
The international community was criticized for being a bystander and not 
intervening to prevent genocide in either Rwanda or Cambodia. Further, dur-
ing the Bosnian war the UN was present but was unable to secure protection of 
civilians and protect a safe area, leading to the murder of 8000 men and boys 
in Srebrenica (Power 2003). The 1995 Srebrenica massacre, genocide in Rwanda 
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(1994), and atrocities in Kosovo (1998–1999) and Darfur in the 1990s pushed 
genocide to the forefront of political and humanitarian discourses, bringing 
questions of the role of humanitarianism in confronting and preventing geno-
cide into public, political, and academic debate. In 2005, arguably as a result of 
the atrocities witnessed in the 1990s, the UN implemented the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P). While this has created an infrastructure that is supposed to 
protect the most vulnerable and prevent genocide and other mass atrocities, it 
has also raised concerns that military interventions with other goals are justi-
fied by R2P. Although evoked several times, Libya is the only case where the 
R2P doctrine has been officially used. The doctrine was claimed to be imple-
mented via the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which was proposed by 
France, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom and adopted on March 17, 2011. The 
multistate nato-led coalition adopted military means with the supposed aim 
of protecting civilians from an oppressive regime. However, the legitimacy and 
the effects of the international intervention are still debated, and figures re-
lated to casualties of the 2011 coalition bombing are contested. According to 
Human Rights Watch (2012), the bombing resulted in a loss of life of at least 72 
civilians and up to 1000 supposed combatants; according to Libyan sources, the 
figures are higher. The long-term implications of the intervention, including 
displacement and instability, are still unfolding.
Different cases globally demonstrate the complicated humanitarian chal-
lenges posed by genocide and intervention. The international community is 
yet to find a way to effectively protect civilians and prevent murderous conflict 
and genocide (Annan 1998; Kuperman 2001).
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Gift
In 1925, French sociologist and anthropologist Marcel Mauss wrote the classic 
of social theories of reciprocity and gift exchange, arguing that gifts create and 
reproduce social relations. Mauss noticed three obligations in societies prac-
ticing the so-called gift economies: to give, to accept, and to return the gift 
(Mauss 1967[1925]). Since every gift carries with it a set of obligations, it pres-
ents a materialization of social relations. When there is a significant temporal 
delay between the gift and the countergift, or when there are many people 
linked into a network (Lévi-Strauss 1969), participants can avoid recognizing 
their participation in a gift exchange.
Anthropologist Anette Weiner suggests that there are forms of giving that 
contribute to the reproduction of whole societies, not just of relations between 
particular individuals. In such forms of giving, an obligation is created not just 
between the giver and the receiver, but also between their relatives and non-
kin, allowing for “long term regeneration of intergenerational (and intragen-
erational) social relations” (Weiner 1980: 79).
This view of the gift as productive of social relations has sparked a discus-
sion among various social theorists on the possibilities of a “free gift”—one 
that requires no answer, and thus is not implicated in the creation and reitera-
tion of social relations. For instance, French philosopher Jacques Derrida 
claimed that a true gift must not be linked with any acknowledgment. Any sort 
of a response—even saying “thank you”—moves the gift into a domain of ex-
change: “For there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, 
countergift or debt” (Derrida 1992: 13). In his reading, the only real gift can be 
the gift of time.
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Anthropologist James Parry has critically assessed the urge of Western 
scholars to find the free gift, noticing that “the ideology of disinterested gift 
emerges in parallel with an ideology of purely interested exchange” (Parry 
1986: 458). In other words, an assumption that there is something corrupt 
about gifts intertwined with reciprocity or interest is the product of an ideol-
ogy that first appeared in modern states with an advanced division of labor. 
Exchange of commodities and gifts in modernist societies works in a specific 
conceptual frame, where gifts and exchange, persons and things, interest and 
disinterest need to be clearly kept apart.
Theories of gift exchange have influenced humanitarian studies. Humani-
tarianism presents a distinct form of a transnational gift that cannot be recip-
rocated (Bornstein 2012). As Didier Fassin argues, there is an assumption of 
ontological inequality between the givers and the recipients of humanitarian 
aid. Those who need saving “are those for whom the gift cannot imply a coun-
ter-gift, since it is assumed that they can only receive. They are the indebted of 
the world” (Fassin 2007: 512). Although it precludes reciprocity, humanitarian 
aid is not quite a “free gift.” Following Weiner’s argument (that gift giving is not 
necessarily about reciprocity between particular persons, but about regenera-
tion of the wider social order), we can analyze how obligations created through 
humanitarian aid reproduce geopolitical links and social relations on a global 
scale. Finally, there is an ongoing tension in humanitarianism between the 
spontaneous and fleeting impulse to save lives and the regulation of this im-
pulse through attempts to bureaucratize humanitarian aid (Bornstein 2009). 
Very often, this tension results in adhocracy, “a system that used rough-and-
ready ways of knowing to quickly arrive at improvised solutions” (Dunn 
2012: 15) creating along the way “chaos and vulnerability as much as it creates 
order” (Dunn 2012: 2).
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Global Health
Global health can be defined as “collaborative international research and ac-
tion for promoting health for all” in an equitable manner (Beaglehole and Bo-
nita 2010). The roots of global health lie in colonial medicine, and in the 
 19th-century concept of “international health,” which worked to control the 
spread of epidemics between countries, including between developed and de-
veloping countries.
When the World Health Organization (who) was formed in 1948, 70 coun-
tries were represented; by 2010, there were 193 countries. After some early set-
backs because of the who’s top-down approach, global health priorities were 
significantly reformulated in 1978 at a conference in Alma-Ata according to the 
principle of “health for all.” This involved access to health education, immuni-
zation, disease control, and essential medications (Farmer, Kleinman, Yong 
Kim and Basilico 2013). However, with the marketization and privatization of 
health in the 1980s, global health was reframed as a commodity rather than a 
right, and, alongside national governments, the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund and unicef became major players in health. The Gates Foun-
dation is now the largest funder for global health.
Severe health inequity remains a burning human rights issue. With the poor 
bearing the brunt of both preventable ill health and human rights violations in 
all countries, health advocacy, public health, and humanitarian and social jus-
tice concerns have been jointly mobilized by governments, non-governmental 
organizations, social and political movements, and health activists to address 
the “pathogenic role of inequity” (Farmer 2003). Humanitarianism operates in 
global health as organized institutional and government action, as well as a 
discourse and justification for community and political action.
The aids pandemic of the 1980s and 1990s catalyzed global health as a field. 
As anti-retroviral treatments transformed a fatal disease to a manageable one 
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and linked to the Millennium Development Goals, billions of dollars became 
available in grants and debt relief in what has been termed global health’s 
“golden age” (Farmer, Kleinman, Yong Kim and Basilico 2013). The United Na-
tions and who ambitiously aimed to extend anti-retroviral treatments to mil-
lions in low- and middle-income countries, in African countries particularly. 
The United States (USA) increased funding to aids prevention, care, and 
treatment tenfold between 2000 and 2006. Despite enormous successes in 
hiv/aids prevention and treatment, however, this roll-out was complicated. 
Some governments, for example in South Africa, ignored medical findings and 
denied aids treatments to stigmatized populations, with tragic consequences 
(Fassin 2007). Others, such as Pakistan, failed owing to other government pri-
orities and corruption in state bureaucracies.
Global health now encompasses interventions for infectious diseases (e.g. 
tuberculosis, malaria, Ebola, Zika), unexplained illness, illness prevention and 
vaccination, maternal and reproductive health, the impact of war, chemical 
and nuclear spills, and political violence towards health and health services. 
Ad hoc actions range from fistula and birthing injuries, for example in Niger 
(Heller 2018), to immunizations; rural health delivery in Haiti and Rwanda 
(Farmer et al. 2013) to interventions in societies in transition to democracy. 
Global health involves temporalities of urgency in situations requiring an im-
mediate mobilization of resources, as well as longer-term temporalities in pro-
grams to improve health outcomes, and fractured health systems. These are 
required to be cost-effective and sustainable, conditions that are not always 
compatible with reducing inequity.
Humanitarian interventions have comprised an array of methodologies and 
techniques. “Quick fix” approaches apply technological innovations, including 
mobile health interventions in remote locations, flying doctors and temporary 
surgical camps, and mass screenings for infectious disease.
Controversies arise concerning the delivery of justice and intervention 
within colonial and postcolonial matrices of organized and institutional pow-
er and knowledge. Interventions must also address challenges involving scal-
ing and translating universalist projects for local contexts. For example, in the 
Republic of Guinea, humanitarian responses to Ebola, insensitive to and ill 
informed about local histories of structural violence, unsettled the explosive 
but latent social tensions in everyday modes of social accommodations be-
tween existing burial practices and hospital medicine, local political structures 
and external political subjection, mining interests and communities, and those 
suspected of “sorcery”—which severely restricted its efficacy (Fairhead 2016). 
Responses must also address the application of Western-derived knowledge 
to  local contexts, accommodate tensions between local, indigenous, and 
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 standardized global approaches, and confront issues of professionalism and 
legitimacy—as well as local community efforts to resist and decolonize top-
down deductive approaches of the global health imperium (Farmer et al. 2013). 
While historically the “West” has been at the center of economic imperialism 
and global health, power is fluid and shifting, as evident in China’s medical 
campaigns across 30 African countries, including the building of private hospi-
tals, in postwar and developing contexts.
Despite clinicians’ best efforts, citizens of the USA are dying on the streets. 
This is because of a confluence of inadequate public health care, acute funding 
pressures on community psychiatry, social inequality, inner-city degeneration, 
and homelessness and related illnesses (Brodwin 2013). In Europe, the conflu-
ence of changing food environments, long-term financial crisis and austerity, 
and cuts in state health provision have also led to deepening health inequities. 
Controversies additionally surround the politics of health care provision to 
asylum seekers. For example, in Europe access to health care for clandestine 
and illegal migrants varies significantly across countries, raising questions 
about health equity, global bioethics, and the need for a more joined-up ap-
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Humanitarian governance, broadly defined, is the attempt to regulate the hu-
manitarian field—including rules, structures, and mechanisms for promoting 
accountable and effective humanitarian practice. Linked to the overall aim of 
humanitarianism, of helping vulnerable populations in need, humanitarian 
governance can be seen as “an increasingly organized and internationalized 
attempt to save the lives, enhance the welfare, and reduce the suffering of the 
world’s vulnerable populations” (Barnett 2013: 379). Although humanitarian 
governance is legitimized as an act of benevolence, it may also help a particu-
lar set of actors achieve their own political and economic goals (Pandolfi 2003; 
Nader and Savinar 2016). Power and inequality are thus central aspects of hu-
manitarian governance.
Self-regulation is a core element of humanitarian governance. At the global, 
transnational, and local levels, the humanitarian field has traditionally been 
governed by non-state actors—the humanitarian organizations themselves. 
The rules and regulations governing the humanitarian sector have therefore 
been a self-organized attempt at collective action, ranging from voluntary 
codes of conduct to more institutional structures with enforcement and sanc-
tioning mechanisms. The content of these regulations, however, is defined by 
political processes led by actors with varying degrees of power and influence, 
and with different agency, values, and objectives.
One of the challenges of governing humanitarian non-state actors is the so-
called accountability black hole (Yuhas 2015). Although humanitarian gover-
nance may originally be driven by a humanitarian ethos of helping the most 
vulnerable, it also involves practices ruling the lives of the most vulnerable 
without providing them with a means of recourse to hold the humanitarian 
actors accountable for their actions (Garnier, Sandvik, and Jubilut 2016). Hu-
manitarian actors may be involved in operations to promote their own agen-
das or states’ agendas, thus reproducing unequal power relations, but are not 
necessarily held responsible for this.
Specific humanitarian crises and the unintended and negative impacts of 
humanitarian intervention have spurred the development of humanitarian 
governance. Assessments of the operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992–
1993), the genocide in Rwanda (1994), and the interventions in Bosnia 1992–
1995 and Kosovo (1999) led to recommendations in form of regulation and en-
forcement to ensure the improved performance of non-governmental and 
international organizations (Givoni 2011). One outcome of this process was the 
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establishment of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs—
turned into the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (ocha) in 
1998. ocha is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure 
a coherent response to emergencies and for guaranteeing a framework within 
which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort.
The Oslo Guidelines on the use of military and civil defense assets in disas-
ter relief were developed in 1994, and then updated (ocha 2007), in response 
to the increasing role of the military in humanitarian operations.
The non-governmental organizations created the Sphere handbook and 
Sphere standards, including minimum standards that would help to improve 
accountability and the overall quality of humanitarian response to those af-
fected by disasters. Although the main actors are international and non- 
governmental organizations (ngos), states play a role in defining and imple-
menting humanitarian governance (Harvey 2009). Based on the 1991 UN 
Humanitarian Resolution 46/182, states have the first responsibility to protect 
citizens in situations of natural disasters and other emergencies and should in 
principle be able to respond to humanitarian crises. If they require aid, states 
should be able to coordinate external assistance. State laws and registration 
procedures both in aid-receiving and origin states are regulating humanitarian 
organizations. These regulations are related to wider issues of governance and 
politics, as restrictions of access for humanitarian organizations can be used as 
a way of controlling the citizens, constraining ngos, and curtailing human 
rights. Humanitarian actors must face the potential contradiction between 
providing support to governments and preserving the independence needed 
to protect those who need it.
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Human Dignity
Human dignity relates to myriad of meanings across different cultural contexts 
and time frames (Habermas 2010; Kateb 2011). Its current use, which is codified 
within international law as a legal principle, a utilitarian and universal ideal, is 
located within Eurocentric epistemologies of rights and personhood. In this 
sense, its origins have both Roman and Greek roots. As a construct, the notion 
“human dignity” conjoins the predicate “human” and the noun “dignity,” which 
draws on the Latin expressions humus for human, decus for dignity, and on the 
Greek word dignitas for dignity. But while the idea of human dignity enjoys 
global acceptance as a basic ethical and legal principle, it is also captured by 
contextually specific vocabularies embedded in philosophies of moral value, 
mutual respect, interdependency and conviviality, such as the notions of 
Ubuntu (South Africa), Ujama (Tanzania), Kizuna (Japan), Satyagraha (India), 
and Ashia (Southern Cameroons), among others. Any universal use of human 
dignity must therefore be sensitive to specific contextual understandings and 
be further subjected to empirical substantiation.
As a key humanitarian concept (Edkins 2003; McCrudden 2008; Meron and 
Rosas 1991), human dignity refers to the basic act of recognizing another per-
son as a worthy human—that is, the status of human beings that entitles 
them to respect. It is the basic foundation of every human relationship and is 
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 manifested differently across various cultural contexts. To be human is to have 
dignity, which Italian scholar Giorgio Agamben (1998) refers to as more than 
just bare life: a respectable and respected social being, rather than just a brute 
biological organism. It is a grounding justification for all the actions under-
taken to protect and preserve human welfare.
Human dignity became one of the most significant constructs of humani-
tarianism after the end of World War ii and is now protected in almost every 
internal law and domestic jurisdiction. It became an institutionalized practice 
after the Holocaust and the founding of the United Nations system. Within this 
context, “human” was defined as a particular kind of liberal individual requir-
ing protection. In international law, human dignity is articulated as a right and 
is enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
At the individual level, human dignity refers to a sense of pride over one’s 
self-worth and value, often operationalized by development agencies and na-
tional governments as a cultivation of individual capabilities. Collectively, it is 
a moral obligation embedded in an ethics of care that spells out the condi-
tions  through which people get processed as valuable humans deserving of 
 recognition—that is, the terms by which a person gains recognition as a full 
and equal human being.
Although they are premised on the notion of human dignity and equality, 
humanitarian interventions are not always distributed equally. Therefore, 
some scholars argue that they are part of a broader matrix of political projects, 
where there is more urgency to salvage some groups’ human dignity than that 
of others. This can be referred to as the inequality of humanitarianism, situat-
ed within a narrow recognition of a status as citizen with specific rights, privi-
leges, and obligations. This is embedded in the thesis, to paraphrase George 
Orwell (1945), that while all humans are equal, some are more equal than oth-
ers, and therefore the responsibility to protect them is more urgent—hence 
creating a hierarchy of suffering and being.
Today, dignity is a deeply contested construct with shifting interpretations, 
and not only the prerogative of humans, as seen in instruments protecting the 
dignity of plants, animals, and, more recently, robots. It is also invoked in bio-
ethical debates and a core element of instruments concerned with biotechnol-
ogy, biomedicine and artificial intelligence, calling for a concept of dignity that 
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Human Rights
Human rights are a discourse and ideology around which a massive global 
phenomenon has formed since World War ii. This phenomenon encompasses 
the human rights community, including human rights experts and activists, 
and artifacts including human rights covenants, policy papers, and reports. 
The core of human rights ideology rests on the ideas of equality and eman-
cipation, and is further anchored in the universalizing category of “everyone,” 
a gender-neutral and all-encompassing term that eludes distinctions on the 
basis of nationality or other criteria. At the same time, human rights can be 
conceptualized as entities protecting the individual against the arbitrary treat-
ment of the sovereign, whether embodied by a monarch, state, tribe, clan, or 
family.
In their emphasis on the individual, human rights are connected to interna-
tional humanitarian law, which likewise places its emphasis on the individual, 
not on states, which are the primary subjects of international law. Both human 
rights and international humanitarian law also aim to find different ways of 
protecting the individual. Yet the temporality and overall vision of human 
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 nature and reality are fundamentally different. While international humanitar-
ian law is more history-oriented and pessimistic, human rights ideology is for-
ward-looking and utopian, founded on a notion of human nature as flawed but 
 capable of improvement. Thus, the main impetus of human rights work is to 
address existing wrongdoing and harmful patterns and structures, and to work 
toward future improvement. Simultaneously, future improvement forms a fun-
damental legitimating component for human rights work occurring today.
The history of human rights is commonly presented in scholarly accounts 
through a standardized, mythical “textbook narrative of origins,” a tale of for-
ward-looking progressiveness authored primarily by Western legal philoso-
phers and legal scholars that depicts human rights as the ultimate outcome of 
human evolution. Sometimes, this narrative is presented via a “universalizing 
variation” that aims to find precedence for human rights thinking across 
 different eras and civilizations. Yet such efforts fall into conceptual vagueness 
by  overlooking the distinctive discourses and contexts of such efforts 
( Halme-Tuomisaari and Slotte 2015). The same problematic applies also to the 
 universalism–relativism debate that has characterized human rights since the 
1947 statement by the American Anthropological Association (aaa) on the 
planned Universal Declaration of Human Rights (udhr) adopted in 1948 (aaa 
1947; UN 1948).
Over the past few decades, the history of human rights has started to awak-
en vivid debate (Moyn 2012). The gist of the debate can be summarized by two 
questions. First, have human rights in some form always been around, in all 
cultures and geographic areas, gradually growing into human consciousness 
via the “evolution” of mankind? Or are they rather “new inventions,” receiving 
their origin in a “big bang moment,” most commonly seen as the adoption of 
the udhr, followed by subsequent expansion in geographic and substantive 
terms? Today, most scholars have adopted an interim position, seeing human 
rights as a particular post-World War ii phenomenon while simultaneously ac-
knowledging diverse forms of continuity, both institutional continuities, with 
practices of the League of Nations, and ideological continuities with earlier 
rights initiatives that extend back to the revolutionary era and natural rights 
tradition.
The popularity of human rights can be connected both to their emancipa-
tory ethos and to their capacity to appear simultaneously as “absolute” and 
“undefined”; or, in the words of legal scholar Duncan Kennedy, universal and 
factoid (Kennedy 2002). These qualities also lend themselves to the relation-
ship that human rights have to law: human rights are both law and reason for 
law. Combined, these qualities support the continued expansion of human 
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rights as they have in the much-utilized terminology of Sally Merry become 
“vernacularized,” as new concerns and interest groups have become recog-
nized under their umbrella (Merry 2006). The transition of women’s or indig-
enous peoples’ rights into human rights are familiar examples, with the rights 
of lgbtqi people forming the latest high-profile example. Human rights also 
provide important legitimation for humanitarian interventions and form a 
contemporary standard of “civilization.”
A central dimension of expansion is the legalization of human rights, illus-
trated by the udhr. While the 1948 document was adopted as a legally non-
binding declaration, over the subsequent decades most of the declaration’s 
content has gained legal recognition either through the introduction of na-
tional legislation or via specialized United Nations human rights covenants—
including the two primary covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights. Today, some legal scholars argue that basic human rights tenets 
form customary international law. Adherence to human rights forms a con-
temporary measuring stick for “modern nations,” which in some instances is 
used as legitimation to curtail the recognition of state sovereignty, resulting in 
such labels as “rogue” or “failed” states. Today, human rights are accompanied 
by vast monitoring mechanisms. Yet there is continual concern for the “culture 
of impunity” for grave human rights violations.
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Human security refers to the protection of individual safety, dignity, and well-
being at both the national and international level. While the notion of security 
has been historically mainly associated with state security and military threats, 
the concept of human security has broadened its meaning to include individu-
als as new referent objects and to envisage other kinds of threats (economic, 
environmental, health, political, etc.) to their safety. In the human security 
framework, individuals are not only put at the center of the attention, but 
also  their safety is considered crucial for international peace and stability. 
 Human security is understood beyond the physical safety or survival of indi-
viduals; it concerns people’s physical and psychological integrity, dignity and 
well-being.
The concept emerged in 1990s, when the end of the Cold War radically al-
tered the international security structure. The notion of human security was 
first conceptualized in the 1994 United Nations Development Program (undp), 
when the Human Development Report (undp 1994) provided a broad defini-
tion of the concept in terms of concern for human life and dignity. The term 
was officially framed in 2001 by the Commission on Human Security, which 
was established in response to the UN Secretary-General’s call at the 2000 Mil-
lennium Summit for a world “free from want and fear.” It was defined as fol-
lows: “Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms 
that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) 
and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes 
that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, 
social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together 
give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (Ogata and 
Sen 2003).
In the humanitarian sector, the conceptualization of human security, un-
derstood in terms of rights rather than needs, has brought an increasing em-
phasis on protection activities and humanitarian actors’ widespread shift from 
a needs-based approach to a rights-based approach to assistance. The protec-
tion of individuals’ safety, dignity, and integrity has become a core element of 
assistance, along with the more traditional sectors of intervention such as 
food, water, shelter, and health.
More generally, by putting the human being at the center of the global 
 security system, the elaboration of the notion of human security has had sev-
eral important implications. The concept has been used to justify military 
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 humanitarian interventions considered necessary to address serious violations 
of people’s human security during internal conflict or civil war, natural disas-
ters, famine, and other emergencies. In order to protect human security, the 
international community can be called into action, not only by the aggressive 
behavior of one state towards another, but also by serious violations of human 
rights perpetrated against people by another non-state actor and/or the state 
itself.
Proponents of human security have underlined its potential emancipatory 
power in different realms—from the possibility to address economic, social, 
and political causes of human insecurity (Newman 2001) to the capacity of 
challenging existing power relations (Grayson 2004); from the claim that hu-
man security tends to be and is produced through individual empowerment 
(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007) to the potential of human security in giving 
voice to the voiceless and powerless (Suhrke 1999; MacFarlane 2004). Critical 
readings, however, have pointed out the inability of human security agendas to 
disrupt existing power inequalities (McCormack 2008) and policy frameworks 
(Chandler 2008), and the tendency of human security to strengthen interna-
tional institutions rather than empowering individuals (McCormack 2008). 
Others have highlighted how this new paradigm has not brought any particu-
larly innovative practical strategy or positive outcome in humanitarian opera-
tions (Muggah and Krause 2006), but rather has de facto replaced develop-
ment aspirations and inscribed them into a security agenda (Pupavac 2005).
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Human Trafficking
Trafficking in persons (tip) is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, har-
boring, or receipt of persons, typically for, but not limited to, the purposes of 
sexual exploitation or forced labor (unodc 2018). “Trafficking” is also de-
scribed as a modern slave trade, a throwback to an ancient time that has its 
roots in precapitalist societies. Until recently, there was no international agree-
ment on the legal definition of trafficking. In 2000, the United Nations (UN) 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its accompanying 
protocols—more commonly known as the Palermo Protocols—were adopted 
by the UN General Assembly to clarify the term and distinguish the phenom-
enon from human smuggling. According to the UN, human trafficking involves 
“the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giv-
ing or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploita-
tion shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others 
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or prac-
tices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. The consent of a 
victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation … shall be irrele-
vant where any of the means set forth … have been used” (UN 2000: 42).
Nonetheless, in public discourse, tip often continues to be confused with 
the smuggling of people (som), which is “the procurement, in order to obtain, 
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directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of 
a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent 
resident” (UN 2000: 54–55). The conflation of trafficking with smuggling also 
seems to be sanctioned by the Palermo Protocols (Sharma 2005). While these 
are intended to differentiate tip from som, the distinction has been collapsed 
in law. As Nandita Sharma argues, “by making the consent of the migrant in 
her/his movement across borders ‘irrelevant’ if they experience any form of 
deception, coercion, or abuse in the process, this definition also dramatically 
expands the scope of trafficking” (Sharma 2005: 90). This is even more evident 
if we consider that “coercion,” within the definition of tip, is not only under-
stood in the terms of brute physical force or mental domination, but also in 
more general terms as the abuse of a position of vulnerability (Sharma 2005). 
It is thus very difficult to set human smuggling apart from human trafficking, 
especially if the former occurs in a condition of extreme vulnerability, such as 
that faced by war-displaced communities.
Although there is no consensus on the actual number of trafficked persons, 
the International Labour Organization (ilo) estimates that there were 40.3 
million victims of human trafficking globally in 2016 alone (ilo 2019). In this 
context, tip has grown into a multibillion-dollar industry in which, according 
to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc), females are mostly trafficked 
for sexual exploitation and males for forced labor (unodc 2018). Studies sug-
gest that minors increasingly make up larger shares of the total number of traf-
ficked persons (unodc 2018).
Lately, recognition of how humanitarian crises such as armed conflicts and 
forced displacement exacerbate people’s exposure to trafficking and exploita-
tion has grown. In other words, human trafficking flourishes in wartime be-
cause people are particular vulnerable and criminals are less compelled to 
abide by the rule of law (Shelley 2010). However, a growing body of critical 
scholarship on tip has begun to question the narratives of victimization and 
criminality in the official discourse on trafficking as inadequate categories to 
account for the complexity of the phenomenon (Davidson O’Connell 2010). 
One of the main conclusions of recent research on the effects of the Syrian war 
on tip, for example, indicates that much of the exploitation taking place is not 
carried out by criminal minded organizations, but rather involves families and 
communities left with no viable alternatives for survival other than situations 
that can be characterized as exploitation, both in the terms of exploiting and 
being exploited (icmpd 2015).
A large swathe of literature has also demonstrated how tightening border 
controls and the implementation of restrictive immigration policies favor the 
emergence of tip (Andrijasevic 2007). Along those lines, other studies have 
argued that, instead of conflating human smuggling with human trafficking, 
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researchers and humanitarian practitioners should better address the implica-
tions of stricter border regimes and the militarization of border control on 
smuggling and trafficking in human beings (Achilli 2017).
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Humanitarian Corridor
A humanitarian corridor is a safe route via which endangered civilians are pro-
vided with aid and/or are evacuated. A humanitarian corridor is defined and 
characterized by its highly restricted, narrow space, which distinguishes it 
from humanitarian projects carried out within a wider or unrestricted space. 
Humanitarian corridors have a long history and have occurred in many 
 conflicts and disaster zones. Famous examples include the Kindertransport of 
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1938–1939, in which Jewish children were evacuated from areas under Nazi 
control to the United Kingdom; the 1992–1995 humanitarian corridor into the 
besieged Bosnian city of Sarajevo, which included an international air lift; and, 
more recently, the 2018 evacuation of civilians by bus out of the Syrian city of 
Ghouta. As these examples show, humanitarian corridors can take on many 
different forms and can occur through many different initiatives.
The need for humanitarian corridors arises when armed conflict cuts off 
large numbers of civilians from accessing basic needs. This may occur inciden-
tally as conflict parties fight without taking the civilian presence into account. 
But it may also happen deliberately through sieges, in which armed actors pur-
posefully cut off residential areas from water, electricity, food, and health care, 
and effectively hold civilian populations to ransom.
Since the 1990s, most humanitarian corridors have been called for and nego-
tiated under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Humanitarian corridors 
may be created through negotiations with armed actors who agree to cease 
hostilities within the corridor; but they can also occur spontaneously when 
civilians collectively seek a path to safety and are helped by other civilians or 
state authorities on their way (Kukavica and Plesnicar 2016). Humanitarian 
corridors can be enforced by military means, and against the explicit goal of 
whichever actor is endangering the civilian population. A well-known exam-
ple for this type of corridor is the 1948/1949 airlift by the American army into 
the German city of Berlin, which was cut off from West Germany by Soviet 
forces. Since 2011, a new form of aerial humanitarian corridor has emerged in 
which charitable organizations collect resources to fly civilians out of crisis 
zones, to enable them to claim asylum or shelter in another country (Kellogg 
Institute For International Studies 2018). A shared feature of humanitarian cor-
ridors is their temporary character. All humanitarian corridors are opened and 
closed, or appear or disappear, at some point in time. They may exist for only a 
day, or for several years, or may open repeatedly on certain occasions.
Humanitarian corridors may fail to achieve their goal and have occasionally 
been abused by armed actors as smuggling routes for weapons or other re-
sources. In every case, humanitarian corridors are not neutral or impact-free 
activities; their existence changes the make-up of the local war economy, 
which includes the presence or absence of civilians, and, of course, aid. This 
explains why it is often so difficult to get all stakeholders to agree on a humani-
tarian corridor and why corridors are frequently attacked shortly after open-
ing. Another reason why actors may be reluctant to open humanitarian corri-
dors is that they may also lead to the exposure of war crimes by accompanying 
UN observers or journalists.
Humanitarian corridors draw attention to the way in which space and terri-
tory are restructured during crises and disasters. The presence of  humanitarian 
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actors can change local infrastructure, real estate markets, leisure zones, and 
perceptions of where safety and danger are located and who is allowed to ac-
cess certain spaces (Smirl 2015; Duffield 2012). Thus, humanitarian actors can 
have a powerful impact on the way in which space is reassigned and redivided 
in the region in which they operate.
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Humanitarian Design
Humanitarian design is a term that can be used to describe the process of de-
signing products, services, or systems for populations affected by natural and/
or human-made disasters. For example, a cooking stove designed for a refugee 
camp is a product that needs to take into account not only cultural appropri-
ateness and the needs of the refugee, but also the services attached to the prod-
uct, such as fuel production in the area. It should also consider the system reali-
ties of the humanitarian market, such as logistics, humanitarian budgets, and 
decision-making (Fladvad Nielsen, Sandvik, and Gabrielsen Jumbert 2016).
The occurrence of humanitarian crises, such as conflicts or natural and in-
dustrial disasters, triggers the response of multiple international stakeholders 
to provide different kinds of assistance to the affected populations. This inter-
national response generally implies the deployment of products and services 
that temporarily strengthen or even replace disrupted local activities (Fladvad 
Nielsen and Santos 2013). Humanitarian design aims to create strategies to 
 improve the delivery of emergency aid and the efficiency/effectiveness of 
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 humanitarian action. It seeks to develop innovations for the humanitarian 
market, defined as the market that emerges in the aftermath of the crisis, heav-
ily represented by international and national non-governmental organiza-
tions. It also includes donors, service providers, and enterprises that develop, 
purchase, and distribute goods such as food, shelter, medical equipment, and 
energy generating devices. To understand the goals of humanitarian design, 
one must understand the definitions and goals of humanitarian action and the 
Humanitarian Charter (Sphere 2018), which centers on dignity. Through the 
Humanitarian Charter, humanitarian action has committed itself to provide 
disaster-affected communities with essential physical goods and services in 
emergencies. The goal of dignity implies that the aim of humanitarian action 
is value based and human centered, as is design science (Cross 2007). This is 
where design and design thinking become relevant.
Design is a value-oriented activity in which the designer seeks to identify 
designs that bring improved well-being for those involved. Following this line 
of reasoning, “humanitarian design” should also refer to the application of “de-
signerly” approaches that assist crisis-affected people in reaching a situation in 
which they can live with dignity. “Designerly ways” and design thinking offer 
the ability to make sense of how contributions can deliver impact within com-
plex and multistakeholder landscapes, including actors within the humanitar-
ian market. “Designerly ways” imply that designers arrive at the final products, 
services, and organizational/policy changes through a wide range of methods, 
tools, and processes that are combined with a mindset that reduce bias in their 
decision-making while solving problems. Humanitarian design and humani-
tarian innovation both aim at reaching the “end users” of humanitarian action. 
This is a complex goal, as humanitarian end users such as refugees, especially 
in the contexts of low income and least developed countries, are often vulner-
able and marginalized, in the sense that they are most often deprived of rights 
such as free movement or workers’ and educational rights. In other settings 
they can have different legal rights; in other words, they do not form a homo-
geneous group yet are often the target of “one-size-fits-all” innovations. As in 
humanitarian innovation, humanitarian design involves thorough assess-
ments and insight gathering; prototyping and testing in-field; follow-up and 
evaluation processes; and business models that take into account the local 
market, existing services, and power relations. However, while humanitarian 
designers emphasize contextual approaches by adapting or designing with 
end users (Green 2005), humanitarian innovation focuses more strongly on 
identifying theories of change (Sandvik 2017) and on the structural changes 
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Humanitarian Soldier
Humanitarianly legitimized military interventions in global crisis zones, 
zones breeding instability—large-scale violence, sickness, military treats, and 
displacement—have become normalized in the post-Cold War era. Particular-
ly after 9/11, humanitarianism has become multifariously entangled with the 
outright political and strategic international objectives of state actors. Many 
researchers have argued that during this time the so-called liberal Western 
states began to use humanitarian rationale, rhetoric, and practices as tools 
to advance their strategic objectives in global politics (Barnett 2011; Chandler 
2002; Douzinas 2007). This trajectory fortified the collaboration and cooption 
between military and humanitarian actors, resulting in a blurring of the line 
between military, state, and humanitarian action and actors.
As a result of the politicization and militarization of humanitarianism, the 
operational environment in conflict areas has changed. The blurring of the 
boundaries between humanitarian non-governmental organizations and oth-
er actors—state, military, and counter insurgency—and their agendas in con-
flict zones has resulted in the shrinking of “humanitarian space.” Thus, the 
credibility of the neutrality of humanitarian actors and respect for humanitar-
ian law has also decreased, ensuring an increased level of violence targeting 
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humanitarian workers and a decline in the access of vulnerable populations to 
aid (Acuto 2014). Moreover, the public imaginary and people’s conceptions of 
and expectations regarding foreign conflict, crisis zones, and humanitarian/
military presence in areas of action have also witnessed changes. The cooption 
and closer collaboration of humanitarianism and militarism have given birth 
to a figure that appropriately encapsulates and embodies the global politics of 
the politicized humanitarian system and the logics of the new wars: the hu-
manitarian soldier.
The figure of the humanitarian soldier is apparent in the legitimizing 
speeches and the official and public relations contexts of post-9/11 military op-
erations, and such a figure often becomes most apparent in visual form. The 
figure of the contemporary soldier employed in global crisis areas incorporates 
the physical and visual features of a humanitarian worker and a strong milita-
rized soldier rolled into one, and therefore they corporally embody the merg-
ing of humanitarian and military action. For example, material released by the 
multinational nato-led International Assistance Force (isaf) in Afghanistan 
characterizes the key features of the new humane soldiers in global crisis 
zones. The isaf soldiers are pictured as armed with state-of-the-art military 
equipment and presented as strong and determined in their fight against the 
Taliban. Yet, in addition to this, the soldiers are habitually shown distributing 
humanitarian aid, providing health care, tutoring local populations, helping to 
reconstruct the war-ravaged country, and humanely communicating and inter-
acting with the locals (Kotilainen 2016).
Humanitarian soldiers embody the military–humanitarian ethos of post-
9/11 global politics, and they represent the strong, care-giving, moral, yet mil-
itarized power of the “international community” and the “West” and of the 
“humanitarian international order” (Barnett 2010) at work on the ground in 
global crisis zones (De Lauri 2019; Kotilainen 2016). This figure, in public rela-
tions use, aspires to make Western warfare seem humane and conducted in 
accordance with the moral legitimization for such interventions. The humani-
tarian soldier is therefore well suited to winning over the hearts and minds 
of the domestic populations of the warring states. Furthermore, in addition 
to these deliberate objectives, the strong, militarized, yet compassionate 
soldiers create a symbolic contrast with the local, less-developed objects in 
need of help and tutelage, an image that embodies strong colonial under-
tones and poignantly echoes contemporary global hierarchies (Kotilainen 
2016).
The humanitarian soldier is also deployed in non-military operations, for 
example in the massive intervention by the United States in Haiti after the 2010 
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Humanitarian War
In the post- World War ii period, the newly created (1945) United Nations (UN) 
was hesitant to approve the idea of military intervention by a member state in 
the sovereign land of another member state, even in the case of alarming hu-
manitarian situations. During the Cold War, geopolitics played an important 
role in rendering the UN Security Council ineffective as member states turned 
a blind eye to human rights violations of their political allies around the world 
(Roberts 1993).
The principle of non-intervention was the dominant norm within the UN 
system until the late 1980s, and member states would be expected to justify 
their interventionist actions based on the UN Charter’s chapter concerning 
“threat to the international peace and security” so as not to receive condemna-
tion and pushback from the UN (Vincent 2015). Yet, between World War ii and 
the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed interstate wars (e.g. the Korean 
and Vietnam wars), political interventions through coup d’états (e.g.  Nicaragua, 
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Greece, Chile, and Turkey), and proxy wars (e.g. the Congo Crisis and Angolan 
Civil War) organized by powerful states, most actively by the United States 
(USA) and a number of western European states.
Despite the UN’s reluctance to endorse military interventions, the idea of 
“just war” in contemporary politics was subtly consolidated during the Cold 
War era through the foreign policy of the USA, the Truman Doctrine, the Nix-
on Doctrine, and the Carter Doctrine, as well as European policies for the post-
colonial governance of former colonies (De Lauri 2019a). After the end of the 
Cold War, the idea of “humanitarian war” as the massive use of armed force in 
the name of humanitarianism proliferated globally (De Lauri 2019b). Humani-
tarian military interventions in Iraq (1991), Somalia (1993), Bosnia (1995), and 
Kosovo (1999) were all backed by the UN Security Council through missions, 
resolutions, and peace-keeping operations, and gathered significant support 
from civil society groups associated with the (new) left of the post-Cold War 
era, at least until the devastating consequences of these humanitarian wars 
unfolded. International law provided not legality but a certain degree of legiti-
macy to most of the foreign military interventions, on the grounds that they 
were implemented to end genocides, civil wars, and human rights violations in 
situations of state failure or tyranny (Chesterman 2002).
Between the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, both 
humanitarians and activists assumed and claimed autonomy, neutrality, and 
independence for humanitarian engagements around the world to deliver 
“global pietas” and to defend human rights. At the same time, the world wit-
nessed a growing overlapping between compassion and war (De Lauri 2019a; 
Pandolfi and Rousseau 2016). A surprising number of leftist scholars and activ-
ists, some of whom became fervent supporters of the invasions of Afghanistan 
(2001) and Iraq (2003), were convinced that mass atrocities, incidents of geno-
cide, and massive abuses of human rights around the world needed to be 
stopped through armed interventions for the sake of humanity (Çubukçu 
2018). Therefore, in the 21st century, humanitarian war has become synony-
mous to war-making (and vice versa), and integral to understanding the chang-
ing economic, geopolitical, and warfare organization in the world. While the 
legitimacy of humanitarian wars continues to be a matter of fierce legal debate 
in policy and scholarly circles, humanitarianism has proven to be a complex 
enterprise embedded into the political economy of the organization of warfare 
(Duffield 2014).
Introducing humanitarianism into warfare, under the banner of “humani-
tarian war,” at the end of the 20th century coincided with the global restructur-
ing of power and hegemony, the changing nature of geopolitical competition, 
the expansion of neoliberal capitalism, and the increasing complexity of state 
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organization/mobilization for warfare (Malesevic 2010; Duffield 2014). The in-
novation of defining militarism as humanitarianism and war as peace has 
been used to legitimate the protracted presence of foreign armies in Afghani-
stan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya, Yemen, and Syria in the first two decades of the 21st 
century, with the increasingly visible presence of militaries, businesses, and 
humanitarians from the non-Western world as well, more specifically Russia, 
China, Turkey, and the oil-rich Arabian Gulf countries, which are altering the 
Western-dominated international system of security (Snetkov and Lanteigne 
2015; Ziadah 2019).
Humanitarian war has normalized the extraordinary circumstances of war 
by turning large swathes of lands in the Global South into sites of “emergency,” 
“recovery,” “stabilization,” and “reconstruction,” where the legal and illegal/ 
extrajudicial networks of warfare, humanitarian assistance, business, trade, 
banking, trafficking, and smuggling are all entangled through increasingly so-
phisticated and securitized new technologies (Andreas 2008; Duffield 2014; 
Kaldor 2012; Nordstrom 2004).
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Humanitarian–development Nexus
Strengthening the humanitarian–development nexus and overcoming long-
standing attitudinal, institutional, and funding obstacles was identified as a 
top priority at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (ocha 2017). However, 
this is a challenging aim in fragile states and cases of protracted conflict, in 
which the majority of the world’s poor live (ids 2018).
The nexus refers to the transition or overlap between the delivery of hu-
manitarian assistance and the provision of long-term development assistance. 
While this may appear as a logical shift from one type of assistance to another, 
it implies a number of challenges (Hanatani, Gómez, and Kawaguchi 2018), 
especially if there is no linear development from humanitarian assistance to 
development aid or there is a need for simultaneous provision of both types of 
assistance in a given area, country, or region. There are different temporalities 
inherent to international humanitarianism and development, which are al-
ways the product of the particular historical–political spaces in which interna-
tional organizations operate (Brun 2016). Issues to be considered include the 
aim and type of the assistance provided, who provides it and through which 
channels, and the degree of expected government and community involve-
ment and decision-making power. Recently, scholars and practitioners have 
critically scrutinized the link between security (or rather securitization poli-
cies) and humanitarian–development assistance (Hinds 2015).
The starting point, and main dividing line, is the formal distinction between 
humanitarian assistance and development assistance. Humanitarian assis-
tance, and those delivering it, has to comply with the four humanitarian prin-
ciples approved by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution 
58/114 of 2004: humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence (ocha 
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2012). Development assistance is not defined as neutral and independent, but 
rather aims to meet a country’s (and the donors) political priorities and longer-
term development plans.
The humanitarian principles derive from the core principles guiding the 
work of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the national Red 
Cross/Red Crescent societies. A large number of non-governmental organiza-
tions have signed up to a Code of Conduct for disaster relief and a set of Mini-
mum Standards in Humanitarian Response. The UN Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs (ocha) is assigned to mobilize and coordinate 
principled humanitarian action. In practice, politics of negotiation and hu-
manitarian diplomacy between state and non-state actors play a key role in 
determining when, where, and how aid is delivered (De Lauri 2018).
Development assistance and actors depend on approval from a national 
government and assistance is expected to be planned and delivered in accor-
dance with national development priorities and plans and in collaboration 
with and coordinated by national and local authorities. A number of special-
ized UN agencies are involved, in addition to the UN Development Programme 
and frequently the World Bank and various other development banks.
The volume, cost, and length of humanitarian assistance provision has, ac-
cording to ocha (2017), grown dramatically since 2017, in large part owing to 
the protracted nature of crises and the blurred distinctions between the two 
types of assistance. Interagency humanitarian appeals now last an average of 
seven years, which extends the timeframe of many development programs, 
and the size of appeals has increased nearly 400 percent during this period. At 
the same time, the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals have set out not just to meet (humanitarian) needs, but also to re-
duce risk, vulnerability, and overall levels of need, and thus provide a reference 
frame for both humanitarian and development actors.
So far, this has been difficult to achieve, and the humanitarian– development 
nexus remains a significant conceptual division (Zetter 2014) of the long-
standing attitudinal, institutional, and funding differences that will require a 
major reform of the UN system to achieve.
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Humanity
The term “humanity” forms one of the four core principles of humanitarian 
assistance alongside neutrality, impartiality, and independence (DuBois 2018). 
As such, it has become enshrined as a humanitarian principle implying a con-
sensus understanding of its definition as a form of collective belonging. While 
it is deployed politically to appeal for humanitarian aid, its ideological force 
derives from how it masks asymmetrical power relations and the consequent 
harm that humanitarian missions can impart. In the global humanitarian dis-
course, the term has become a strategic rhetorical device used to gain support 
for such endeavors. In his critique of humanitarian missions, Didier Fassin 
(2011) acknowledges how such assistance is framed as a “noble” pursuit, for it 
seeks to ameliorate the impoverished conditions of others. However, this very 
impulse subjugates, establishing a relation of domination between those who 
give over those who receive. Thus, Fassin characterizes humanitarianism as a 
system of governance that reproduces this inequity.
The problem of inequity is a reoccurring strain throughout scholarship that 
interrogates the notion of humanity as a collective ideal and a natural state. 
Samara Esmeir (2012) notes that in Egypt the shaping of the human “subject” 
was performed through the institution of legal reforms that sought to distin-
guish between the “civility” of the law and the barbarity of colonial violence. 
However, Esmeir’s work shows that the law itself did not secure a common 
humanity for its subjects, but rather subjugated Egyptians and perpetrated a 
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new form of violence by inscribing their humanity into the teleology of the law 
(Esmeir 2012). The law thus became a means of bifurcating citizens between 
legally recognized “humans” and “nonhuman” entities illegible to the Egyptian 
legal system. This conundrum is what Esmeir defines as “juridical humanity,” 
which enabled a particular legal visibility for certain subjects while producing 
the erasure of others. Noting the continual discrepancies between the con-
structed nature of the category of “human” and the “non-human” subjects it 
seems to engender, the extent to which humanity is deemed a universal condi-
tion is undoubtedly an aspirational stance.
In Neda Atanasoski’s criticism of the liberal humanist paradigm, she posits 
that humanity is a term deployed by the United States (USA) in the postsocial-
ist era to signal the “resolution” of its violent legacy of colonialism, genocide, 
and racism. By promoting a false representation of an inclusive multicultural 
society in order to shield its imperialist agenda, the USA positions its military 
campaigns as a form of global moral stewardship (Atanasoski 2013). This agen-
da is apparent in the strategic use of “freedom” and “democracy” as justifica-
tions for military interventions, through which the USA applies a neocolonial 
“civilizing” discourse that characterizes non-Western subjects as anachronistic 
and in need of liberation. These ideological forces often play out within the 
context of humanitarian wars; and, as Antonio De Lauri states, such wars “are 
a primary means of globally affirming a specific model of humanity, one that is 
built according to the cultural, moral, and economic standards of Western de-
mocracies” (De Lauri 2019: 48).
The universalizing language that underpins the term “humanity” in support 
of humanitarian campaigns conducted by non-governmental organizations 
employs a different set of intentions. Benevolence, altruism, and compassion 
constitute the driving force of such missions, which aim to alleviate the suffer-
ing of those in crisis. As Marc DuBois states, “humanity focuses humanitarian 
action on the urgency of the immediate needs of people, not the needs of a 
system, even if ultimately it is that system that must deal with those needs in 
the long term. More deeply, humanity steeps humanitarian action in the dig-
nity of each individual” (DuBois 2018: 7). While DuBois is concerned with rec-
ognizing the limitations of humanitarian actions and ensuring a bottom-up 
approach to long-term structural change, his use of the term “humanity” sug-
gests that even in its invocation it can produce a more nuanced and authentic 
recognition of subjects in need.
One productive way in which to approach the term humanity is to recognize 
its perpetual politicization, prompting scholars to analyze the hierarchies in 
which the term itself is deployed. This endeavor becomes exceptionally perti-




through rhetoric concerning national and tribal affiliations, religious practices, 
cultural norms, class stratifications, and gendered, racial, or ethnic categories. 
These classifications and other practices of identification can work to margin-
alize any given social group. In these instances, recognizing an individual or a 
collective’s humanity becomes the arbiter of who can enter the domain of citi-
zenship and be afforded sovereign protection, who can access and benefit 
from the institutions of housing, health care, education, or employment, and 
who is prone to violence, incarceration, or execution. In considering the binary 
of inclusion and exclusion, Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) theory of homo sacer is a 
useful rubric by which to recognize that humanity is often understood as those 
that are afforded social protection over and against those who are cast out 
from society and can be killed with impunity. Thus, the term “humanity” is as 
much entrenched in the enactment of social divisions and exposure to vio-
lence as it is in aspiring to imagine a coherent, secure, and unified social whole.
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Impartiality
Impartiality is one of the most well-known humanitarian principles, which 
were first declared in 1965 by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement (ocha 2012). Impartiality means that humanitarian aid should be 
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strictly given to those who need it most, and there should be no discrimination 
on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religion, or political beliefs. Impartial-
ity is thus closely related to the humanitarian principle of humanity, which 
enshrines humanitarian aid’s universal humanism. It is also closely related to 
the principle of neutrality, meaning that humanitarian actors should not take 
political or controversial positions, or take sides in a conflict. Further, impar-
tiality is closely related to the humanitarian practice of needs assessment, 
which is a survey of a disaster-affected population, to determine where the 
most urgent humanitarian needs lie.
Most large humanitarian organizations, whether non-governmental, faith-
based, or associated with the United Nations, officially adhere to the humani-
tarian principles, including impartiality. On paper, acting impartially appears 
simple. Programs and projects can be easily designed according to impartiality, 
by including needs-assessments or by developing categories of people who are 
understood to be the most in need, for example.
However, in practice, impartiality is a very difficult principle to operational-
ize. This is primarily because of the complex political and social environment 
that humanitarian organizations work in and a lack of prior understanding of 
this complex environment. This means that organizations might misunder-
stand who most urgently requires aid or may have a different view on aid pri-
oritization than the disaster-affected population. Access is another important 
factor that can inhibit impartiality because organizations may not be able to 
reach those in the greatest need. Such lack of access can be geographical, but 
also social—for example, when vulnerable persons are too poor or discrimi-
nated against to participate in needs assessments or simply remain invisible to 
aid agencies. Humanitarian agencies can also face significant pressure to dis-
tribute aid quickly or according to project deadlines, and in such cases, impar-
tiality may be compromised. Despite their intentions to act impartially, hu-
manitarian organizations are therefore quite frequently accused of being 
biased or distributing aid in an unfair way (Krähenbühl 2013).
The international designation of some political groups as terrorist organiza-
tions has provided another complication for impartial aid distribution, as it 
criminalizes aid provision to these groups. Providing aid to both sides in a con-
flict can also create pragmatic hurdles, for example when it compromises the 
safety of organizations or inhibits its ability to carry out the humanitarian ne-
gotiations that are required to ensure access to vulnerable groups.
Impartiality, similar to other principles of international humanitarian ac-
tion, can perhaps be best understood “as a complex rule that requires interpre-
tation in practice” (Green 2017). Many large organizations have analyzed how 




practice” reports and field experiences can be found in their publications 
( Labbé and Daudin 2015).
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Independence
Along with humanity, neutrality, and impartiality, independence is a core hu-
manitarian principle: “Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the 
political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with 
regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented” (ocha 
2012). Therefore, in its ideal configuration, humanitarianism aims at inde-
pendence, for it is guided only by the aim to alleviate human suffering and 
save lives. Yet, wherever humanitarian action is promoted and conducted, 
a major concern that humanitarian organizations and practitioners have to 
face is the risk of manipulation by political, military, private, and religious 
actors.
Independence as a term situates humanitarian action in opposition to de-
pendency, subjection, and domination. As a humanitarian principle, it is a 
product of “history, ethical imagination, and practical considerations” (Barnett 
and Weiss 2011: 109). Independence, like the principle of neutrality, is founda-
tional in the pursuit of maintaining an apolitical impression of humanitarian-
ism. Remaining aside, independent from politics, is an active strategy to create 
humanitarian space. Herein humanitarian issues are seen either as outside of 
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politics or the lowest common denominator between different politics, or even 
as diplomacy’s “ground zero” (Paulmann 2013; Egeland 2013).
Maintaining humanitarian independence is a complex task. As a core prin-
ciple and key operational strategy, independence is endorsed by those human-
itarian actors refusing to accept resources (i.e. funding and donations) that 
might produce a conditionality compromising the actor’s autonomy, either in 
scale or objectives (Minear 2002). In the context of complex emergencies and 
long-term conflicts, there have been several attempts by governmental, para-
state, and armed groups at subordinating humanitarian goals to political ones 
(Donini 2011). However, humanitarian actors themselves may be inclined, in 
some circumstances, to accommodate or use political reasons and means to 
negotiate and deliver humanitarian aid, and at times to influence the course of 
events in conflict or post-disaster settings.
There are several other factors that may jeopardize the ambition for inde-
pendence, for example the pressures of donors’ agendas, the growing role of 
the private sector (from pharmaceutical corporations to agricultural industries 
and from insurance companies to service providers), the influence of broader 
goals (for instance in the case of faith-based humanitarian organizations) or 
simply the difficulty of handling the complexity of specific circumstances.
Independence is advocated particularly by some so-called traditional hu-
manitarian actors. For example, Médecins Sans Frontières and the Internation-
al Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ifrc) publicly speak 
against the instrumentalization of humanitarianism—although what hap-
pens in humanitarian practice is often the result of compromises and negotia-
tions (De Lauri 2018). Other humanitarian actors are more directly involved in 
broad political projects such as promoting democracy, overthrowing a regime, 
or contributing to post-war reconstruction (Mascarenhas 2017). This indicates 
that the geography of humanitarian interventions and the variety of actors in 
the realm of humanitarianism are continuously redefining the interpretation 
of core humanitarian principles, including independence, and the way they 
are promoted and/or contested. Rather than being discussed ontologically as a 
single system, humanitarianism is best understood in plural terms with several 
independent and dependent interests at stake (Barnett and Weiss 2011).
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Indicators
Indicators are used to describe and measure different aspects of humanitarian 
aid. Humanitarian indicators fall into three distinct categories: situation indi-
cators, response monitoring indicators, and impact indicators. Situation indi-
cators track the effect a crisis has on both the affected population and infra-
structure and services. They can either explain what the current situation is 
(baseline indicators) or explain what is required in crisis-affected areas (needs 
indicators). Response monitoring indicators consist of input, outcome, and 
output indicators. Input indicators show the financial and human resources 
provided for the response, outcome indicators measure the delivery of goods 
and services to affected populations towards the achievement of a particular 
outcome, and output indicators measure the likely or achieved effects of an 
intervention. Impact indicators measure the medium- to long-term results of 
an intervention (natf 2012).
Gathering primary data for measuring progress using humanitarian indica-
tors is often not feasible because of the inherent difficulties in collecting data 
during the acute phase of humanitarian emergencies and the ethical issues 
that surround conducting research when civilians are in urgent need of hu-
manitarian assistance. However, it may be possible to gather secondary data 
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for situation indicators from government data sources, such as the national 
census. In chronic humanitarian crises, primary data collection is often more 
feasible. However, secondary data may be outdated owing to the absence of 
functioning government statistical agencies (unfpa 2010).
There are numerous established sources of humanitarian indicators. The 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs runs a hu-
manitarian indicator registry, a repository of indicators that are used in all 
stages of a humanitarian crisis. The Sphere Project, launched in 1997, is an-
other key source of indicators for measuring humanitarian response. The 
Sphere Handbook provides a set of core minimum standards related to water 
supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion, food security and nutrition, shelter, 
settlement and non-food items, and health action. Sphere indicators are de-
signed to measure whether these minimum standards have been attained. The 
2011 edition of the handbook includes 48 minimum standards and 159 indica-
tors. An assessment of the 2011 edition of the Sphere Handbook found that 
standards and indicators were not robust enough, and that measurement defi-
nitions were unclear, leaving room for interpretation (Frison, Smith, and Blan-
chet 2018). Moreover, Sphere indicators are not always appropriate, as there 
are times when humanitarian indicators need to be contextualized. For exam-
ple, in some cases minimum standards are above existing living conditions in 
a country and thus the minimum standard has to be lowered to be attainable, 
with the reverse also holding true. A new edition of the Sphere Handbook was 
published in 2018.
While indicators are important for learning lessons and improving profes-
sional practices, too great an emphasis on indicators and technical discussions 
can detract from genuine focus on crisis-affected communities. Donor report-
ing requirements have become increasingly stringent, owing to increased em-
phasis on “value for money” and a desire for greater accountability. While these 
are important considerations, too many indicators can be onerous for imple-
menting partners. This is because of the increased paperwork required and the 
fact that they draw human resources away from operational capacity without 
necessarily increasing the effectiveness of humanitarian response (Satterth-
waite 2010; dara 2013). The fact that different donors have different reporting 
requirements compounds this issue. There is therefore a need for donors to har-
monize their reporting requirements and to strike the right balance between 
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Innocence
Calls for humanitarian interventions are often based on the urgent need to 
protect “innocent lives” (i.e. civilians under attack, refugees, trafficked victims, 
and—especially—vulnerable children). In a recent report, Helle Thorning-
Schmidt, ceo of Save the Children and former Prime Minister of Denmark, 
made a passionate plea to stop the suffering of children affected by war: “These 
children have seen and experienced things no child ever should: their homes 
burnt, their families killed and their innocence stolen” (Save the Children Inter-
national 2018).
As a moral and ethical concept, innocence refers to the absence of guilt, 
moral wrongdoing, and responsibility. Either as a sinless, pre-fall, Garden-of-
Eden condition in Judeo-Christian theology or as the pre-social “state of na-
ture” in modern Enlightenment philosophy, the notion of innocence that his-
torically shapes humanitarian sensitivity designates an apolitical status of 
“epistemic and moral purity” (Ticktin 2017: 578), uncorrupted and uncontami-
nated by power, and best epitomized by children. Addressing children’s suffer-
ing through the trope of “stolen innocence,” humanitarianism can thus claim 
to operate beyond political logics.
Questioning the cross-cultural universality of the concept and its supposed 
apolitical character, critical social scientists have argued that the humanitar-
ian mobilization of innocence produces profoundly political consequences 
as it sets oversimplifying dichotomic boundaries between “the innocent” and 
“the guilty” and establishes ethnocentric hierarchies of moral deservingness 
 between “differently innocent” victims (Fassin 2010). During the 2015 European 
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migration reception crisis, for instance, children and (pregnant) women were 
granted priority access to humanitarian protection as archetypical figures of 
innocence in the West. Some male migrants purposely made themselves seri-
ously injured or sick to qualify as defenseless and innocent (enough) for pro-
tection, while boatmen were assigned the position of ruthless, cold-blooded 
“ human  traffickers”—though many of them may be family members, friends, or 
part of migrant communities in a similar situation to the migrants themselves 
(Ticktin 2015).
Similarly, not all children are considered equally innocent, and the dividing 
line between innocence and culpability can be blurred, creating contradic-
tions. The massive involvement of children as combatants in conflict zones, 
from Somalia to Myanmar, from Yemen to Syria, has scandalously contami-
nated the purity of childhood innocence and generated moral panic. At the 
end of the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991–2002), major humanitarian organiza-
tions lobbied to prevent any child perpetrator below 18 years of age from being 
prosecuted or punished for war crimes in the country’s United Nations special 
court. As a result, former child soldiers were inserted in socio-rehabilitation 
programs, including special schools, vocational training, and child protection 
structures. This generated a widespread sense of injustice among those survi-
vors who saw the killers of their family members—who were now recatego-
rized as innocent victims—being granted greater access to the limited postwar 
development funds (Rosen 2007).
Humanitarian organizations’ own “innocence”—namely their neutrality, 
impartiality, and independence from the “corrupted realm” of politics—is also 
increasingly challenged by the inescapable necessity to interact, negotiate, and 
mingle with a plurality of political actors in complex emergencies. Aid agen-
cies involved in peace-keeping operations or post-disaster reconstructions 
have to cooperate with national governments and military forces, while sub-
contracting to other non-governmental organizations and local organizations 
to deliver services. In fact, providing relief to afflicted victims does not occur in 
a political vacuum (Weiss 2007) and, despite official rhetoric, it often forces 
humanitarians to act outside the framework of innocence.
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Innovation
In November 2009, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Per-
formance held an innovation fair introducing the notion of innovation as a 
key category within the humanitarian system (Betts and Bloom 2014). Since 
then, innovation has been the subject and focus of attention in the humanitar-
ian policy agenda, within and across organizations. Additionally, special funds 
and partnerships, so-called “innovation units,” have been developed by several 
United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, governments, the 
military, and businesses (unhcr 2015; McDonald et al. 2017). Although the no-
tion itself remains poorly understood in many international debates (Bloom 
and Betts 2013) and its “meaning and value remain contested” (Betts and 
Bloom 2014: 5), humanitarian innovation has been embraced as a strategic con-
cern for organizations and the humanitarian field as a whole (Scriven 2016). 
Broadly put, humanitarian innovation refers to “a means of adaptation and im-
provement through finding and scaling solutions to problems, in the forms of 
products, processes or wider business models” (Betts and Bloom 2014: 5) with 
the aim of transforming the operations, management, methods, and partner-
ships of organizations (Scriven 2016).
The emerging discussion about the term draws mainly on the traditional 
understandings and models from management theory (Scriven 2016). While 
the concept of “novation” first appeared in the 13th century as a legal category 
signifying imitation, it later developed into the term “innovation,” which en-
dorses “the concept of a new idea being scaled over time” (Godin quoted in 
Bloom and Betts 2013: 5). In the first studies that treated innovation as an inde-
pendent subject of analysis, it was correlated with theories of diffusion, the 
manner by which ideas are adopted by people, and with business  management, 
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which aims at creating advantages for profit in the global market (Bloom and 
Betts 2013). The importance of humanitarian innovation has been linked to its 
capacity to change the trajectory of humanitarian assistance allowing for im-
provement, and therefore the opportunity to overcome programmatic and op-
erational obstacles (Scriven 2016) in categories including grants and finance, 
research and development, and/or collaborations and networks (Betts and 
Bloom 2014).
However, precisely because humanitarian innovation’s processes rely heav-
ily on learning and readaptation to aimed results as its “causal pathway for 
change is unknown” (Obrecht 2017: 6), it introduces untested technologies and 
methods into unstable environments, making their potential harm and long-
term consequences invisible to aid recipients and communities alike (McDon-
ald et al. 2017). Here, innovation’s “effectiveness” is permeated by the desirabil-
ity of transformative and radical change “to both what humanitarian actors do 
and how they do it,” consequently creating or increasing risk (Sandvik 2017: 7; 
see also Ramalingam et al. 2015). As such, alliances and partnerships fostering 
innovation are forged in the vein of new technological transformations fo-
cused on automation/artificial intelligence and data exchange. These innova-
tions can only be unraveled as outcomes of a (fourth) industrial revolution 
“offering entirely new capabilities for people and machines and ways in which 
technology becomes embedded within societies” (RobotWorx 2018). Specific 
technologies such as blockchain or robotics/automation systems contain val-
ues and assumptions held by those who produce them (Forsythe and Hess 
2002), not only impacting efficiency and productivity (WeRobotics 2018) but 
fundamentally redefining the boundaries of the humanitarian field (Downey, 
Dumit, and Williams 2013).
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International Cooperation
International cooperation is a necessary element of humanitarian action and 
has been integral to humanitarian aid from its earliest beginnings. Internation-
al cooperation can take many forms, be carried out between a large number of 
actors, and take place on different levels (El Taraboulsi et al. 2016). Cooperation 
does not necessarily involve state authorities. Depending on the context with-
in which humanitarian aid is delivered, it may take place via, for example, 
a partnership between a small non-governmental organization (ngo) located 
in the Global South and a large ngo in the Global North. It may involve mili-
tias, private businesses, donors, ngo field staff, ngo headquarters, and the 
head of a village or a ministry. International cooperation is carried out both 
within complex, high-level diplomatic meetings and day-to-day interactions 
between, for example, expatriate and national staff in the field.
In the context of large-scale humanitarian emergencies that involve a num-
ber of different actors, international cooperation happens on a multitude of 
scales. For example, while the European Union’s Emergency Response Coordi-
nation Center responds to a request from the disaster-affected country’s civil 
protection authorities (European Commission 2019), the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr) may be searching for implementing 
partners among national ngos, and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross may be negotiating access with an armed group (Janmyr 2018). At the 
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same time, the director of a national ngo may be responding to a call for proj-
ects by a specific ngo consortium that is helping her understand specific do-
nor requirements. Thus, international cooperation takes place between aid 
providers and host states and societies, but also among aid providers from dif-
ferent countries.
The reasons for international cooperation are similarly varied. First, inter-
national cooperation ensures that providers of foreign aid have a legal basis for 
their presence abroad and are present at the request of host-state authorities. 
Secondly, cooperation is required to ensure an effective coordination between 
a large number of multinational aid providers and host state and society. 
Thirdly, cooperation is needed to agree on approaches to aid delivery that are 
acceptable to all stakeholders involved in the aid effort (Di Iorio and Zeuthen 
2011). International cooperation can take place around questions of resources 
(e.g. when host states provide land for refugee camps built by unhcr), of ac-
cess (e.g. when armed actors agree to ceasefires to allow aid into conflict 
zones), and also questions of cultural or political interests. As a bedrock of 
humanitarian aid, international cooperation occurs throughout and on all lev-
els of the aid delivery process. Yet it is constantly subject to challenges related 
to, for example, unequal power relations within the international system, coer-
cive measures implemented by powerful state actors, power imbalances, or the 
right to reject aid. When foreign actors deliver aid abroad without the coopera-
tion of the host country, this mostly has negative results: aid delivery may be-
come chaotic, and at worst it may be considered a hostile act.
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International humanitarian law (ihl) is a part of public international law that 
addresses the limits of acceptable conduct in armed conflict (Crawford and 
Pert 2015; Clapham and Gaeta 2014). In its underlying assumptions and ideol-
ogy, ihl is related to human rights as the individual is at the core of both, as 
opposed to states that form the primary subjects of international law. Both 
human rights and international humanitarian law aim to find different ways of 
protecting the individual. Yet their temporality and overall vision of human 
nature are fundamentally different. While human rights ideology is forward-
looking and utopian, international humanitarian law keeps its gaze fixed on 
the past record of violence and warfare that has characterized much of human 
history. This record is treated as offering evidence of fundamental characteris-
tics of human nature, namely that such acts are endemic and inevitable, and 
by extension seen as impossible to eradicate for good. Thus, the main purpose 
of ihl is to create tools and standards for governing this part of human nature 
and human conduct, so as to restrict harm and destruction in the inevitable 
case of violent outbreaks.
ihl can be classified under two distinct trajectories, namely the Hague Con-
ventions and the Geneva Conventions. Each term refers to a cluster of treaties 
and declarations while also having distinct emphases: the Hague Conventions 
articulate acceptable methods of warfare, conduct of hostilities, and occupa-
tion, while the Geneva Conventions are directed at protecting the individual, 
civilians during warfare as well as injured combatants. Laws to govern warfare 
have long roots that date back centuries, if not millennia. The basis of current 
codification goes back to the 19th century and to agreements between states, in 
particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The major part of ihl is 
contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, complemented by the Addition-
al Protocols of 1977 that relate to the protection of victims of armed conflicts. 
Both documents have broad international applicability. The two branches of 
law covered in the Hague and Geneva Conventions are further developed by 
the first two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions on the protection 
of civilians (1977). These are referred to as Additional Protocol i (ap i), which 
governs international armed conflict, and Additional Protocol ii (ap ii), which 
governs non-international armed conflict.
Initially, ihl only applied to international armed conflict (iac), and thus 
excluded internal tensions and disturbances. Yet Protocol ii (adopted in 1977 
and entered into force in 1978) of the Geneva Convention extended ihl to 
non-international armed conflict. The definition of iac is found in Article Two, 
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which is common to the four Geneva Conventions: this states that the rules of 
iac apply to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which 
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.” Thus, iac can 
only be between two or more sovereign states (Dinstein 2016). A situation in 
which a foreign power sends troops into a territory to support a local move-
ment is also considered an international armed conflict (gc Art. 2(2)). Addi-
tional Protocol I extends the field of application to “armed conflicts in which 
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination” (api, 
Art. 1(4)).
ihl aims to address and restrict harm towards both participants in hostili-
ties and civilians. At the core of ihl are two principles: that persons who are 
not, or are no longer, participating in hostilities must be protected; and that 
the right of parties in an armed conflict to choose methods and means of war-
fare is not unlimited. On these bases, ihl is further divided into two main 
branches. Jus ad bellum refers to the conditions under which a state may resort 
to the use of warfare, loosely referring to armed attack and aggression. Such 
acts are generally prohibited today, save for two exceptions: self-defense and 
United Nations authorization. Jus in bellum refers to rules applying in the case 
of armed conflicts, protecting persons who are not participating in the hostili-
ties, as well as restricting the means and methods of warfare (Solis 2016).
The law goes into effect once armed conflict has commenced and applies 
to all sides of a conflict irrespective of who has initiated it. ihl includes 
regulations on the treatment of prisoners of war, combatant status, and 
rules regulating the conduct of hostilities and humanitarian access and as-
sistance to certain categories of vulnerable persons. Vulnerable persons in-
clude wounded and sick in armed forces in the field (gc i); wounded, sick, 
and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea (gc ii); prisoners of war 
(gc iii); and protected civilians (gc iv). The latter is particularly relevant 
to humanitarian protection and assistance, and was established to prevent 
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International Organizations
The term international organization is most frequently associated with inter-
governmental organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade 
Organization, or the International Labour Organization. International organi-
zations are generally comprised of sovereign states, although other entities can 
also apply to become members. They are, by their nature, multilateral. The In-
ternational Law Commission defines an international organization as an “or-
ganization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by interna-
tional law and possessing its own international legal personality” (ilc 2011). It 
is important to distinguish between intergovernmental organizations, which 
are the focus of this entry, and international non-governmental organizations, 
which are not established by intergovernmental agreement, are non-profit in 
nature and must adhere to the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states (Willets 2001). The International Committee of the Red Cross 
has a unique legal status, similar to that of intergovernmental organizations, 
such as the UN, while not being intergovernmental in nature.
International humanitarian organizations including the UN and the Inter-
national Organization for Migration, which became a “Related Organization” 
of the UN in 2016, are generally well funded. This is largely because most do-
nors continue to prefer to channel aid through these organizations, rather than 
giving it directly to other implementing organizations. This is because intergov-
ernmental organizations are perceived as having greater capacity to manage 
large volumes of funds, and greater knowledge and expertise. In 2016, for ex-
ample, 60 percent of all direct government humanitarian funding went to mul-
tilateral organizations. In contrast, non-governmental organizations received 
just 20 percent of direct government funding (Development Initiatives 2018).
International humanitarian organizations adopt different approaches to 
emergency and aid, and are subject to different mandates and restrictions. The 
UN is exempt from some key international legislation governing humanitarian 
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relief operations. For example, humanitarian operations that are undertaken 
as a result of a United Nations Security Council (unsc) Resolution are exempt 
from requiring consent from the parties involved. The unsc “may adopt bind-
ing measures requiring parties to an armed conflict, and other relevant states, 
to consent to humanitarian relief operations or impose such operations on 
parties” (Akande and Gillard 2016: 18). Syria is an example of this: unsc Reso-
lution 2165 (2014) constituted a binding decision that UN humanitarian agen-
cies and their implementing partners were authorized to provide humanitari-
an relief to conflict-affected populations. In this case, consent from the parties 
to the armed conflict was not required (Akande and Gillard 2016).
The UN often uses integrated missions in crisis-affected countries. However, 
at least some degree of political consensus is required for this approach to 
work. Moreover, when engaging in peace-keeping and peace-building mis-
sions, their legitimacy to coordinate humanitarian response may be compro-
mised “as they are bringing humanitarian response within the all- encompassing 
strategy of stabilization” (dara 2013: 5).
Humanitarian international organizations also face political limitations 
when it comes to humanitarian response. In Syria, for instance, the UN can 
only operate within the Syrian government’s mandate and with its consent. 
The UN’s presence in Damascus and its cooperation with the government have 
led to distrust among partners in opposition areas. This has had a negative 
impact on the organization’s ability to deliver an effective humanitarian re-
sponse (Independent Commission for Aid Impact 2018).
Despite efforts to improve coordination within the UN system, challenges 
persist. Agencies often compete rather than collaborate. There are instances of 
different agencies running parallel efforts, an example being during the early 
years of the Syrian refugee crisis, when agencies failed to coordinate their re-
sponse (Mansour 2017; Kelley 2017).
A number of UN agencies increasingly “outsource” their work to local con-
tractors and organizations. This reduces contact between those providing as-
sistance and crisis-affected communities. Contact is also an issue in relation to 
understanding the needs of local populations and in terms of taking local con-
text into account. Although some progress has been made, further efforts are 
required in this regard (dara 2013).
International organizations have much to offer in terms of humanitarian 
response. However, continued efforts are needed to address some of the chal-
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Livelihoods
In the humanitarian world, livelihoods are activities that allow people to se-
cure the basic necessities of life, such as food, water, shelter and clothing (un-
hcr 2014: 1). The term has historically drawn special attention as it is widely 
employed by non-governmental organizations (ngos) and United Nations 
agencies dealing with development and relief in rural and urban environ-
ments. The frequently protracted nature of crises produced by human-made 
conflict or natural disasters has ended up placing greater emphasis on refugee 
capacity to develop coping mechanisms and self-reliance, which have now 
gained great momentum in international debates. In fact, during the 1960s and 
1970s the strategy of targeting refugees around the world by humanitarian live-
lihoods-programming changed from the care and maintenance of refugees to 
a self-reliance formula. In the same vein, the language of “resilient” (Reid 2012) 
or “sustainable” livelihoods (Chambers and Conway 1992) has placed further 
responsibility to survive and thrive on the beneficiaries themselves, based on 
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the capacity of crisis-affected people to circumvent exclusion with urban- or 
rural-based methods.
ngos have primarily used livelihoods to refer to biological life and the way in 
which individuals or social groups develop means to sustain life in contexts of 
displacement through access to both employment and services. Nonetheless, 
ngos’ approaches have nuanced this understanding of livelihoods, which has 
become a self-standing professional sector, although cutting across humani-
tarian protection, shelter, labor, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (these three 
latter often referred to as WASH). The increased importance of livelihoods in 
the humanitarian sector has paved the way to a common, transnational—but 
mostly technical—understanding of the term. Against this backdrop, the chal-
lenge of translating the word from English into other languages is noteworthy, 
with several languages borrowing it from English tout court. Some languages, 
Arabic being an example, resort to paraphrases, such as “ways to improve life.” 
Tentative translations of the term livelihoods play a major role in unfolding 
the standardized and dehistoricized way in which livelihood strategies have 
often been exported through humanitarian programming, which is aimed at 
guaranteeing survival on the basis of local specificities.
Employed in contexts of crisis, where the source of instability, poor infra-
structure, hazards, risks, and violence is both political and economic, the term 
has gradually been redefined in the light of political vulnerabilities and gover-
nance deficiencies (Jaspars and Shoham 2002). Since the early 2000s, the 
 culture-specific concept of livelihoods and the process of livelihood-hunting 
have increasingly concerned practitioners and researchers. For instance, while 
the term has largely been employed as an individual strategy of developing 
tactics of survival in crisis-affected contexts, livelihoods can now also entail a 
collective aspiration (Kaiser 2009) to economic sustainability and self-suffi-
ciency in cultures where family, religious belonging, or household-oriented 
ways of coping write the real grammar of everyday life.
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Media
Media plays a central role in shaping the humanitarian field, from mediating 
and drawing attention to humanitarian crises, to serving as a platform for 
alerts about unfolding crises, to reporting on the hidden and underlying causes 
of crises. Media is here broadly understood as both the medium, whether 
press, radio, or television, as well as online news media and the media actors—
the editorial teams and journalists of respective media outlets—who make 
decisions about events to cover and how to cover them. Social media outlets 
are increasingly also studied in the framework of media studies, where news is 
both produced (by social media users) and relayed from other news sources. 
Different types of media exercise significant power in framing perceptions 
about the key issues at stake in an emergency setting.
The war in Biafra between 1967 and 1970 led to the emergence of a new vi-
sual culture in modern humanitarianism, and the establishment of Médecins 
Sans Frontières was essentially motivated by the need to “bear witness” 
 (témoigner). This mobilized media coverage of the war and the ensuing suffer-
ing. Following this, photographic images came to be seen as central to mobiliz-
ing Western political attention towards ongoing crises and to ensuring human-
itarian access.
Scholarly literature has extensively focused on the role of the media in pri-
oritizing certain humanitarian crises. This literature has debated whether 
there is a “cnn effect,” or other types of effects, that media coverage of a given 
situation would have on the political responses and “calls for intervention” 
(Robinson 2002). In order to assess which political contexts in Western capitals 
are more or less likely to give the media a decisive role in shaping responses, 
the focus has been primarily Westerncentric, mainly looking at North Ameri-
can and European media channels and how they portray crises occurring 
elsewhere.
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Media is generally omnipresent in humanitarian studies, even beyond me-
dia studies. In the critical literature that discusses what humanitarianism is or 
should be and its moral underpinnings, the role of the media is either explic-
itly pointed out or is a background element that mediates the relationship be-
tween the external “humanitarian actors” and the victims and “beneficiaries” 
of humanitarian aid and compassion. Peter Singer (1972) argues that we are as 
obliged to help a distant stranger in dire need as we are to help somebody in 
extreme distress who is in close proximity to us—that distance per se does not 
have any impact. Yet media coverage of such distant suffering is what makes it 
possible to mobilize funds and aid workers to provide assistance “elsewhere.” 
Along the same lines, Deen K. Chatterjee, in seeking to make sense of duties to 
help distant strangers, writes: “Today we live in a world in which spheres of 
interaction are constantly expanding, while advanced technology makes it 
easy to reach the distant needy and vividly broadcast their plight to all” (Chat-
terjee 2004). Lilie Chouliaraki also studies distant suffering and how it is medi-
ated through news media, and emphasizes the “asymmetry of power between 
the comfort of spectators in their living rooms and the vulnerability of suffer-
ers on the spectator’s television screens” (2006: 4).
Media plays an important role in framing humanitarian crises in certain 
ways, shaping narratives about ongoing crises and the way they are understood 
in the public sphere. For this reason, humanitarian organizations rely on mass 
media to draw attention to otherwise forgotten crises. This, in turn, is seen as 
the gateway to increased donations and political attention (Powers 2014). At 
the same time, humanitarian actors are used by journalists to provide factual 
information, from statistics to broader political context.
The emergence of new technologies has impacted the communication of 
humanitarian actors, for example with the growing use of social media to share 
campaign ads and short videos in social-media friendly formats. Such plat-
forms have opened up for online activism, another form of engagement for 
humanitarian causes, allowing almost anyone to launch their own awareness 
raising campaigns or crowdfunding for specific causes.
Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert
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Medical Neutrality
Medical neutrality refers to the principle of non-interference with medical ser-
vices during conflicts and other humanitarian crises. The concept of medical 
neutrality is grounded in statutes in international humanitarian law (ihl) and 
international human rights law, and is informed by ethical codes such as the 
Hippocratic Oath (Bouchet-Saulnier et al. 2013; Roberts and VanRooyen 2013). 
It requires three things: (1) the protection of and non-interference with the 
operations of medical facilities, medical transport, and medical personnel; (2) 
the provision of the best medical care possible to all who need medical atten-
tion, combatants and non-combatants alike, regardless of their political affili-
ation or participation in conflicts and politics; and most generally, (3) the man-
date that warring factions both protect and refrain from targeting civilians 
during conflicts. Numerous non-governmental aid and human rights organiza-
tions, United Nations agencies, and state signatories to international laws and 
treaties support and variably enact the principle of medical neutrality. For ex-
ample, alongside the International Committee of the Red Cross (icrc), Physi-
cians for Human Rights has led many initiatives to define and enforce medical 
neutrality.
The four Geneva Conventions, which allude to the idea of medical neutral-
ity, were ratified in 1949. Protocols i and ii were added in 1977 to, among other 
things, specify the meaning of medical neutrality and more generally expand 
the application of ihl to account for the nature of 20th-century conflicts. Pro-
tocol i sets out new rules regarding the treatment of the deceased, the protec-
tion and care for civilians and prisoners involved in and affected by conflicts, 
and the protection of all forms of medical units and personnel. Protocol ii 
adds the protection of victims of non-international and internal armed con-
flicts to those already covered within the laws of war. These additional  protocols 
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have been ratified by 168 countries, excepting several countries including Iran, 
Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and the United States. Benton 
and Atshan (2016: 153) argue that these legal and clinical artifacts “were devel-
oped in the interests of state power” and serve political ends.
Violations of medical neutrality occur when, for instance, civilians, medi-
cal facilities, and medical personnel are deliberately targeted in conflict. In 
recent years, the armed forces of several countries have repeatedly and de-
liberately targeted civilian and medical infrastructures such as hospitals and 
ambulances, and have strategically obstructed and corrupted the flow of medi-
cal supplies (Hamdy and Bayoumi 2016). National militaries now undermine 
the provision of health care to oppositional groups by retaliating against the 
health professionals who treat the sick and wounded, for example in Syria. 
Access to populations in need, medical facilities, and medical supplies are 
sometimes controlled by parties to conflict, forcing humanitarian organiza-
tions and medical providers to partner with them and funnel aid through 
partisan affiliates (Sparrow 2018). While violations of medical neutrality can 
rise to the level of war crimes, there are few mechanisms to enforce or pun-
ish the actors involved. During periods of civil unrest, violations of medical 
neutrality can infringe important human rights treaties such as the Interna-
tional Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against 
Torture, but again, there are few mechanisms through which victims can seek 
justice.
There remains a tension between the principle and operational necessity of 
medical neutrality legally required of state actors and intervening aid organi-
zations, and the principle of medical neutrality and activism on behalf of pa-
tients practiced by individuals who provide medical care and protection dur-
ing humanitarian emergencies (Allhoff 2008). This tension, referred to as “the 
problem of neutrality” by Peter Redfield (2013), has been central to the differ-
ences in missions and practices of organizations such as Médecins Sans Fron-
tières and the icrc that hire and deploy clinical medical providers during con-
flicts. Ethnographies of medical care in conflict provide a window into these 
tensions, and into how medical neutrality is variably socially and politically 
constructed and debated by different individuals within different aid and do-
nor organizations—especially various medical providers involved in humani-
tarian response. For example, Hamdy and Bayoumi (2016) and Aciksoz (2016) 
demonstrate that while clinical providers provide a unique witness to the 
physical toll of conflict on the bodies of their patients in Egypt and Turkey re-
spectively, these clinicians also use their position as “neutral” actors as a politi-
cal stance from which to advocate for social and political change. Their neu-
trality, in these cases, is not apolitical, exceptional, or immune from the 
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conflicts at hand, but rather explicitly and strategically political and engaged 
in advocacy on behalf of patients.
Lauren Carruth
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Mental Health
The nexus of humanitarianism and mental health has gained traction in re-
gard to environmental, political, and epidemiological situations. Humanitari-
an frameworks of response, assistance, relief, and aid have been operational-
ized heterogeneously around disruptions to mental health caused by conflict, 
war, environmental disaster, climate change impacts, poverty, and displace-
ment. The deleterious effects of these factors on clinical and subclinical forms 
of suffering have been targeted, and the enhanced ability of health services to 
deliver care has been sought.
Mental health and humanitarianism foster collaborations between social 
scientists, medical practitioners, lawyers, politicians, anthropologists, and 
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 international development and aid experts. This is important for the framing 
and practical delivery of mental health needs, for example in recognizing the 
social and structural origins of mental health, integrating contexts of emer-
gency and crisis into diagnostic practice, and task-sharing in low and high re-
source situations (Kohrt and Mendenhall 2015). Such collaborations also right-
ly recognize the complexity of mental health problems in humanitarian 
situations and the multiple bureaucracies that those seeking mental health 
care for themselves or others must navigate. The field of medical humanitarian-
ism seeks to harmonize humanitarianism’s quest for  universals—particularly 
around the entwining of humanity and human rights with intellectual innova-
tion, comparison, and programmatic delivery—while simultaneously account-
ing for elements of state sovereignty, geopolitics, socio-political tensions, 
 violence and militarism, and the psychological distress of affected people, in-
cluding the mental health problems of humanitarian workers, practitioners, 
and consultants themselves (Abramovitz and Panter-Brick 2015).
The humanitarianism–mental health nexus originated with 19th-century 
psychiatrists who introduced humanitarian reforms into the treatment of the 
criminally insane (Khan 2017). This led definitions of mental illness to emerge 
and expand. A century on, humanitarian “psy-ences” and new subfields, such 
as humanitarian psychiatry, have emerged, notably through the ideological as-
cendancy of the psychiatric classification post-traumatic stress disorder. Crit-
ics question the political uses of trauma in governing the structures and bor-
ders of the international legal system, military and humanitarian interventions, 
and policies around military populations, displaced people, refugees, and asy-
lum seekers. They identify the hierarchical assumptions in the ways that trau-
mas are selectively denied or recognized in crisis situations (James 2010). Oth-
ers criticize the ways in which psychiatry and medicine have become entwined 
with legal doctrines regarding the right to refuge, family life, and protection 
from persecution. They also criticize how refugee minds and bodies, diagnosed 
with physical and psychological trauma, become border tools governing a hu-
manitarian gateway to “Western citizenship,” and restrict doctors’ ability to 
deliver treatment and care (Fassin and Rechtman 2009). These criticisms show 
us that collaborations between doctors and lawyers, designed to help people in 
humanitarian crises, are by no means always beneficial.
Regarding conjunctions with humanitarianism and development, the World 
Health Organization (who) was formed in 1948 as a global unified health body 
to tackle “international health” crises. This meant the world’s richest countries 
would help the world’s poorest, according to a crude geography based on first, 
second, and third worlds. The collaboration built on a historical genealogy that 
largely began with colonial medicine, through associated forms of tropical 
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medicine and missionary medicine, to international health, global health, and 
finally global mental health (Farmer, Kim, Kleinman, and Basilico 2013).
Significantly, in 2001, a who report highlighting the growing “global burden” 
of mental disorders stated that “there can be no health without mental health” 
(who 2001). This led to the new Movement for Global Mental Health to ur-
gently call, in 2007, for the scaling-up of mental health services in low- and 
middle-income countries. Access to health services was framed as a pressing 
moral imperative, affordable medication as a basic human right, and mental 
disorders as having universal neurological and biological causes. Critics, on the 
other hand, have vociferously opposed the increasing overprescription of psy-
chiatric medication, and the neglect of cultural, political, and socio-economic 
factors involved (Fernando 2014). They raise colonial critiques of Western 
agenda-setting, the Americanization of distress, and the imperium of Western 
psychiatry (Watters 2011). In their criticisms of global mental health, anthro-
pologists have made important advances in cultural and global psychiatry, in-
cluding in the cultural formulation of the world’s largest de facto classification 
system: the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (dsm-5), 
published by the American Psychiatric Association.
Debating the relationship between intellectual critique and practical ac-
tion, academics question the cultural limitations of social science as ameliora-
tive practice. They ask how intellectual and moral ideals can be combined with 
realistic and pragmatic approaches to suffering and sustain a commitment to 
humanitarian social reform, especially when health systems, the humanitarian 
industry, and the languages of psychiatric classification are flawed (Wilkinson 
and Kleinman 2016).
Overcoming implementation challenges has produced numerous multi-
sectoral, multidisciplinary approaches to psychosocial and mental health sup-
port programs. Notwithstanding, challenges arise in aligning program priori-
ties across sectors, overcoming coordination challenges, reconciling theories 
and models of change, and obtaining funding.
Nichola Khan
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Migration
There is no universally accepted definition of human migration. Consequently, 
multiple interpretations of the term “migrant” coexist. In its most basic sense, 
migration can refer to physical movement from one place to another. Accord-
ing to the United Nations, “most experts agree that an international migrant is 
someone who changes his or her country of usual residence, irrespective of the 
reason for migration or legal status” (UN 2019). Often, both spatial and tempo-
ral dimensions are included in definitions of migration. While people can mi-
grate from a rural town to a nearby metropolis or frequently travel back and 
forth between two places, migrants are commonly described as people who 
cross international borders and change their habitual place of residence for a 
limited period or longer stay.
If an element of coercion exists, the act of migration is generally referred to 
as forced. Similarly, if individuals cross national borders unauthorized, they 
are commonly referred to as irregular migrants. However, migration can occur 
anywhere on the spectrum of experiences between forced and voluntary 
(Erdal and Oeppen 2018) and regular and irregular (Kubal 2013). While migra-
tion can be defined as voluntary and/or irregular by state agencies, it may be 
experienced differently by the individual migrant and other actors. Therefore, 
migrant labels and categories are frequently contested. Following the 2015 
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migration reception crisis in Europe, for example, debates concerning refugees 
versus migrants soared. While humanitarian actors mostly argued that “refu-
gees are not migrants” (unhcr 2016), advocates for an inclusive understand-
ing of migrants highlighted refugees as a type of migrants (Carling 2017). While 
some migrants are victimized and granted protection as refugees under the 
1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, others are not. 
However, anyone on the move may be in need of humanitarian assistance and 
protection—regardless their legal status.
The relationship between migration and humanitarianism is not clear cut. 
In humanitarian crises, affected populations are commonly displaced owing to 
conflicts or natural disasters, but are not necessarily labeled internal or inter-
national migrants. Migrants have no legal protection in international humani-
tarian law, but they may be protected in their capacity as refugees or as civil-
ians (Gieseken and Ouellet-Décoste 2018). This could be the case in contexts of 
armed conflict, where international humanitarian law regulates the limits of 
acceptable conduct. Migrants may also be entitled to protection through inter-
national human rights law or even national legislation as, for example, work-
ers, residents, or citizens (ilo 2016).
Yet, as part of its core responsibility to “leave no one behind,” the Agenda for 
Humanity (ocha 2019) aims to integrate the specific vulnerabilities of migra-
tions “into humanitarian and other response plans.” Likewise, the Internation-
al Committee of the Red Cross response to vulnerable migrants is based on the 
“needs of migrants.” It is not conditioned by the migrants’ status (icrc 2019). 
Indeed, a diversity of internal and international migrants can find themselves 
in precarious situations and in need of shelter, support, or assistance. The 
range of vulnerable migrants includes, but is not limited to, people who leave 
their home owing to poverty or climate change, victims of trafficking, inter-
nally displaced people, exploited child workers, irregular migrants who are 
criminalized in host societies, stateless people, failed asylum seekers who can-
not re-enter their origin countries, forcefully evicted migrant workers, and low-
skilled migrants performing dirty, dangerous, and demeaning work for low 
wages and with few rights.
As manifested by the diversity of migrants’ precariousness, migrants can af-
fect or be affected by humanitarian crises throughout all stages of migration: 
before, during, and after the journey. Prospective migrants can choose or be 
forced to leave owing to humanitarian crises, migrants en route are particu-
larly vulnerable to human rights abuse as they are outside their countries of 
citizenship or residency, and immigrants who reside as foreigners can lack ba-
sic rights or services as they do not have citizenship. Migrants can also influ-
ence humanitarian crises, both by intensifying or abating conflicts. Emigrants, 
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for instance through diaspora networks, can engage before, during, and after 
conflicts. By returning, transferring money, or engaging in national and inter-
national politics, they may alter the humanitarian, or developmental, state of 
affairs in their countries of origin.
In sum, the relationship between migration and humanitarianism is mani-
fold. It is also in constant development. While refugee movement has long 
been high on the humanitarian agenda, migration and vulnerable migrants 
have more recently come to the fore of the discourse. Whether stuck in inhu-
mane detention camps, displaced in the wake of natural disasters, or packed in 
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A minority can be defined as “a cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic, sexual and 
gender distinct group that coexists with other groups but is generally subordi-
nate to a dominant group” (Encyclopædia Britannica). Minorities can coincide 
with indigenous people (understood as the earliest known inhabitants of an 
area) but can also be new or emergent groups in national or urban settings. 
Resources and the traditional way of life of indigenous people and minorities 
are often challenged by dominant state centers that exploit the group’s re-
source base for the interests of the state center and in the long run undermine 
the group’s capacity to reproduce their way of life, its relationship with the 
environment, and its cultural identity (see, for example, www.culturalsurvival.
org). Competition for resources has made minorities vulnerable for discrimi-
nation or—as in the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar—even outright expul-
sion. As minorities are typically marginalized or oppressed in relation to the 
center, they are often (but not always) more vulnerable to disasters and con-
flicts (Roeder 2014).
Humanitarian organizations emerge as a third force, working as a boost for 
ethnic and religious minorities’ aspirations for cultural autonomy and rights 
claims. However, humanitarian organizations and development cooperation 
can also lead to enhancing the enclosure of previously inaccessible minorities 
and their unwillingly participation in the “civilizing” and disciplining assimila-
tion programs of dominant centers in the minority regions (Duncan 2004). Hu-
manitarian organizations are becoming increasingly important in producing 
the “truth” about human rights violations in the international media (Redfield 
2013). In some ethnic minority areas, where the state does not exercise full sov-
ereignty, humanitarian organizations and international non-governmental or-
ganizations (ingos) may assume state functions, providing much of the lack-
ing infrastructures in terms of human rights protection, public health, and 
education.
When humanitarian organizations lack access to some areas, they negotiate 
access with local actors, including armed groups (De Lauri 2018). In this way, 
they often consolidate or reconfigure power relations at the local level among 
ethnic minorities, armed groups, and political parties. International humani-
tarian organizations also partner with local organizations in ethnic minority 
areas and support existing structures and local knowledge (Ferris 2011). Work-
ing for ethnic and religious minorities in conflict situations can be difficult, as 
in most cases organizations do not receive permission to operate and therefore 
do not receive access to the most vulnerable people. Dependence on  permission 
can lead to perverse effects: for example, the Office of the United Nations High 
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Commissioner for Refugees might be led to relocate villages and thus contrib-
ute to enhancing state control over minority villagers (Feldman and Ticktin 
2010). In conflict situations, humanitarian agents may even endanger local 
people who regard ingos with suspicion or open hostility. International hu-
manitarian organizations can bolster transnational networks of minority peo-
ple and constitute a crucial part in the making of transnational ethnic and re-
ligious communities (Salemink 2003), but can equally contradict strategies of 
local communities that are based on local knowledge.
In the worst case, competition for humanitarian funding might become a 
cause for an escalation in violence between different parties in a conflict (De 
Lauri 2016). In some cases, humanitarian aid can be used as a leverage to con-
solidate the position of some ethnic, religious, or political groups to the detri-
ment of others.
Support of linguistic minorities is another area of intervention, for example 
via mother tongue-based education in minority or frontier regions (Lall 2016). 
Humanitarian organizations engaged in supporting indigenous or minorities’ 
access to education are at the forefront of pulling together resources for indig-
enous or minority literacy movements, enhancing the globalization of local 
aspirations. In this endeavor, ingos risk a clash with state interests, but can 
also contribute to the peace process by helping to bridge minority education 
with national education.
Humanitarian assistance in the education and health sectors complement 
and add to existing development cooperation from donor governments that 
support infrastructural projects in minority regions in relation to business in-
vestments. These mega-projects are often used for business as well as being 
ordering devices for military purposes, and can bring about resistance from 
minorities if they suffer land-grabs and inadequate compensation.
The role of humanitarian organizations and humanitarian workers’ life-
styles may affect trusting relations with minorities. International humanitari-
an workers are often part of a privileged transnational and networked elite: 
they use hotels, drive suvs, and are not always fully aware of specific minori-
ties’ concerns (Smirl 2008).
Alexander Horstmann
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Missionary
The concept and figure of the missionary, a qualified agent authorized to re-
cruit adherents in areas outside the de facto spiritual jurisdiction of a church, 
arose in the context of Western Christianity. The history and practices of hu-
manitarianism and Christian missions are closely intertwined. While expan-
sion and recruitment are a hallmark of many religious traditions, the humani-
tarian dimension of expansion practices in religions outside Western 
Christianity is less well understood, partly because of Christian ideological and 
technological dominance in the organizational field of systematic recruitment 
across space. As a consequence, there is no comparable body of research ex-
amining the connection between humanitarianism and missionaries of other 
religions, such as Islam and Buddhism.
Christianity has been actively recruiting since its early stages, and the con-
version of “pagans” was an important factor in the religious homogenization of 
Europe in the Middle Ages (Wood 2001). Yet a more specialized mission sector 
only emerged with the geographically mobility of the mendicant orders in the 
15th century and the formation of Vatican’s specialized Congregation for the 
Propagation of the Faith in the context of competition with strengthening 
Protestant churches in the 17th century. Initially weak, the Protestant  challenge 
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found a solid missionary footing in the late 18th century with the founding of 
the first effective missionary voluntary organizations (Neill 1986). This new 
Protestant missionary movement created the organizationally powerful mod-
ern form of missions.
Modern Christian missions were historically intertwined with confessional 
hostilities playing out in the enlarging theater of European overseas expan-
sions. Their humanitarian dimensions inscribe themselves in the complex reli-
gious and political tensions of the last six centuries and the dynamics of 
 European expansionism. The goal of conversion of other populations to Chris-
tianity almost naturally aligned the missions with imperial political authori-
ties  (Abernethy 2000). However, the relationship between missionaries and 
political agents empirically occupies a spectrum from full collaboration to 
highly contentious opposition (Stanley 1990; Porter 2004).
Missionary initiated and implemented humanitarian projects emerged 
within this spectrum as religious representatives identified issues and condi-
tions that they sought to alleviate. Substantively, missionaries contributed to 
the emerging humanitarian field by identifying and mobilizing support for a 
series of social problems and policies: they were active in promoting education 
(Savage 1997), health care (Williams 1982), and disaster relief (Bohr 1972), and 
in combating economic exploitation and body-harming practices such as 
 enslavement, female genital mutilation, foot-binding, or widows’ ritual self-
immolation in India (Oddie 1979).
Missionaries’ typical role as initiators of humanitarian projects thus comes 
from the combination of several factors: their geographical proximity to ob-
served social problems and cases of social injustice (Nepstad 2004); religious 
ideologies of compassion and the perceived value of humanitarian practices as 
technologies of salvation (Chaves 1998); and the ability of missionary organiza-
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Mitigation
Broadly put, there are three meanings of the notion of mitigation in the human-
itarian context. The first meaning refers to the prevention or avoidance of hu-
manitarian crises often caused by armed conflict (Lane 2016). Here, mitigation 
takes the form of anticipatory responses aimed at tackling three aspects: the 
societal preconditions of violent politics, the potential of violent conflict itself, 
and the potential effects of the conflict (Albala-Bertrand 2000). The second 
meaning of mitigation refers to the alleviation of suffering caused by humani-
tarian emergencies through the provision of relief aid that creates temporary 
administrative, personnel, and financial compromises (Hoffman, Weiss, and 
Egeland 2017). The third meaning is that mitigation is a specific phase of the 
so-called “disaster management cycle,” which is typically divided into differ-
ent stages (Coetzee and Van Niekerk 2012) such as mitigation,  preparedness, 
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and response and recovery phases. In this context, mitigation deals with com-
plex emergencies, considered the outcome of “societal/institutional weak-
ness” and multicausal factors such as food insecurity, epidemics, conflicts, or 
displaced populations, and also with natural disasters, perceived as the re-
sult of the “physical weakness” of structures and processes (Albala-Bertrand 
2000: 216).
Following the end of the Cold War, the boundaries between humanitarian 
relief and development have been progressively blurred and integrated into a 
resilient life cycle. There is now no clear division between communities di-
rectly experiencing crises, those vulnerable to future disaster/emergencies, or 
those in recovery stages. In parallel, the notion of mitigation has shifted from 
being primarily reactive to being integrated into a larger project to build “bet-
ter societies” (Hoffman, Weiss, and Egeland 2017: 19). In this logic, mitigation is 
merged into the broader framework of sustainable development that seeks to 
create safer communities (Schneider 2017). Although complex emergencies 
are integral to political and economic structures, the logic of mitigation in hu-
manitarian settings “derives from a natural disaster model that pays little at-
tention to social or political factors” (Duffield 1994). However, the violent and 
entrenched political nature of complex humanitarian emergencies requires 
more multifaceted mitigation measures and responses than natural disasters 
(Albala-Bertrand 2000).
By the end of the Cold War, mitigation measures were less focused on rescue 
or protection and more on the modulation of social and economic processes to 
promote “adaptative coping strategies” (Duffield 2013: 8). The division between 
ex-ante and ex-post disaster related activities emerged as a separate yet inter-
connected stream of humanitarian aid (Hollis 2014). This included a shift to-
wards the view that disasters were the outcome of interconnected events and 
that emergencies were integral to the human–environment relationship. Sub-
sequently, disasters seemed not only very predictable, but their magnitude 
also seemed reducible to advance planning (Schneider 2017). Akin to this new 
trend, disaster risk reduction required the implementation of measures and 
policies with a twofold aim: to enable societies to be resilient to natural haz-
ards and to decrease societal vulnerability (UN 2004). Disaster risk reduction 
conceived the lessening of risk as a series of endeavors tracked across social, 
economic, governmental, and professional sectors of activity (UN 2004). In-
stead of fearing disasters per se, societies are “urged to learn the new life-skills 
of preparedness and resilience” (Duffield 2013: 480). Disaster mitigation cen-
ters on the technical and material inputs to “prepare for the predetermined 
roles” that different actors and processes have in pre-disaster, during the disas-
ter, and during post-disaster operations (Sushil 2017). In this vein, the United 
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Nations General Assembly established an open-ended intergovernmental ex-
pert working group to update the terminology used by the United Nations 
 Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (unisdr) (UN General Assembly 2015). In 
June 2015, the unisdr working group defined mitigation as “[t]he lessening or 
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Monitoring mechanisms are a set of institutions and practices that in the fields 
of international human rights and humanitarian law address either already 
committed wrongdoing or aim to prevent future wrongdoing. The ideas be-
hind monitoring mechanisms borrow from criminal law, and have similar aims 
to realize reconciliation, restitution, reparations, and even deterrence. More 
broadly, monitoring mechanisms can be seen as aiming to end what is known 
as “the culture of impunity” towards grave human rights violations.
Monitoring mechanisms can have both states and individuals as their par-
ties, and they can be either permanent or temporary in nature. In the United 
Nations (UN) context, monitoring mechanisms include expert committees 
and councils formed of states. An example of expert committees is offered by 
UN human rights treaty bodies, which monitor how states comply with the 
obligations that they have undertaken by becoming parties to international 
human rights covenants (Halme-Tuomisaari 2013). In the absence of an inter-
national human rights court operating under the UN with universal jurisdic-
tion, treaty bodies are also the UN’s most authoritative human rights monitor-
ing mechanisms. To date, there are ten UN treaty bodies, including the UN 
Human Rights Committee founded in 1976, which monitors how states comply 
with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, founded in 1985, which monitors 
state compliance with the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights.
The treaty bodies are composed of 15–20 selected nationals of state parties 
to a given covenant and are not the same as courts. In their tasks, members act 
(or are supposed to act) as autonomous experts representing the viewpoint of 
a particular covenant and human rights, not the national interests of their host 
states. UN committees convene regularly, today most often in the Geneva of-
fices of the UN Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights. Sessions 
are also sometimes arranged at the UN headquarters in New York. These ses-
sions include elements called “constructive dialogue” with state parties, refer-
ring to a formal exchange between the committee and state representatives, as 
well as informal sessions between committee members and non-governmen-
tal organizations (ngos). Some committees also process individual petitions 
and issue documents known as “general comments”: these lengthy documents 
elaborate on the content of individual covenant paragraphs in light of commit-
tee case law. The most important element of treaty bodies is their cyclical na-
ture: as is stipulated in their covenant-based mandates, treaty body hearings 
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are intended to be a recurring and repetitive, instead of an exceptional and 
unique practice, which jointly form an ongoing rights dialogue, ideally leading 
towards a gradual and permanent improvement in state and non-state human 
rights conduct, thus also leading to world improvement.
The Universal Periodic Review (upr) is another UN monitoring mechanism 
that operates with a similar repetitive logic. It is a monitoring practice orga-
nized by the UN Human Rights Council, an international body composed of 
the member states of the UN. The upr was launched in 2006 as the former UN 
Human Rights Commission was transformed into the current Council, accom-
panied by the hope that the new body would be rid of its predecessor’s adver-
sarial and politicized nature. The operational logic of the upr is straightfor-
ward: each state takes turns in presenting the Council with its report in a highly 
formalized and organized “ritual” (Charlesworth and Larking 2014; Cowan and 
Billaud 2017). In its first decade, the upr has been praised for its universal par-
ticipation and high visibility, making it the preferred monitoring mechanism 
for the lobbying of many ngos. Yet recent developments have posed challeng-
es to the stated aims of the Human Rights Council to form a truly universal 
monitoring mechanism: echoing broader dynamics of world politics and the 
return of unilateralism instead of postwar multilateralism, the United States 
announced its withdrawal from the Council in 2018.
Other monitoring mechanisms include regional human rights expert bodies 
and diverse international courts, including the International Court of Justice 
and the International Criminal Court, both of which operate under the UN. 
Numerous regional mechanisms also exist: these include the European Court 
of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African 
Court on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights. The past few decades have also 
seen the proliferation of diverse kinds of other monitoring mechanisms of a 
more interim nature, aimed at addressing grave international humanitarian 
catastrophes and genocide, including the Commission on Truth and Reconcili-
ation in Yugoslavia, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission of 
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Moral Responsibility
Philosophers and theologians from all traditions have long been preoccupied 
with the issue of doing “the right thing” and apportioning praise or blame ac-
cordingly. For example, in the parable of the Good Samaritan, two passers-by 
ignore the suffering of a bludgeoned stranger but the third stops to assist and 
protect the stranger because he feels compelled to do so (Boltanski 2007). It is 
immediately clear to the reader where the moral obligation lies, and that it is 
connected with our common humanity. Or, to quote George Steiner, “men are 
accomplices to that which leaves them indifferent” (Steiner 1967: 150). In the 
context of humanitarian action, this moral imperative often clashes with 
messy or fast-moving realities on the ground. Thus, in Kantian terms, “ought 
implies can,” meaning that in a given situation the moral responsibility of the 
humanitarian is to alleviate suffering when it is realistically possible to do so 
(Slim, 2015: 179). In real life humanitarian situations, deliberations around the 
morality of acts of commission or omission are rarely so clear cut. A number of 
variables make such deliberations more difficult. These include considerations 
of distance, time, universality, and, of course, politics.
In principle, the quality of mercy is not strained—absolutes cannot be 
 compromised—and distance should not matter, especially today when “any-
body can know everything about anything” (Primo Levi in Boltanski 2007: 9). 
While it is true that more suffering is more visible than in any earlier phase of 
human history, distance still lengthens the causal chain of moral responsibility 
in practice, making the determination of the morality or otherwise of acts of 
omission more difficult (Boltanski 2007; Ginzburg 1994). The knowledge of 
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 distant suffering triggers the imperative to assist, but the representation of the 
suffering might be subject to manipulation by media or actors on the ground 
(Boltanski 2007). Time raises the issue of the tension between deontological 
and consequentialist ethics: should actions be judged morally right based on 
duty and principles in the here and now, or in terms of consequences and de-
sired ends at some future time? A difficult moral calculation has to be made: 
saving a few lives today could preclude saving much larger numbers tomorrow, 
or, on the contrary, humanitarian access and space might shrink over time.
What is the humanitarian’s universe of obligation? Should the perspectives 
of insiders prevail over those of outsiders? Traditional humanitarian discourse 
posits that humanitarian values are universal and consubstantial with our 
common humanity. It follows that all societies understand vulnerability, pain, 
and anguish in broadly similar terms, and that the imperative to assist and 
protect according to need is generalizable (Linklater 2007). However, this view 
is disputed outside the mainly Western humanitarian canon, and postcolonial 
and communitarian perspectives warn against the assumptions that it is self 
evident that all human beings have some common interests (Linklater 2007). 
Insiders and outsiders may clash over whether moral obligations are first and 
foremost to family, tribe, community, or religious affinity, or cut across these. 
Current debates on the localization of humanitarian action further complicate 
debates around principles and universes of obligation.
Politics of all actors involved in humanitarian situations are always a major 
challenge to the moral responsibility of doing the right thing. Governments, 
belligerents, local authorities, affected groups, and of course humanitarians—
individually or collectively—naturally seek advantages from the provision of 
aid through a variety of forms of instrumentalization (Donini 2012). Decisions 
on where, how, and how much to intervene all have moral implications for 
which there is no easy solution. For many, navigating as close as possible to 
principle and carefully deliberating trade-offs on the basis of facts rather than 
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Needs
One of the key specificities of organizations active in the humanitarian space 
is the emphasis they place on the role that needs play in shaping their deci-
sions. The needs-based approach can be seen as a way of operationalizing hu-
manitarian principles—especially impartiality—as it aims to give priority to 
humanitarian concerns over any other type of political consideration. Funding 
is said to be provided on a needs-only basis, while the quality of the needs-as-
sessment strategy followed by humanitarian practitioners is often taken as a 
key standard of professionalism. Although humanitarian practice has always 
involved documenting and analyzing the needs of crisis-affected people, the 
emphasis has been more on the defense of human rights than on the allevia-
tion of humanitarian needs in the language used (Cabanes 2014). Needs-based 
rhetoric entered humanitarian language in the 1980s, building on the develop-
ment field of the 1970s in which the use of the term “needs” meant to signal the 
rejection of a development agenda was based on the promotion of growth 
(Singh 1979).
The historical emergence of the term has strongly influenced its contempo-
rary multifaceted use in the humanitarian field. A first use refers to basic hu-
man needs that must be met during and after a crisis. From the early ages of 
humanitarianism, when aid mostly consisted of protection and intervention 
for health-related needs, the notion of needs has seen a considerable expan-
sion, and it now covers elements that were traditionally regarded as belonging 
to the development realm, such as education or infrastructure building. This 
mission creep has been criticized for diluting the humanitarian agenda and 
increasing the risk of aid manipulation. By covering an expanding range of 
needs, humanitarian actors provide the same services that governmental au-
thorities would provide under normal circumstances, hence relieving the pres-
sure on these authorities to provide public goods (Narang and Stanton 2017). 
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Moreover, the narrative of a humanitarian agenda driven by universal needs is 
often used to hide the very political nature of the humanitarian endeavor. Re-
search on humanitarian funding shows that, despite rhetorical commitments, 
humanitarian donors prioritize needs according to a political agenda (Fink 
and Redaelli 2011). An illustrative example of this lies in the recent develop-
ment of humanitarian strategies in which donors target specific geographical 
areas (e.g. former colonies for Belgium, France, or the United Kingdom) or spe-
cific vulnerable groups (as the Netherlands does for children in crisis settings). 
Besides, humanitarian organizations often create needs to ensure their organi-
zational survival.
A second use of the term refers to the state of deprivation of a crisis-affected 
population. This deficit conception has also attracted criticism. First, in the ab-
sence of commonly agreed standards on humanitarian needs, humanitarian 
organizations often assume that they have the authority to decide on the norm 
and minimum requirements in terms of access to basic needs and services. Un-
der this assumption, humanitarianism can be conceived as a paternalist en-
deavor combining expression of care with a form of domination (Barnett 2016). 
To signal their opposition to this agenda, some organizations prefer to speak of 
a humanitarian duty to uphold the rights of crisis-affected populations, even if 
this right-based approach has been questioned for paving the way for military 
interventionism in crisis contexts. Secondly, the language of needs is closely 
linked to a commodification of humanitarian action, where the emphasis is put 
on needs that are easy to quantify. Core concepts of humanitarian practice 
such as “protection,” “security,” and “dignity” are too subjective and multifacet-
ed to be quantified (Darcy and Hofmann 2003). Thirdly, focusing on a needs-
only approach contributes to the continuation of current pathologies of aid. 
Although practices considerably differ, needs assessment exercises are often 
formal processes—mostly carried out by international organizations at inter-
agency level (the so-called clusters)—which rely on a series of quantifiable and 
often partial indicators. Contextualizing these exercises is often challenging, as 
vulnerability is relative, depending on the capacity of a population to adapt to 
a crisis. Getting to the contextual level implies being able to devote time and 
resources in needs assessments that organizations often lack in crisis contexts.
Humanitarian organizations do not always involve local communities and 
institutions properly. As a consequence, they reinforce the aid dependency 
cycle. The needs-based approach is of a reactive nature, whereas concepts 
such as vulnerability and risk allow humanitarian needs to be put in a broader 
political and historical perspective, emphasizing the role of root causes and 
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Neutrality
Together with humanity, impartiality, and independence, neutrality is a prime 
humanitarian principle that lies at the center of humanitarian orthodoxy. It is 
so bound up with traditional definitions of what distinguishes humanitarian-
ism that neutrality is seen as a metric that can be used to determine the hu-
manitarian status of a person, project, action, or organization. Yet this belies 
the slippery nature of neutrality because it exists primarily as a claim that rests 
on the recognition of others for its achievement. This constitutes a major, and 
possibly permanent, instability for humanitarian actors and organizations. It 
means that whatever form, relation, or action humanitarianism takes will be 
shaped and limited by the need to manage the perceptions of others in order 
to fulfill the relevant requirements for recognition. To inquire into neutrality is 
to open up the contested and contingent basis of humanitarian-ness itself, and 
its relationship to politics.
The role played by neutrality in common definitions of humanitarianism 
indexes the outsized influence played by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (icrc) on the field of modern humanitarian action (Barnett 2011; 
Redfield 2010). The icrc emerged in the latter half of the 19th century as a 
moral response to war-related suffering. It proclaimed a neutral or apolitical 
position—the refusal to “take side in hostilities or engage at any time in 
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 controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature” (Plattner 
1996)—which was instrumental in gaining access to victims of war. Neutrality 
thus became part of an attempt to (re)define the scene of violent conflict or 
natural disaster and carve out a humanitarian space conducive to the delivery 
of care and aid to those suffering or otherwise in need. The commitment to 
neutrality is not without its critics or controversies, for in practice it can work 
against the aim of humanitarianism to relieve and protect those in need. In-
deed, a neutral position tends to favor the more powerful in a given conflict, 
thus nullifying the claim to neutrality even as it is being made. Fiona Terry re-
calls the reaction to humanitarian organizations from Bosnian Muslims in the 
1990s war when they shouted, “we have no need of you, we need arms to de-
fend ourselves, your food aid and medicines only allow us to die in good health” 
(2002: 22). In recent years, the position of some groups has evolved. For exam-
ple, Doctors Without Borders has argued that the instrumental neutrality that 
enables their work does not mean that they are neutral about suffering, and 
they claim this as grounds to speak out against the atrocities that they witness 
in ways that can have political effects (Redfield 2010).
Such tensions reveal humanitarianism’s fraught relationship to politics and 
an acknowledgement that the claim to be apolitical is itself strategic, for as one 
veteran manager of several icrc relief operations put it, “only if you’re politi-
cally savvy can you be politically neutral” (quote in Minear 2002: 78). This 
points to the fact that neutrality is—like impartiality and independence—a 
performative claim that must be demonstrated to oneself and others (donors, 
beneficiaries, colleagues, parties to a conflict, etc.), and this means responding 
to and shaping the perceptions of those others. This can become paramount in 
contexts of aid: “The need to be perceived as neutral in order to remain present 
outweighs the importance of basing assistance on the greatest need” (Terry 
2001: 4). Shaping perceptions of neutrality can be quite a challenge because 
humanitarians act in diverse contexts where people are likely to see politics 
everywhere. Neutrality is thus often a claim seeking evidence, and humanitar-
ians must frequently submit their actions, and their status as humanitarians, to 
the evaluation of others who might have their own ideas about what consti-
tutes “neutrality” or “politics.” Indeed, neutrality is a semantic shifter; that is, its 
meaning can only be defined relatively and in relation to other definitions and 
categories (Brada 2016), such as “politics” (as that which it is not). Consequent-
ly, to successfully claim neutrality requires intervening in socially complex and 
culturally diverse contexts in order to secure the recognition necessary to 
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Non-governmental Organizations
Non-governmental organizations (ngos) are crucial actors in the humanitari-
an field. However, there are differences between ngos and other humanitarian 
actors in terms of origin and status. Humanitarianism is mostly understood as 
emergency relief for vulnerable and suffering people. The International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (icrc), created in 1863 after the massacre at the Battle 
of Solferino (1859), constitutes the core of modern humanitarian intervention. 
It was recognized as a transnational humanitarian organization by the Geneva 
Conventions in 1949. ngos, instead, are generally seen as promoters of social 
change, even though there is no internationally agreed definition of them (Ryf-
man 2007). Anti-Slavery International, created in 1839 and inspired by a Chris-
tian attitude against slavery, is often mentioned as the first international ngo, 
although the term “non-governmental organization” was introduced later, in 
1945 with Article 71 of the United Nations (UN) Charter. A variety of different 
organizations have been established since the end of World War ii and the 
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process of decolonization that triggered international development as a global 
phenomenon (Krause 2014). In the 1980s, a boost in the sector led to a global 
rise of ngos, including a number of faith-based organizations (Christian, 
 Islamic, Buddhist, etc.) who got involved in delivering humanitarian aid (Fer-
ris  2005). Since that time, these actors have brought new approaches, but 
also  new  problems, especially following the “War on Terror” and the over- 
politicized relationship between Christian and Muslim organizations (Ryfman 
2007).
Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind (2009) distinguish between the roles of ngos 
as actors and agents. As actors, ngos promote certain values. At the same time, 
they work as agents of social cohesion and stability. In the relationship with 
humanitarianism, both aspects are relevant. Yet ngos do not represent a ho-
mogeneous body of organizations, which may differ significantly in terms of 
ideals and actions. While the creation of Médecins Sans Frontières (msf) in 
1971 was an open critique of the icrc approach to the Biafra crisis and inaugu-
rated a new course of actions to address humanitarian crises, the UN Develop-
ment Programme and other UN agencies have since the 1970s increased their 
cooperation with ngos, who progressively assumed the role of services provid-
ers in the humanitarian field. Organizations such as Oxfam, CARE, or Action 
Contre la Faim became important humanitarian actors, and their involvement 
was connected to standards and procedures set by the donors, rather than by 
the critical and independent approach promoted by msf (Krause 2014). These 
organizations deal with various aspects of emergency aid in different sectors, 
and their role has increased since the 1980s.
ngos connect humanitarian and development interventions, for instance 
through the discourse of human rights. Moreover, global neoliberal reforms in 
the post-Cold War era have reduced the intervention of the state in welfare 
provision, delegating this role to ngos. However, as they are not recognized 
under international law, the nature of their legitimacy is often contested. How-
ell and Lind (2009: 30) note that “the relationship between ngos and interna-
tional institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank was fraught with tension and mutual suspicion,” putting the roles and 
legitimacy of ngos under more scrutiny.
Janice Gross Stein (2008) emphasizes the double nature of ngos’ account-
ability, toward representativeness and effectiveness. ngos should both prove 
capable of guaranteeing a certain standard of intervention and also of repre-
senting the needs and interest of their stakeholders to win legitimacy at the 
international level. While an organization such as the icrc has a recognized 
code and procedures that can be applied in every humanitarian context, most 
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of the ngos’ legitimacy comes from their connection to their stakeholders and 
beneficiaries. Philippe Ryfman (2007) underlines this tension between stan-
dardized procedures required by donors, such as the European Civil Protection 
and Humanitarian Aid Operations or the UN, and the need to be accountable 
to a grassroots base inspired by specific values.
The growing importance of humanitarian budgets has pushed ngos onto 
a path of standardization and professionalization. There are initiatives aimed 
at supporting this tendency, such as the Sphere project, launched in 1996 to 
create a common set of humanitarian standards, and the Humanitarian Ac-
countability Project, which aimed to create a standard procedure to make 
ngos  accountable toward their beneficiaries. Monica Krause (2014) relates 
both these initiatives to what she defines as the “market for project” approach, 
which sees ngos competing for funding in the production of projects evaluat-
ed by donors. This competition is pushing ngos to enlarge their field of action, 
for example by increasing their roles in the security and state-building sectors. 
This was evident in the “War on Terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq and, more 
recently, in the fight against Boko Haram in the Sahel. Moreover, humanitar-
ian agencies count on the capacity of ngos to mobilize funding through their 
stakeholders, examples being after the earthquakes in the Indian Ocean in 2004 
and in Haiti in 2010. According to Howell and Lind (2009), this blurs the bor-
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The emergence of post-conflict peace-building in the 1990s created a new are-
na for humanitarian action and formed part of broader efforts to assist war-
torn societies and help them in a more peaceful direction. Peace-building was 
introduced to United Nations (UN) doctrine in the 1992 An Agenda for Peace, 
where it was defined as “action to identify and support structures which will 
tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” 
(Boutros-Ghali 1992: §15). The notion came to encompass a wide range of ac-
tivities: from physical reconstruction, disarmament, and elections to refugee 
management, security sector reform, political and legal reform, reconciliation, 
and transitional justice.
Resources for peace-building in civil war settings boosted the budgets of 
international humanitarian organizations (Fearon 2008). The protection, re-
turn, and resettlement of refugees were central tasks for humanitarian actors, 
but they also took on broader responsibilities for assistance to war-affected 
populations in anticipation of more permanent state institutions that could 
fill their needs. With the limited success of international state-building efforts, 
this role often turned into semi-permanent structures of welfare provision (Lie 
2017).
The integration of humanitarian aid within a broader peace-building agen-
da has been criticized for undermining the neutrality and independence of 
humanitarian actors. In particular, contested peace-building efforts in Afghan-
istan and Iraq reinforced the reputation of humanitarian organizations as part 
of a Western political agenda. At present, humanitarian organizations face the 
opposite dilemma in postwar Syria: to stay on as part of a peace-building pro-
cess to the benefit of the current government’s regime, or to withdraw in the 
name of human rights.
It is possible to maintain a strictly humanitarian role in the context of 
peace-building, and there is a long tradition in humanitarian action for operat-
ing pragmatically in controversial political environments without taking a po-
litical stance. The question, therefore, is not so much whether to engage in 
post-conflict situations but to what extent humanitarian priorities should be 
dictated by an overarching agenda of peace and development. Indeed, such 
integration was recently prescribed as a central objective in the Agenda for 
Humanity adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 in order to ad-
dress the root causes of humanitarian needs (Ki-Moon 2016).
Peace-building evolved in an international political climate where political 
liberalism was the predominant ideology. In effect, political and economic 
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 liberalization was the framework for all major international peace operations 
in the 1990s and 2000s, usually even without thematizing this political orienta-
tion (Paris 2004). Eventually, this resulted in scholarly and political criticism of 
“liberal peace-building” for being a Western hegemonic project poorly adapted 
to local conditions in “non-liberal” countries. More recently, scholarly debates 
have emphasized the non-liberal rationales behind the international engage-
ment in peace-building as well as the multiple roles and potentials of local 
political actors in both generating and resisting foreign interference (Camp-
bell, Chandler, and Sabaratnam 2011).
After two decades of lofty ambitions of radical social and political trans-
formation, hopes for peace-building as a miracle cure have waned (Chandler 
2017). Moreover, the combination of a shift in American attention towards 
the “Global War on Terror” and the increased opposition to political liberal-
ism by Russia and China in the UN Security Council has contributed to the 
replacement of the objective of peace-building with “stabilization,” “resil-
ience,” and the “protection of civilians.” These are currently more dominant 
policy frameworks of humanitarian action in war-torn countries than peace- 
building.
Although the idea of promoting peace through political and economic lib-
eralization has been downplayed as a strategy for peace operations, it nonethe-
less still lives on in UN policies of conflict prevention, development assistance, 
prevention of extremism, and in the UN Sustainable Development Goal 16 to 
“promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, pro-
vide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive in-
stitutions at all levels” (UN 2015; UN 2018). It is in this wider sense of peace-
building that it remains central to debates on humanitarian action as part of 
the nexus between humanitarianism, development, and peace.
Kristoffer Lidén
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Philanthropy
The etymology of the term “philanthropy” refers to the love of humankind 
(philos + anthropos) and it is associated with altruistic and disinterested giving. 
Humanitarianism and philanthropy have been the focus of distinct bodies of 
scholarly work that, to a large extent, remain disconnected. Although the his-
toriography of philanthropy is extremely rich and vast, social science’s explora-
tions of humanitarianism have infrequently, if at all, drawn upon relevant his-
torical studies of philanthropy. Apart from being unproductive, such a 
disconnection ignores the historical roots of Western humanitarianism. As 
Craig Calhoun (2008) notes, the emergence of the term “humanitarian” may be 
traced to the late 18th and early 19th century. Initially, the concept had theo-
logical connotations and referred to the humanity of Christ, but later it came 
to depict systematic efforts to alleviate human suffering and advance human-
ity in general. In fact, initially, humanitarianism and philanthropy largely con-
verged (Calhoun 2008: 79).
As efforts to alleviate the pain of the suffering stranger, humanitarianism 
and philanthropy have much in common. Yet they are based on differences in 
scale, scope, technologies, and modi operandi. The cosmopolitan character of 
humanitarianism is a key differential component. Michael Barnett (2011: 18) 
describes humanitarianism as “nothing less than a revolution in the ethics of 
care” and stresses the internationalization of care in a shifting global arena. As 
the impulse to alleviate the suffering of the “other,” humanitarianism has a 
clear orientation towards the distant stranger. Philanthropy, on the other 
hand, can be both local and international. Nevertheless, recent studies have 
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 unsettled the de facto cosmopolitan character of humanitarianism, focusing 
on small-scale local humanitarian endeavors that could easily be defined as 
philanthropic, such as fundraising projects for acquaintances or nearby (rath-
er than distant) strangers. Finally, although philanthropy is often associated 
with an impulse and an affect, historical studies of “scientific philanthropy” 
have demonstrated that, like humanitarianism, philanthropy is also regular-
ized and institutionalized (Howe 1980).
There are a few exceptions in the literature that seek to bridge the distinc-
tion between philanthropy and humanitarianism. Erica Bornstein’s ethnogra-
phy of humanitarianism in New Delhi (Bornstein 2012) is one such example. 
Bornstein draws on the anthropological discussions on the gift to explore ev-
eryday and, mostly, informal humanitarian practices in India. As she shows, 
these mundane philanthropic practices are shaped by the broader global econ-
omies of philanthropy and humanitarianism, and efforts to regulate and insti-
tutionalize giving. Other studies of religious philanthropy, such as Islamic phi-
lanthropy (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003), draw upon local gifting 
practices and explore their manifestations in the contemporary humanitarian 
and philanthropic worlds. As Peter Redfield and Erica Bornstein have stressed 
(2010: 9), drawing parallels between humanitarianism and religious traditions 
can help unsettle Eurocentric assumptions around humanitarianism and, in 
the case of philanthropy, bring continuities and affinities to the fore.
The demarcation of spheres and ethics of care implied by the distinction 
between philanthropy and humanitarianism can be traced in the vernacu-
lar understandings of the two words, their genealogy, and the historical bur-
den they carry. In the mid-19th century, the term philanthropy was widely 
used by the people who participated in the emerging forms of collective 
intervention towards the poorest sections of the population. At the begin-
ning of the 21st century, however, particularly in Europe, philanthropy has 
increasingly been accompanied by criticism, at times being seen as an effect 
of bourgeois hypocrisy and class domination. In a similar vein, local under-
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Photography
Photography is the process of impressing a transparent film coated with a light-
sensitive emulsion (analog photography) or a magnetic memory (digital pho-
tography) with the light reflected from a subject or object through the lens of 
a camera and reproducing the image thereby created. Photography has been 
commonly associated with a higher true value than other genres, such as pic-
torial art or sculpture, because of the particular technology that it uses. Victor 
Bürgin (1982) notes how pictorial art and films are usually received by the pub-
lic as objects that need to be experienced critically, whereas photography pres-
ents itself as part of the environment. Similarly, Susan Sontag (1973) explains 
how photography is commonly perceived as a transparent method showing a 
piece of reality, while writing and paintings are associated with interpretation. 
On the contrary, scholars have highlighted how the act of taking a picture is not 
only about appropriating what is represented, but also about locating the im-
age producer in a certain position toward the subject/object photographed, this 
being a position of knowledge and therefore power (Sontag 1973; Bürgin 1982).
Since the end of the 19th century, when technological progress allowed the 
popularization and easy reproduction of photographs, photography was in-
creasingly used “to focus public attention on select examples of human misery 
in the world—from the local slum to the distant famine—transforming specif-
ic episodes of privation and suffering into humanitarian crises and campaigns” 
(Fehrenbach and Rodogno 2015: 4). Photographic accounts of humanitarian 
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crises, together with documentaries and other visual representations, have 
been crucial in the second half of the 20th century in the global spread of in-
formation about large-scale suffering and affliction, and have been functional 
in mobilizing support and raising awareness and funds for relief operations. 
The relatively new notion of “humanitarian photography,” coined in the 1990s, 
refers specifically to the use of photo representation in the humanitarian sec-
tor (Fehrenbach and Rodogno 2015).
However, although images of distant suffering are particularly power-
ful in creating an emotional response in the viewer (Sontag 2003; Boltanski 
1999), their ability to elicit an ethical or political action is less clear. Vivid and 
shocking images of suffering have been denounced for reproducing a colonial 
perspective, further distancing the observer from the victim and ultimately 
dehumanizing the sufferer (Benthall 1993). Representations of suffering, a 
characteristic trait of humanitarian communication, have also been criticized 
for their inherent commodification of suffering (Kennedy 2009), compassion 
fatigue (Moeller 1999), and their role in concealing the root political causes of 
humanitarian disasters (Campbell 2012). Humanitarian photography has also 
been extensively criticized for its tendency to represent people as helpless and 
passive victims (Manzo 2008; Kurasawa 2015).
At the same time, humanitarian photography has been characterized by an 
attempt to gradually modify its iconography and using more positive imagery 
(Lidchi 1999; Chouliaraki 2013). In 2006, some of the major international hu-
manitarian organizations have collaboratively elaborated and signed a code of 
conducts on the use of images (Concord 2006) with the objective of challeng-
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Post-disaster Recovery
Post-disaster recovery is a complex process at the crossroads of environmental, 
social, and infrastructural dimensions. The United Nations Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction defines recovery as the “restoring or improving of livelihoods 
and health, as well as economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental 
assets, systems and activities, of a disaster-affected community or society, 
aligning with the principles of sustainable development and ‘build back bet-
ter,’ to avoid or reduce future disaster risk” (undrr). Recovery comprises the 
short-term restoration of basic services and facilities, which is called rehabili-
tation, and medium- to long-term reconstruction activities, which relate to the 
construction environment and social systems and livelihoods.
In the past, recovery was seen as the last phase of the disaster management 
cycle and it emphasized the reconstruction of infrastructure, subsuming social 
considerations. This linear understanding also informed sequential typologies 
of post-disaster shelter and housing provision. It can be correlated to the de-
funct, event-centric, “hazards view” of disasters—where the goal of recov-
ery  meant a return to the status quo, albeit with improved technological 
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fixes—and to the “engineering view” of resilience, which defined a system as 
resilient when it returned to its former state after a disturbance.
Contemporary approaches to recovery have debunked this “physicalist par-
adigm” and instead adopt integrated and multidisciplinary lenses. They under-
score the importance of prevention and planning through comprehensive vul-
nerability and resilience assessments, and much research is being done on 
how to best articulate recovery to sustainable outcomes to minimize future 
risks. Many models of disaster recovery exist: some foreground safety, others 
sequential phases or sectors of intervention; some focus on organizational lo-
gistics and others on linkages with development. They are all “approximations 
of reality” (Davis and Alexander 2016: 41). Recovery is not a uniform process 
because certain areas, groups, and sectors may recover faster than others, de-
pending on a disaster’s impacts and people’s capacities/assets to overcome 
them. Recovery is multiscalar, in that it simultaneously involves individual, 
household, community, national, and global processes. Social recovery is influ-
enced by factors relating to market incentives, political ecology and economy, 
governance, timeliness and effectiveness of search and rescue activities, and 
appropriateness of emergency assistance, socio-cultural values and belief sys-
tems, strength of civil society, institutional capacity, and questions of transpar-
ency, trust, and accountability. No doubt, recovery is greatly enhanced or hin-
dered by its predisaster context—thus the emphasis on prevention and 
preparedness. Moreover, many studies have shown the wide range of compet-
ing interests that characterize the window of opportunity that post-disaster 
recovery opens.
Specific issues have garnered sustained attention from researchers and 
practitioners alike. This is namely the case for community participation (Marsh 
et al. 2018), the role of social capital and networks (Aldrich 2012), and gender 
(Enarson and Chakrabarti 2009). Studies have approached these topics under 
normative frameworks to facilitate operationalization and through critical 
analytical lenses to show the limitations of policy rhetoric. For example, 
 community-based disaster management is a significant area of intervention 
for capacity-building, although many scholars have shown that community co-
hesion and completion are elusive. Furthermore, because of their complexity 
and resistance to quantitative forms of valuation, significant dimensions of 
social recovery, such as culture and local knowledge, remain unevenly ad-
dressed (Krüger et al. 2015), although culture has always been the starting point 
in the anthropology of disaster (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 2002).
Today, as the field of post-disaster recovery seeks to better implement sus-
tainability principles, and while more longitudinal studies become available, 
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questions of environmental justice, fairness, and ethics, as well as affect, 
 creativity, and memorialization are enriching our understanding of what a 
successful recovery means. Recovery will always entail a mix of technical and 
social processes requiring collaboration, inspiration, and resolve.
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Postwar Reconstruction
The expression “postwar reconstruction” was first mobilized after World War ii 
when the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a partner 
institution of the World Bank Group, was established with the mission of fi-
nancing the reconstruction of European nations. The Bank shared the goals of 
the Marshall Plan in reconstructing devastated European economies by re-
building infrastructures, removing trade barriers and modernizing industries. 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund remain major stake-
holders in postwar reconstruction efforts, although the European Union and 
Japan also contribute their share (Barnett, Kim, O’Donnell and Sitea 2007). 
Postwar reconstruction is now part of larger “peace-building” enterprises 
that,  in addition to economic recovery, entail stabilizing post-conflict zones 
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(via  disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs), restoring 
state institutions (via the reconstruction of infrastructures, the establishment 
of the rule of law) and dealing with social issues (via transitional justice pro-
grams, human rights promotion, and gender empowerment).
Since the end of the Cold War, security has become a more prominent inter-
national concern, and has triggered major transformations in the conflict pre-
vention machinery of the United Nations (UN). Moving away from the founda-
tional pillars of the UN Charter that prohibit the recourse to force in the name 
of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and self-determination, the UN Se-
curity Council has gradually authorized the use of force by broadening its defi-
nition of the “threat to peace and security” (Orford 2013). These UN-sponsored 
military interventions have simultaneously played an important role in the 
expansion of the humanitarian realm. Influenced by the UN’s greater empha-
sis on responsibility (via the responsibility to protect doctrine) instead of neu-
trality, humanitarianism has become progressively enmeshed with governance 
and security interests. As a result, humanitarianism is now entangled with 
projects of peace-building, democratic transition, and reconstruction.
The humanitarian apparatus deployed to realize postwar reconstruction 
objectives displaces state sovereignty in favor of more concentrated forms of 
power and accumulation, such as nato troops, international organizations, 
development agencies, non-governmental organizations, local civil society or-
ganizations, and private contractors (Monsutti 2012), a process that Barnett 
Rubin qualifies as “internationalized state-building” (Rubin 2006).
Beyond the reconstruction of state institutions, postwar reconstruction also 
involves cultural and symbolic production via rituals such as workshops and 
trainings aimed at achieving the objective of “good governance” (Billaud 2012). 
Humanitarian action embedded in democratization efforts is therefore largely 
immaterial and productive. As a manifestation of “transnational governmen-
tality” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002), it consists of shaping modern subjectivi-
ties via the transmission of certain knowledge practices, institutional codes, 
and norms, which are envisioned as necessary components for the establish-
ment of a rational state administration. Often disconnected from the material 
and social reality of local war economies, the “peace” that is built is therefore 
often very flimsy and at best virtual (De Lauri and Billaud 2016), rather than 
emancipatory. While bolstering the idea of change and progress for external 
constituencies, the narrative of postwar reconstruction often hides the conti-
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Private Sector
Private businesses started to become important agents in humanitarian aid 
after World War ii. The nature of the post-World War ii humanitarian aid from 
the United States to Europe was mostly dictated by the availability of food 
products and consumer goods from well-known American companies. This aid 
facilitated European integration into liberal capitalism and the introduction of 
consumerism to European societies (Wieters 2016). During the Cold War era, 
the Global South turned into a market space in which humanitarianism could 
dispose of Western agricultural and commodity surplus, and discipline so 
called Third World citizens as healthy labor force and customers for Western 
businesses (Sasson 2016; Wieters 2016). The second half of the Cold War era 
witnessed human rights activism that was concerned with growing business 
interests in the expanding humanitarian space, as well as the changing role of 
some humanitarian agencies in the business capitalization of emergency situ-
ations (Sasson 2016). Following the end of the Cold War, the siege of Sarajevo 
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between 1992 and 1995 marked an interesting era in the history of expansion-
ary capitalism that was facilitated by new communication/satellite technolo-
gies: humanitarian space opened by military intervention began to harbor 
black market activities (i.e. smuggling of aid items and sex trafficking), which 
produced private revenues and created a local business class before the eyes of 
aid workers, United Nations peacekeepers, foreign journalists, and academics 
(Andreas 2008).
A remarkable trait of the humanitarian wars in the 21st century was the ex-
tensive use of private military and security companies (pmscs) in war zones 
such as Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a long history of private mercenaries in 
human warfare, but their redefinition as private contractors, their presence in 
the new humanitarian wars, and their diverse areas of activity have been par-
ticularly questionable, especially in terms of legitimacy in international law 
and the potential impact on human security (Gillard 2006; Spearin 2009). Lib-
eral expectations (e.g. democracy, freedom, peace, economic development) 
from humanitarian interventions, wars on terror and international state- 
building attempts in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and more 
recently Libya, Syria, and Yemen have failed dramatically; however, the pres-
ence of foreigners as armies, humanitarians, social entrepreneurs, and busi-
nesses is gaining a new discourse and format in the 21st century. The new trend 
refers to the growing, and increasingly more privatized, intersection between 
the processes of neoliberalism, securitization/militarization, and humanitari-
anism (Duffield 2014).
Financial institutions (from the World Bank to the German Development 
Bank), businesses (e.g. pmscs, construction, food, logistics, energy, informa-
tion, media, communication and digital technology firms), and social 
 enterprises (e.g. digitalized entrepreneurial networks for refugees as part of 
 resilience-building) are in active collaboration in areas of aid provision, disas-
ter risk financing and management, service delivery, governance, reconstruc-
tion, stabilization, and development in post-disaster and conflict zones. At the 
same time, the nature of the international humanitarian regime has been 
changing with the gradual physical and financial withdrawal of the Western 
states and their humanitarian forces from the humanitarian space on the 
ground in dangerous war zones. Mark Duffield (2016: 149) argues that this is 
associated with anxiety and risk aversion in the Western world that is due to 
“policy failure, political push-back and humanitarian access denial.” This kind 
of change entails (1) a new discourse centered around resilience-building 
among civilians in conflict zones to reduce dependency on humanitarian as-
sistance (i.e. social entrepreneurship in capitalistic and neoliberal terms), (2) 
new technologies to continue distant monitoring and controlling of “people of 
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concern” (i.e.  remote management of humanitarian crisis and “bunkeriza-
tion”), and (3) local and regional allies based in stable countries close to con-
flict regions who can be trusted to manage the conflict zones (e.g. the United 
Arab Emirates) (Duffield 2016; Ziadah 2019).
The recent international humanitarian engagement with Syrian refugees in 
the Middle East demonstrated some of the most privatized aspects of this evo-
lution in the humanitarian regime. Automation of aid, cash-transfer programs, 
and informational mobile apps for Syrian refugees are promoted as examples 
of social entrepreneurship, innovation, and capacity-building for self-reliance. 
New surveillance technologies such as biometric registration, satellite sensing, 
mapping and networking software, and algorithmic analysis have become stra-
tegic tools to keep Syrian refugees in surveillance not only where they are cur-
rently, but also in places to which they may move in the future (Duffield 2016; 
Jacobsen 2017). The United Arab Emirates (uae) is now playing the role of a 
facilitator and financier in this remote management mode of engagement with 
Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance. The uae is the most skillful oil-
rich Gulf state in terms of commercializing humanitarian aid and incorporat-
ing it into supply chain capitalism through its ports and logistical capacities 
worldwide (Ziadah 2019). The uae organizes the annual Dubai International 
Humanitarian Aid and Development Conference and Exhibition as an innova-
tive platform for businesses to exhibit and advertise their products (e.g. tents, 
furniture, medicine, portable toilets, solar energy panels, and nutritional for-
mulas) to potential state and non-state customers in the humanitarian sector. 
In this highly commercialized world of humanitarianism in the 21st century, it 
is not surprising that the busiest street with grocery stores and stands in the 
Zaatari Camp for Syrian refugees in Jordan is called Champs-Élysées, and Bul-
gari, the luxury jewelry brand, donated funds to a kindergarten inside the camp 
in 2018 (Nichol 2018).
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Professionalization
Since the late 1990s, “the humanitarian sector has bureaucratized, rationalized, 
and professionalized with an unpredictable passion” (Barnett 2012: 188). His-
torically, the urge to professionalize was a reaction to the manifold shortcom-
ings and failures of humanitarian organizations, such as the Rwandan geno-
cide in 1994, which traumatized the humanitarian community and triggered a 
series of internal evaluations such as the one “held the year after [which] sadly 
concluded that, once political failure led to the crisis, many more lives could 
have been saved had humanitarian organizations better coordinated and acted 
more professionally” (Hilhorst 2002: 359). Since the 1990s, alongside increased 
budgets and an ever-growing number of people employed by humanitarian 
organizations, the importance of humanitarian intervention in global politics 
has risen.
Professionalization in humanitarian contexts has a set of meanings that all 
imply processes of specialization and diversification. First, professionalization 
refers to the acquirement of the necessary competencies and skills represent-
ed by the individual humanitarian. This points both to respective professions, 
such as engineering, nursing, logistics, and international humanitarian law in 
general, and also to specific training for the provision of professional  assistance 
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in the context of a humanitarian mission. Today, a growing number of univer-
sities offer specialized master’s degree courses in humanitarian aid and inter-
national assistance, many of which are part of the Network on Humanitarian 
Action. Secondly, professionalization implies that the humanitarian organiza-
tion holds itself and is being held accountable to its beneficiaries, donors, and 
employees. Systems of control are increasingly being put into place to make 
sure humanitarians work in professional ways. Thirdly, professionalization is 
coined through the set of codes and standards arranged in and through key 
humanitarian actors. The level of professionalism is measured through adher-
ence to those principles. The last three decades have shown a variety of con-
certed efforts to regulate, standardize, and professionalize humanitarian inter-
vention (Roth 2012), from the 1994 “Code of Conduct for the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non- Governmental Organisations 
(ngos) in Disaster Relief,” over projects such as Humanitarian Accountability 
Partnership and Sphere, to the Active Learning Network for Accountability 
and Performance in Humanitarian Action network. Those initiatives are meant 
to safeguard the professional conduct of intervention and heighten the effi-
ciency and the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.
Professionalization is as much an outcome as it is a strategy of aid organiza-
tions working within the increasing complexities and demands of humanitar-
ian contexts. Today, humanitarian organizations have to navigate a “dense pro-
fessional world of ngos” (Bornstein 2005). While professionalization aims to 
provide improved assistance, it can also be used to enact and enforce hierar-
chies between different sets of people involved in the humanitarian encoun-
ter: national and international staff, humanitarians and beneficiaries, head-
quarters and field offices. Those dynamics are a reflection of a structural lack 
of balance that is inscribed in the humanitarian system as a whole. During the 
processes of codification and standardization that often accompany the larger 
process of professionalization, the universal is emphasized over the contextual 
(Lewis and Mosse 2006). Tensions between the different levels of interven-
tion and between standardized technocratic knowledge and contextual value- 
driven commitment remain at the heart of processes of professionalization.
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Protection
Broadly speaking, protection refers to “all activities aimed at obtaining full re-
spect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of 
the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights, humanitarian law and refugee 
law)” (iasc 1999; see also Goodwin-Gill 1989 and Stevens 2013). In the humani-
tarian context, its purpose is to ensure that people at risk—for example, be-
cause of conflict, disasters, or persecution—have access to the rights and as-
sistance to which they are entitled. In extreme cases, force may be justified to 
intervene in states that are failing to protect their population from the most 
heinous crimes.
While the main legal duty of protection lies with states and specialized 
agencies, protection is widely recognized as an integral component of any hu-
manitarian action (DuBois 2010). In other words, a range of actors, from United 
Nations (UN) peacekeepers to community health care providers, can poten-
tially offer protection (see unsc Resolution 1265). Protection activities may 
prevent or stop rights violations or facilitate recovery after they occur. They 
include not only assistance and rehabilitation support but also environment-
building activities to “create a social, cultural, institutional and legal environ-
ment conducive to the respect for rights” (ocha 2012).
In contrast to this operational description, various regimes of international 
law define “protection” in particular ways. In humanitarian law, the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols refer to the guarantees that warring 
parties must afford to persons not engaged in the fighting. The framework for 
ensuring protection includes: (1) provision of an international legal status and 
rights to categories of non-combatants (i.e. civilians, the sick and injured, pris-
oners of war, and medical and religious personnel) and (2) regulations related 
to relief actions (Bouchet-Saulnier 2002). The International Committee of the 
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Red Cross and parties to the conflict are obliged to facilitate assistance and 
monitor the rights afforded to persons with special legal status.
In refugee law, meanwhile, protection refers to the international protection 
provided by the host state or the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (unhcr), as well as the national protection (or lack there-
of) in the country of origin. The international dimension includes consular 
and diplomatic protection, normally provided to nationals abroad, and rights 
and benefits in the host community (unhcr 2004). Most importantly, host 
states may not directly or indirectly remove someone to a country where he or 
she has a well-founded fear of persecution or risks certain serious harms (the 
principle of non-refoulement).
Under international law, the space of protection is unspecified. An increas-
ing variety of “protection elsewhere” practices have therefore been adopted by 
destination states to deflect and deter refugee arrivals. These include safe third 
country policies, such as the eu–Turkey agreement and the Dublin Regulation, 
extraterritorial processing centers, containment in safe havens, and applica-
tion of the “internal protection alternative” as an exception to refugee status. 
To be compatible with legal obligations, the protection in such contexts must 
be “effective” and “durable” (unhcr 2003). However, all too often, sending 
states rely on warring factions, peacekeeping forces, or even a person’s per-
sonal networks to provide protection without any mechanism for ensuring 
that such actors are able and willing to do so for a significant period of time.
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Quarantine
The notion of quarantine is embedded in local and global health practices. 
Historically, it has been defined as the “detention and segregation of subjects 
suspected to carry a contagious disease” (Gensini, Yacoub and Conti 2004: 
257–258). Today, the term is used by the World Health Organization (who) to 
refer to “the compulsory physical separation, including restriction of move-
ment, of populations or groups of healthy people who have been exposed to a 
contagious disease. This may include efforts to segregate these persons within 
specified geographic areas” (who 2008: 10). In the context of the recent COV-
ID-19 pandemic, for instance, quarantine has been widely enforced globally to 
restrict the movement, or separate “from the rest of the population, of healthy 
persons who may have been exposed to the virus, with the objective of monitor-
ing their symptoms and ensuring early detection of cases” (WHO 2020). There-
fore, the term quarantine is restricted to healthy (asymptomatic) individuals 
after exposure and only in the potential scenario that they might transmit the 
disease. The term isolation, however, refers to infected (symptomatic) persons. 
Both measures are considered preventive tools to avoid transmission and pro-
tect public health (Allen 2017). The origin of the term dates back to the 14th 
century, when quarantine was the foundation of coordinated disease control 
strategies that included actions such as sanitary cordons, bills of health issued 
to ships, fumigation, disinfection, and regulation of groups of persons (Tognotti 
2013: 254–255).
After 1893, in both Europe and the United States, conventions and regula-
tions for the standardization of quarantine measures began to be ratified, es-
tablishing periods of detention. When who replaced the International Office 
of Public Health in 1948, the expression “quarantine diseases” disappeared and 
was replaced by “pathologies controlled under international health law,” such 
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as plague, cholera, and yellow fever, and “pathologies under surveillance,” such 
as poliomyelitis, recurrent fever, and typhus (Gensini, Yacoub and Conti 2004: 
259–260; Davey et al. 2013: 6). The modern quarantine concept has been driven 
by three main currents: first, the personification of epidemics, where a con-
crete connection between travel and outbreak is established; secondly, the 
 existence of a social organization capable of supporting the necessary infra-
structure; and thirdly, the role of medical science (Mafart and Perret 1998).
The quarantine-humanitarian nexus can be traced back to the resurgence 
of attention towards infectious diseases that were catalogued as “emergen-
cies” and the arrival of a global governance logic where “health spread” was 
constituted as an imperative (Bashford 2006; Mafart and Perret 1998; Gensini, 
Yacoub and Conti 2004: 260). The contemporary regimes for intervention in 
the field of global health can be divided into global health security and hu-
manitarian biomedicine. The first one focuses on “emerging infectious dis-
eases” that threaten wealthy countries and on systems of preparedness. The 
second type targets diseases that afflict poor nations and is directed towards 
individual human lives (Lakoff 2010: 60). The treatment of the Ebola outbreak 
in 2014 is exemplary of the intersection of these two regimes and the difficult 
use of quarantine in humanitarian contexts. Measures to contain the spread 
of Ebola via quarantines and isolation units to care for patients required ex-
tensive infrastructure and resources that were impossible to either sustain 
by humanitarian organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, or rep-
licate through national public health systems. Furthermore, the application 
of quarantine measures, often raises ethical problems as discussed by who’s 
Guidance for Managing Ethical Issues in Infectious Disease Outbreaks (2016). 
Moreover, pandemic preparedness inscribes a distinct notion of security into 
the regulations of populations whereby “good” circulations are created in op-
position to “bad” circulations: “protective care from dangerous care, infected 
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Refugee
Who is a refugee? This question has no easy answers. In the public imagina-
tion, refugees are people forcibly displaced by events beyond their control: 
war, ethnic persecution, natural disasters. Lacking the protection of their own 
government, refugees are entitled to its substitute by a third party.
The core international refugee instruments, the United Nations (UN) Con-
vention on the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol, establish criteria 
for refugee status and set out the rights and benefits that states must accord 
refugees. They define “refugees” as persons who, owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion, are outside the country of their nation-
ality and are unable or, owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of 
the protection of that country. For stateless persons, the same criteria apply 
with regard to the country of former habitual residence. Unlike an internally 
displaced person, a refugee has crossed an international border to a third state.
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This “global” refugee concept is both broader and narrower than is common-
ly assumed. On the one hand, despite its specific language, it covers most dis-
placement that results from armed conflict and serious public disorder (un-
hcr 2016). One would be hard pressed to think of many conflicts where the 
violence has no relationship to ethnicity, religion, political opinion, or race. The 
concept of an “imputed political opinion,” for example, can apply to entire 
communities presumed to support a certain faction. The Convention definition 
also covers cases of socio-economic deprivation when the country of origin 
fails to ensure access to basic rights on a non-discriminatory basis (Foster 2007).
On the other hand, the 1951 Convention excludes people who face truly in-
discriminate threats: shelling, food insecurity, or the collapse of basic facilities. 
This is where regional regimes of refugee protection come to the rescue—at 
least for refugees in those regions. The 1969 Organisation of African Unity Con-
vention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa specifi-
cally covers people fleeing from “external aggression, occupation, foreign dom-
ination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole 
of (their) country of origin or nationality” (oau 1969). In Latin America, the 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984) includes refugees fleeing from “gen-
eralized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of 
human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public 
order.” This “soft law” definition is the basis for refugee status in many states in 
the region. In Europe, the Qualification Directive of the Common European 
Asylum System extends protection to persons fleeing indiscriminate violence 
or facing torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment in a third country.
The 1951 Convention also excludes, for the most part, environmental refu-
gees, whether the cause of displacement is a natural disaster or the effects of 
climate change. Nonetheless, a claim might be recognized if assistance is being 
withheld or obstructed in a way that marginalizes a specific group.
In an effort to refine the refugee concept, scholars have proposed alternative 
ways to identify those with the strongest claims to assistance. Aristide Zolberg, 
Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo (1989: 33) observe that refugees are persons 
whose “presence abroad is attributable to a well-founded fear of violence” (in-
cluding structural violence) and who “can be assisted only abroad, unless con-
ditions change in their country of origin.” The concept of “survival migration” 
similarly describes those who are “outside their country of origin because of an 
existential threat for which they have no access to a domestic remedy or reso-
lution” (Betts 2010: 4–5). These definitions, while not legally binding, aim to 
promote a more effective international response to refugee flows.
The 1951 Convention and regional instruments clarify the rights and obliga-
tions that refugees have in their host countries. Most importantly, refugees 
may not be returned to the place where they face persecution or other similar 




control, by paying third countries and companies to prevent onward migration 
or by erecting physical borders, for example, may violate this and other core 
principles, including the right to seek asylum (udhr, article 14), and the right 
to leave any country, including one’s own (udhr, article 13).
For logistical, political, and security reasons, humanitarian management of 
large refugee flows is typically organized through camps run by the host state, 
the UN (in particular the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), other organi-
zations, or a combination of the above. To a lesser degree, the humanitarian 
response has supported self-settlement of refugees, for example by channeling 
assistance to the local receiving community.
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Religion
The expansion of humanitarianism as an ideology in Europe was informed by 
the suffering of World War i and humanist ideas of compassion. The emer-
gence of human rights and their universal application after World War ii gave 
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new impetus to humanitarian aid globally (De Lauri 2016). The assumption 
was that humankind could not ethically afford to stay idle. The focus of hu-
manitarian aid was to relieve immediate suffering; it was not a long-term plan 
to help people affected by poverty or structural inequality. The “obligation” to 
help was largely endorsed and disseminated by faith-based organizations, with 
their actions ranging from initiatives to help refugees, such as the sanctuary 
movement in the United States (Rabben 2016) to the consolidation of Islamic 
humanitarianism (Mutaqin 2013). Historically, religious philanthropic practic-
es pre-date the modern humanitarian system, and they continue to shape 
charity and humanitarian action in different regions of the world. Christian, 
Buddhist, and Muslim concepts and ideals, for instance, are mobilized to nour-
ish humanitarian strategies and different modalities of aid.
The secularization of humanitarianism promoted by some humanitarian 
organizations in the second half of the 20th century has questioned the mis-
sionary character of faith-based humanitarianism, and the secular and reli-
gious have come, at least to some extent, into tension. Yet both scholars and 
practitioners have increasingly challenged the rigid dichotomy between secu-
lar and religious approaches. Indeed, many humanitarian organizations have 
their roots in and are still logistically and financially supported by church net-
works and religious actors.
The number of missionaries and volunteers has greatly increased since the 
1980s and 1990s, and the number of protestant and evangelical faith-based or-
ganizations throughout the Global South has multiplied (Barnett and Stein 
2012). While faith-based humanitarian actors that receive financial support 
from governments are generally not allowed to proselytize, in practice prosely-
tism is a component of several religious-humanitarian actions. Organizations 
such as  World Vision—an Evangelical Christian humanitarian and develop-
ment  organization—downplay their religious ethos. Indeed, in many organi-
zations, humanitarian work and missionary work overlap. Some organizations, 
inspired for example by Pentecostal or denominational churches, may prosely-
tize more aggressively than others, and may contribute to religious tensions in 
contexts that are characterized by religious competition and volatility. One 
example of a problematic area of intervention is that of orphanages. Following 
humanitarian campaigns and flows of money, hundreds of orphanages have 
been established in volatile areas after violent conflicts, and faith-based orga-
nizations have played a dominant role in the creation and management of 
these institutions. One problem that emerged was that many of the orphans 
turned out to have parents who had lost access to their children. Another was 
the  commodification of orphanages and mismanagement. Some orphanages 
have been open to sexual abuse and violence.
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The form of control that some religious humanitarian actors have in the 
management of specific social sectors in conflict and post-conflict areas has 
been widely criticized by scholars, as religious faith organizations may exer-
cise almost unlimited power over the most vulnerable people, for example in 
orphanages, refugee shelters, or safe houses for victims of violence. Jin-Heon 
Jung (2015) describes the case of American evangelist organizations operating 
in the Chinese borderland, with conversion to Christianity being almost 
obligatory in exchange of humanitarian entitlements and support. This was 
also the case, for example, with the Free Burma Rangers, an evangelical, hu-
manitarian non-governmental organization (ngo) that provides emergency 
health care and have established a firm presence in the ethnic minority re-
gions of Myanmar. Conversion was not formally required in this case, but the 
Free Burma Rangers used to share the Bible while implementing humanitar-
ian aid.
Stephen Hopgood and Leslie Vinjamuri (2012) argue that World Vision rep-
resents the business model in the humanitarian marketplace, raising its cash 
and motivation for its staff on evangelical and protestant principles. Buddhist 
and Islamic organizations also represent important actors in the humanitarian 
arena. The Tzu Chi Foundation is a case in point. Presently, Tzu Chi is arguably 
the largest Chinese Buddhist charity in the world. It has run an island-wide 
medical network, runs the largest bone marrow databank of the Chinese dias-
pora, and has established the Tzu Chi International Medical Association, mod-
eled upon the secular Médecins Sans Frontières. Julia Huang (2017) notes that 
the foundation did not present Buddhist beliefs, as expected by the founder’s 
followers, but modern sciences and bureaucracy as a solution to human suffer-
ing, a sacralized medical assistance using Buddhist justification and legitima-
tion to giving, including bodily giving.
Organizations such as Islamic Relief—an international aid agency that 
provides humanitarian aid and development assistance globally—must 
maintain a degree of secularization to qualify for public funds, but the reli-
gious giving, and the religious loyalty and motivation of its members are the 
competitive edge in the humanitarian marketplace (Hopgood and Vinjamuri 
2012). Besides following Islamic principles and Islamic law, Islamic humani-
tarianism promotes itself to markets and donors by advertising activities in 
Islamic radical contexts, which have become no-go areas for many seculars 
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Resilience
Resilience is one of those ubiquitous concepts that permeate the spectrum of 
social sciences, global governance, and public policy. The conceptual trajecto-
ry of resilience is transdisciplinary, and so are its applications. In the field of 
humanitarianism, resilience has been discussed as a managerial technique, 
a paradigm for the study of governmentality, a theory describing interdepen-
dencies between humans and ecosystems, or an individual’s or group’s capac-
ity to overcome shocks. For each of these dimensions, resilience has adopted 
complementary tropes that stress the anticipatory nature, adaptability, and 
robustness of a given system.
Resilience comes from the Latin word resilio, meaning to jump back or re-
bound. Some scholars trace the origins of the concept to the physical sciences, 
where it characterizes the quality of materials to return to their former shape 
after an exterior stressor. Thus, in engineering, resilience is a design objective 
for buildings and infrastructure. Other scholars consider that resilience devel-
oped out of environmental economics and ecology (Holling 1973) to describe 
the flexibility and adaptability of ecosystems. Resilience also entered the field 
of psychology in the 1970s, when it was used to explain an individual’s capacity 
to overcome trauma. The more recent iteration of socio-ecological resilience 
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(Folke 2006) emphasizes the interplay between social and ecological systems, 
especially their adaptive capacity to overcome hazards and other shocks, rath-
er than the idea of returning to a previous equilibrium. These views consider 
resilience as a positive property of a system, whether it be a forest, a commu-
nity, or a city. However, debates have taken place about whether this capacity 
means a return to the status quo ante after an efficient recovery, such as after a 
disaster, or a deeper process of reconfiguration wherein a system uses adver-
sity to proactively adjust and renew itself. In fact, recent proposals underscore 
transformability as a cornerstone of resilience thinking, and resilience has be-
come a bridging concept in the fields of disaster risk reduction, climate change, 
sustainable development, and humanitarian assistance.
Analyzing the mainstreaming of resilience in these arenas, critics have un-
derscored how resilience research tended to sideline concerns of political 
economy, political ecology, culture, affect, and memory, ultimately further 
marginalizing vulnerable populations. Others have argued instead that resil-
ience provides a solution to questions of vulnerability via increased agency, 
while others contend for the co-constitutive mutuality of resilience and vul-
nerability. The operationalization of resilience has also led to divergent views 
between quantitative and qualitative approaches, on whether it is an objective 
or subjective state, or process, and whether it is context dependent or not. The 
link between risk and resilience is also significant: when the latter exacerbates 
the former, many undesirable properties can be quite persistent (e.g. poverty), 
and the ability to address their root causes and break them down is as impor-
tant as the ability to bounce back after a disturbance, as the common view of 
resilience suggests. Moreover, resilience can have pernicious outcomes, as 
when disaster victims are deemed resilient—thereby justifying insufficient 
aid.
A different line of inquiry stems from the vantage point of security and hu-
manitarian studies. Scholars inspired by the work of Michel Foucault have ana-
lyzed resilience as a neoliberal form of governmentality that internalizes emer-
gency and normalizes danger by producing a “risk-accepting” biopolitics, 
supplanting the “safety first” approaches of the past (Duffield 2012; Hall and 
Lamont 2013). Here, resilience is akin to a regime of thought, a plastic word, 
when not an ontological category, that instructs to accept, and live with, un-
knowable global risks, shifting the responsibility onto individuals.
Within the international humanitarian regime, the vocabulary of resilience 
has been used for some time as a means to promote the mental health of aid 
workers, foster aid effectiveness, and further beneficiary self-reliance, notably 
through a re-envisioning of the space and temporality of refugee camps. The 
notion of “resiliency humanitarianism” captures this rationale of care and 
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camp management, which aims to responsibilize refugees in their efforts to 
adapt to, and survive, crisis (Ilcan and Rygiel 2015).
There is no doubt that challenges abound when the vocabulary of resilience 
is adopted by such different epistemic communities, but nonetheless, it signals 
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Responsibility to Protect
Responsibility to Protect is a policy doctrine that was endorsed by the United 
Nations (UN) Summit Meeting in 2005. It affirms the primary obligation of 
states to protect its population against harm and, failing that, a secondary re-
sponsibility by the international community to take collective action, and, in 
accordance with the UN Charter, to “help protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (UN 2005, para. 
139). While frequently cited in UN Security Council resolutions, the doctrine 
has only been invoked once to justify military intervention—in Libya in March 
2011. In the academic literature, it is controversial.
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The doctrine developed from mounting international concern in the 1990s 
over rights and obligations relating to the protection of civilians in situations 
of mass atrocities. The near-paralysis of the UN during the genocides in Rwan-
da (1994) and Srebrenica (1995) generated demands for effective international 
intervention on humanitarian grounds. However, the military intervention by 
nato in Kosovo four years later—while justified on humanitarian grounds 
and arguably effective in protecting an ethnic minority from further death and 
displacement—was not authorized by the UN Security Council and was thus 
illegal under international law. The conflicting implications of these cases ac-
celerated efforts initiated earlier in the UN to strengthen the normative basis 
for humanitarian intervention. The result was a Canadian semi-official report 
issued in 2001 (iciss 2001). Building on the concept of “sovereignty as respon-
sibility,” the report essentially argues that effectiveness generates rights: 
a  government that cannot effectively protect its population against mass 
 atrocities—defined as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity—forfeits its right to sovereignty, and the responsibility of 
protection falls to the international community.
The UN Secretariat under Secretary-General Kofi Annan took the work for-
ward, but the text approved at the World Summit in 2005 was noticeably care-
ful. Potential target states and intervening powers alike refused to add new 
binding, legal obligations on states, or to weaken existing restraints on interna-
tional intervention vested in the Security Council.
What, then, is the significance of the doctrine? Soon known under the em-
blem R2P, the doctrine generated considerable activity in the academic and 
policy communities. An international advocacy and research center was 
formed in 2007, followed by the journal Global Responsibility to Protect. At the 
UN, the Secretariat established a special advisor on R2P to the Secretary-Gen-
eral and issued annual reports on the subject, while the General Assembly held 
regularly scheduled “interactive dialogues.” The Security Council frequently 
referred to the doctrine, but only one of its 63 resolutions calling for protection 
of civilians during the 2006–2018 period invoked an international responsibil-
ity to protect. That was in Libya. On all other occasions, the Security Council 
merely affirmed that the primary responsibility to protect fell to the govern-
ment of the state in question.
Debate has followed. Legal scholars note that the doctrine adds nothing to 
existing rights and obligations under international law developed in relation to 
humanitarian intervention. Some argue that it nevertheless provides a discur-
sive framework for clarifying rights, obligations, and consequences of choices 
made in difficult matters of humanitarian intervention; further theorizing and 
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conceptual refinement is therefore important (Orford 2011; Thakur and Maley 
2015). Its strongest proponents view the doctrine as a normative guide for ac-
tion to a more humane world, despite—or precisely because of—the manifest 
failure of the UN to alleviate mass violence in Darfur and Central Africa in the 
early 2000s (Evans 2008; Bellamy 2011), and later in Syria and Myanmar. Critics, 
on the other hand, warn against its potential to legitimize an international re-
gime of trusteeship whose populations “are seen as wards in need of external 
protection” (Mamdani 2010: 53). The Libyan intervention crystallized fears that 
the doctrine would be used to justify military action for non-humanitarian rea-
sons (Hehir and Murray 2013). The subsequent unraveling of the Libyan state 
and society reinforced concerns over the fundamentally problematic aspects 
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Humanitarian organizations work to address the needs of those affected by 
natural disaster, famine, internal conflict, or international war; thus their ac-
tivities are necessary in high-risk contexts. In these cases, humanitarian action 
is prompted by the risk to civilians. However, these situations also generate 
risks for both individual humanitarian actors and humanitarian organizations. 
Humanitarian organizations often define risk as a consideration of the possi-
bility of a detrimental event, and the potential impact generated if the event 
occurs. It can also be expressed as Risk = Likelihood × Impact (Stoddard et al. 
2016). Here, likelihood refers to the potential of a harmful event, while impact 
refers to the potential severity of an event.
In a global context, where the rules of war and human rights are often per-
verted and humanitarian need is high, organizations must allocate more time, 
consideration, and resources to assessing the risks of their work. Risk manage-
ment in the humanitarian industry means “a formalized system for forecast-
ing, weighing and preparing for possible risks in order to minimize their im-
pact” (Czwarno, Haver, and Stoddard 2016: 8). There are countless risks for 
organizations offering humanitarian aid to populations affected by war, con-
flict, displacement, natural disaster, and so on. Potential fiduciary risk, reputa-
tional risk, operational risk, residual risk, and risks to staff are ever looming on 
the horizon of humanitarian activities in increasingly insecure contexts. Some 
define fiduciary risk as “the possibility that resources will not be used as in-
tended” which includes, but is not limited to, “corruption, fraud, embezzle-
ment, theft and diversion of assets” (Czwarno, Haver, and Stoddard 2016: 3). 
Reputational risk is the potential for an occurrence that will ultimately dam-
age the public image of an organization. For example, irreparable reputational 
risk could ensue if an organization makes a move that will damage their cred-
ibility, such as misrepresentation of need or impact, misallocation of funds, or 
intentional diversion of earmarked funds to a project for which the financial 
assistance was not originally allocated (Sarazen 2018). High profile duty of care 
incidents could also damage the public perception of a humanitarian organi-
zation. Risks to staff can present as emotional, physical or financial, and can 
range from street harassment to death (Czwarno, Haver, and Stoddard 2016).
Some organizations conduct risk assessments through rigorous frameworks, 
while others consider risk on an ad hoc basis or via non-standard methodolo-
gy. Each system, either formal or informal, assists organizations in determining 
if and how their humanitarian operations may be exposed to danger. Risk 
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 assessment processes are not currently standardized across the humanitarian 
industry. Formal risk assessments are often conducted by program and security 
teams tasked with decision-making processes that could either prompt or curb 
humanitarian activities. Further, risk assessments form part of the security 
management systems of humanitarian organizations, meaning that they are 
often focused on potential risks to staff or the risks of implementing programs 
in certain areas, rather than the risk of non-delivery of aid.
Contrary to popular belief, aid workers who operate in high risk contexts are 
not primarily expatriate staff representing organizations headquartered far 
away. Traditional risk assessments, if implemented at all, have been critiqued 
for weighing the risks posed to international staff more heavily than the risks 
posed to national staff. In fact, incident and demographic numbers suggest 
that, in some cases, national aid staff are more likely to be targeted by violence 
(Aid Worker Security Database 2017; Bickley 2017; Sarazen 2018).
In contexts where there is a high need for the intervention of international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations because of violence and 
human rights violations, the perpetrators of the violence make the risk assess-
ment matrices even more complex. In short, higher risks provoke higher stakes 
for all involved (Sarazen 2018).
Ultimately, “risk management, no matter how well-conceived and imple-
mented, cannot eliminate risk; it only reduces the likelihood of its occurrence 
and mitigates against the potential consequences” of threats (Stoddard 2016). 
Improved risk management strategies can and should be designed for and 
adapted to the new frontier of humanitarianism in years to come, especially to 
counteract the relative scarcity of humanitarian aid in increasingly high-risk 
contexts (Stoddard et al. 2016).
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Rule of Law
Political leaders and legal thinkers across the globe have unanimously defend-
ed the rule of law as an essential, universal good. In fact, it has become “the 
preeminent legitimating political ideal in the world today” (Tamanaha 2004: 4), 
as compelling as it is seemingly self-evident: a “ubiquitous and ‘natural’ formu-
lation” (Rajkovic 2010: 35).
Yet the rule of law eludes any clear definition. Whether the rule of law in-
cludes the protection of individual rights or ideals of democracy, whether it is 
to be understood in strictly formalistic terms (i.e. abiding by written legal rules 
and limiting law-making power), or whether it refers to the conditions for the 
fulfillment of humanity’s “legitimate aspirations and dignity” (International 
Commission of Jurists 1959: vii, in Tamanaha 2004: 2) remains open to ques-
tion. What is clear, however, is that the more the rule of law is invoked (and the 
more money is spent on its realization worldwide), the more concerns emerge 
regarding its forms of implementation, especially in contexts of post-conflict 
and massive humanitarian responses.
Since the early 1990s, humanitarian and “transitional” settings have been 
underpinned by a lingua franca of combined economic and legal development 
in the name of the rule of law. International donors started seeing the rule of 
law (in terms of government accountability and transparency, and the inde-
pendence of the judiciary) as indispensable for, and inseparable from, eco-
nomic development and the creation of a “‘level playing field’ for economic 
actors” (Channell 2005: 3). The World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund imposed the implementation of the rule of law as a condition of finan-
cial assistance on recipient countries, and millions have been spent on legal 
reforms, largely via humanitarian channels, in places such as Kosovo, Rwanda, 
and Afghanistan. Moreover, a renewed United Nations focus on civilian protec-
tion has led humanitarian actors to postulate a strong link between protection 
and the rule of law, and thus to include access to justice programs geared at 
displaced and war-affected populations in their postwar reconstruction 
efforts.
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Different reasons have been offered to explain major failures in the imple-
mentation of rule of law programs in postwar contexts, ranging from argu-
ments about the hasty transplants of legal rules from one system to another 
that do not sufficiently take historical and socio-cultural contexts into account; 
the short-term nature of most law reform and institution building projects; the 
excessively narrow, legal-technical focus of such projects; and a general lack of 
attention towards “the actual people and processes rather than the abstract 
categories of judge, court, civil society, stakeholder, and the like” (Garth and 
Dezalay 2011: 3).
Others have gone further, proposing outright critiques of the rule of law’s 
raison d’être, from Karl Marx’s critique of the rule of law as bourgeois ideology 
at the service of private property to Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) claim that the 
rule of law nowadays increasingly entails its exception. In a similar vein, Ugo 
Mattei and Laura Nader have argued that the rule of law is an imperial, hege-
monic ideology that serves to justify plunder, the “often violent extraction by 
stronger international political actors victimizing weaker ones” (2008: 2). Such 
(illegal) plunder is nonetheless legitimized by claiming to advance the rule of 
law. Rather than being an exception to the rule, it is the “rule” of law that pro-
motes inequality and impunity (Holston 2008). Anthropological and sociologi-
cal research has also shown how neoliberal governance impacts the way the 
rule of law works in humanitarian theaters (De Lauri and Billaud 2016). The 
increasingly managerial, quantitative, technical approach to the rule of law 
has subordinated its proclaimed ideals of “doing good” to the formal require-
ments of bureaucratic accountability.
Agathe Mora
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Safe Haven
The term safe haven is often used interchangeably with “safe area” and “safe 
zone” (Long 2012; Orchard 2014). While international law does not provide a 
universally accepted definition of the term, it does provide indications of what 
criteria should be met for a safe zone to be established (Gilbert and Rüsch 
2017). Safe havens are designed to protect those in areas affected by armed con-
flict from military attack. In particular, the human rights of those in danger 
should be safeguarded and those within safe havens should be protected from 
the impact of armed conflict, through access to food and medication as well as 
education or employment (Yamashita 2017; Gilbert and Rüsch 2017).
While the Geneva Conventions include provisions for safe havens, the mod-
ern concept emerged during the 1990s, in response to the human rights viola-
tions perpetrated during ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan 
Africa. Prior to the 1990s, safe havens were established as the result of negotia-
tions between the parties to a conflict and relied on voluntary compliance. 
They were demilitarized and monitored by neutral observers. Subsequent safe 
havens were largely created by third parties. They were imposed rather than 
negotiated and involved military deterrents to protect civilians, with varying 
degrees of success (Recchia 2018).
There has been considerable debate about the efficacy and desirability of 
establishing safe havens in humanitarian emergencies. This debate centers on 
whether such areas are truly safe for the populations within and on the moti-
vations behind their establishment. Few, if any, humanitarian safe havens have 
been deemed an unequivocal success. Risks associated with the establishment 
of safe havens by third parties include a shift in the balance of power in the 
conflict zone owing to the deployment of international military forces to es-
tablish and enforce a safe area. In the case of ethnic conflict, those protected 
by a safe haven are often of one ethnicity. While the establishment of a safe 
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haven may buy time for negotiations, it can also risk prolonging them, as the 
protected group—often the militarily weaker group—may harden its negoti-
ating position on the basis of the protection it now receives. This delay can re-
sult in a greater loss of civilian life (Recchia 2018). Failure to disarm those with-
in the safe haven increases the risk that militias will use the protected area as a 
space from which to launch their own military offensives, putting civilians at 
risk (Recchia 2018).
In recent years, there have been numerous proposals to establish safe ha-
vens in conflict-affected areas, including in Syria and Libya. The establishment 
of safe havens has often been linked to attempts to stem the flow of refugees 
from conflict-affected areas. However, safe havens cannot provide protection 
equivalent to that provided by the fundamental right to seek asylum. More-
over, the idea that safe havens constitute a place to which refugees can be re-
turned is problematic, given the minimal form of protection they provide 
( Gilbert and Rüsch 2017).
There are a number of factors that increase the chances of successfully pro-
tecting civilians in safe havens. These include the establishment of a safe hav-
en via an agreement between all parties to a conflict and the presence of a safe 
corridor to the safe haven that guarantees humanitarian access (Gilbert and 
Rüsch 2017). Moreover, any military presence to protect a safe haven must be a 
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In the wake of the Oxfam scandal in Haiti, in which the organization is per-
ceived to have failed to act on and then attempted to cover up sexual miscon-
duct by staff after the 2010 earthquake, the aid sector has been engaged in 
“safeguarding” exercises (bbc 2018). The term was initially based on a United 
Kingdom (UK) legal definition that applied to vulnerable adults and children. 
However, more recently, safeguarding has acquired a broader meaning to in-
clude all actions by aid actors to protect staff from harm (abuse, sexual harass-
ment, and violence) and to ensure staff do not harm beneficiaries (Hoppe and 
Williamson 2018). Nevertheless, safeguarding has already been strongly criti-
cized for being a buzzword largely confined to specific humanitarian policy 
arenas in the Global North, for its lack of inclusiveness, and for being yet an-
other costly top-down initiative (Bruce-Raeburn 2018).
At its core, the safeguarding concept aims to reinforce the humanitarian 
imperative to do no harm by preventing sexual abuse and exploitation, and is 
part of the broader struggle for humanitarian accountability that emerged in 
the 1980s. Since this time, sexual exploitation has been considered the very 
worst kind of humanitarian worker behavior, but the parameters of what con-
stitutes exploitation have been contested. Safeguarding means different things 
to different people in the aid sector, depending on how they are situated within 
the sector, and varies based on gender, nationality, geographical location, and 
age.
Today, the work of preventing sexual exploitation and abuse is commonly 
known by the acronym psea (protection from sexual exploitation and abuse) 
and is led by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Safeguarding has emerged 
at a very specific historical moment for women’s rights, and indeed for the hu-
manitarian sector itself. The current “safeguarding crisis” comes after the glob-
al #MeToo movement that has had particularly significant impact in some of 
the largest donor countries in the Global North. (The movement highlighted 
the prevalence of sexual exploitation and harassment and also of impunity.) 
Safeguarding is also shaped by the professionalization and legalization of aid 
work and the emergence of a duty of care standard for humanitarian workers, 
with respect to humanitarian organizations’ responsibility for the well-being 
and safety of their staff.
The interpretation of what safeguarding means is shaped by the chang-
ing cultural perceptions of transactional sex and prostitution, primar-
ily in the Global North. Whereas codes of conduct have been promoted as a 
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key  mechanism for governing the sexual behavior of humanitarian work-
ers (Matti 2015), there appears to be an emergent assumption that pay-
ing for sex, anywhere and at any time, is incompatible with being a “good” 
humanitarian worker and dependable employee. In practice, this means 
that the distinction between paying for sex and exploiting someone for sex 
is erased.
As part of the ongoing push towards digitization and datafication, efforts 
are being made to “technologize” safeguarding responses. The UK government 
has launched a new Interpol/Save the Children-coordinated vetting project, 
Soteria, which will provide criminal record checks and improve information 
sharing (Gov.UK 2018). The push for quantification and “evidence-based ap-
proaches” engender a framing of social life—and its problems—that lends it-
self to a focus on aspects of “the social” that can be (or be made) classified/
classifiable or counted/countable. However, this also links to surveillance as an 
increasingly common technique of humanitarian governance. How remote 
control strategies will correspond meaningfully to the need to reduce power 
imbalances and empower those in precarious positions, be they beneficiaries 
or staff, remains to be seen (Sandvik 2019).
Kristin Bergtora Sandvik
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Securitization within the humanitarian lexicon refers to the ways in which 
states use humanitarian assistance to further national security or foreign poli-
cy objectives. It assumes a mutually reinforcing association between conflict 
and poverty, and the resulting security threats that emerge from refugees and 
failed states. Securitization in the humanitarian sector is built on a “fear of 
underdevelopment as a source of conflict, criminalized activity and interna-
tional instability” (Duffield 2001: 7). It is precisely these assumptions that link 
violent conflict, security, development, and humanitarian action. More gener-
ally, processes of fear are used to justify the exceptional security measures put 
in place to deter or prevent the movement of internally displaced within or 
refugees across geopolitical borders, whether in the midst of civil war (Hynd-
man 2007) or, more recently, in the context of refugee movements in Europe 
and the United States (USA), and the criminal prosecution of those who assist 
them.
While the extraordinary efforts to secure borders from migration and the 
manipulation of aid in support of political, military, or security aims are not 
new phenomena, the term “securitization” gained prominence in the humani-
tarian sector after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the USA. The 9/11 
attacks ushered in an era in which counter-terrorism aims have altered the 
context within which humanitarian actors operate (O’Leary 2018). Securitiza-
tion is commonly justified as a way of making foreign assistance more effective 
and coherent. Critics, however, object to securitization on two grounds. First, it 
compromises neutral, independent, and impartial humanitarian assistance 
(Williamson 2011), and second, it increases risk and danger for those providing 
such assistance (Fast 2015). In post-9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, pro-
vincial reconstruction teams (prts) comprising military and civilian members 
engaged in diplomatic, development, and humanitarian activities, often de-
signed to “win the hearts and minds” of the communities in which they oper-
ated. The integration of these activities not only blurred the lines between ci-
vilian and military actors, but it also complicated efforts to distinguish 
principled humanitarian assistance from the political action and security 
agenda of the prts and the states that championed them. These blurred lines 
and the erosion of principled humanitarian action, in turn, are often used to 
explain attacks on aid workers.
Yet the contributions to securitization are not entirely one sided. Humani-
tarian agencies adopt security risk management approaches to protect staff 
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and programs and to ensure access to conflict or violence-affected  populations. 
The most common of these approaches are consent-based, in which humani-
tarians seek the tacit or negotiated consent for their presence and programs, in 
contrast to “hardened” measures, in which they aim to either deter attacks 
through the threat of counterthreat (armed escort or withdrawal of services) 
or to decrease their vulnerability through the use of policies, devices, or other 
measures (e.g., restriction of movement, use of perimeter fences). In adopting 
a visibly fortified architecture to protect their staff and compounds in the most 
dangerous places, humanitarian actors more closely resemble the military ac-
tors from whom they aim to distinguish themselves, further blurring the lines 
between them (Fast 2014).
Evidence related to securitization is mixed, however, both in terms of the 
efficacy of counter-insurgency operations (Fishstein and Wilder 2012) and in 
their effects on the security of aid workers. Nevertheless, securitization re-




Duffield, M. (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development 
and Security. Zed Books.
Fast, L. (2014) Aid in Danger: The Perils and Promise of Humanitarianism. University of 
Pennsylvania Press.
Fast, L. (2015) Securitization and Threats to Humanitarian Workers. In: Peterson, J., 
MacGinty, R. eds. The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action. Routledge.
Fishstein, P., Wilder, A. (2012) Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship 
between Aid and Security in Afghanistan. Feinstein International Center, Tufts 
University.
Hyndman, J. (2007) The Securitization of Fear in Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka. Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 97(2): 361–372.
O’Leary, E. (2018) Principles Under Pressure: The Impact of Counterterrorism Measures 
and Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism on Principled Humanitarian Action. 
Norwegian Refugee Council.
Williamson, J.A. (2011) Using Humanitarian Aid to Win Hearts and Minds: A Costly 




Adam Smith’s 1759 The Theory of Moral Sentiments provides one of the earliest 
instances of humanitarian sentiments, which are defined as the emotions that 
direct our attention to the suffering of others and urge us to remedy them. 
From the mid-18th century onwards, moral feelings of love, friendship, trust, 
and solidarity were seen to be equally important as a rational sense of obliga-
tion towards helping distant others. These sentiments have been cultivated in 
everyday practices in modern and contemporary history, although they con-
tinue to be unevenly distributed. They also necessitate a broader definition of 
humanitarianism, going beyond emergencies and their relief to its conceptual-
ization as “a structure of feeling, a cluster of moral principles, a basis for ethical 
claims and political strategies, and a call for action” (Redfield and Bornstein 
2010: 17).
Thomas Haskell (1985) identified the conditions for the historic emergence 
of humanitarian sentiments as (1) the existence of ethical maxims to help suf-
fering strangers, often grounded in religious ideas, (2) the perception of in-
volvement in the causes of this suffering, (3) the ability to see a way to end it, 
and (4) the existence of ordinary and familiar recipes for intervention. This is 
linked to the growth of capitalism, which provided new insights into the causes 
of human suffering, as well as the discipline and technologies to act on these 
insights. The movement to abolish slavery is often identified as one of the first 
campaigns fueled by humanitarian sentiments, with the powerful feelings of 
sympathy and moral qualms that were aroused in supporters leading to politi-
cal action (Wilson and Brown 2009). Another early event that contributed to 
the emergence of foundational ideas of shared humanity was the 1755 Lisbon 
earthquake. Its reporting across Europe focused on how the calamity affected 
ordinary people, and this created an imagined empathy with the sufferings of 
distant strangers.
From the 19th century onwards, the expansion of international trade 
brought with it new senses of interconnectedness. The early achievements of 
science and technology, wrapped up in modern ideas of progress and improve-
ment, led to new understandings of responsibility and obligation. Secular 
 approaches—as alternatives to religious practices—were also beginning to be 
applied to fighting poverty, and together with changes in media, advertising, 
and marketing, they gave rise to mass humanitarianism (Rozario 2003). Since 
the early 20th century, humanitarian organizations such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Oxfam, and innumerable subsequent organiza-
tions have been working to foster humanitarian sentiments among ever more 
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people. The emergence of child sponsorship, with its affective dimensions and 
the involvement of celebrities who have contributed to the emotionalization 
of humanitarianism, has been especially effective. As a result, humanitarian 
sentiments now include feelings of empowerment among Northern citizens 
that they can “Make Poverty History,” often with the help of new digital tech-
nologies (Roy 2010).
It is important to acknowledge the limits of humanitarian sentiments. They 
are often generated by individual stories of suffering that can discourage an 
understanding of the complexities of humanitarian situations. Sentiments can 
be fleeting and therefore provide unstable ground for action (Cohen 2001). 
When such action, be it charitable or political, does occur, it is characterized 
by the tension between seeing the sufferer as poor and in need of compassion 
and as an equal human being with whom to stand in solidarity (Fassin 2012). 
Last but not least, a focus on humanitarian sentiments must not neglect the 
material conditions, political dynamics, and structural causes of suffering. In-
stead, it can enrich our understanding of how these work in the world and 
contribute to mobilizing support for its alleviation.
Anke Schwittay
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Shelter, understood as a place where temporary protection is provided, is a 
priority in an emergency. However, the right to shelter is entangled with other 
issues, thus making it difficult to set a defined humanitarian standard (Babister 
and Kelman 2002). “Adequate housing” (ohchr 2009) is listed in both the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, there is not a definition of ade-
quate housing. Shelters and housing do not constitute the core mandate of 
humanitarian agencies; therefore, there is no standardized policy for related 
issues, such as homelessness or slums. In humanitarian contexts, shelter is a 
temporary need for displaced people. The United Nations Relief and Rehabili-
tation Administration and the International Refugee Organization sheltered 
people displaced by World War ii. In 1950, the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (unhcr) was instituted as the only commission in charge 
of shelter. The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, approved in 1967, 
enlarged the geographical scope of the unhcr, whose mandate to support dis-
placed people was applied all over the world.
Ian Davis explored the ways in which shelters were historically built and 
used in different parts of the world, stating that “shelters must be considered 
as a process, and not as an object” (1978: 33). This statement constitutes the 
basic theoretical approach to shelters, even though its implementation was 
difficult to integrate with humanitarian practice. Although solutions such as 
self-resettlement or the use of local facilities are formally prioritized, there are 
other variables in the provision of shelters, such as potential resistance by host 
government, security, and timing of the intervention. There is often a tension 
between the need to provide “temporary” shelters and the difficulties in quick-
ly granting people adequate accommodation. Shelters need to be built fast, 
and it is important that they appear “temporary,” to avoid the host population 
seeing them as something permanent and thus creating hostility (Babister and 
Kelman 2002). Protecting shelters from external threats is also important, as 
humanitarian shelters are often located in conflict-affected areas. Events such 
as the attacks on the Palestinian refugee camp of Shatila by Christian Maronite 
militias in 1982 or, more recently, the far-right attacks against refugee camps in 
Chios (Greece) in 2016, the accidental bombings of Kamona refugee camp in 
Syria (2016), Rann refugee camp in northern Nigeria (2017), and Makhmour 
refugee camp in northern Iraq (2017–2018) show how the location of the shel-
ters and the security arrangements are crucial. Critics have noticed that 
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 humanitarian management of shelters is a way of controlling displaced people 
until they can be resettled under the control of another authority (Rajaram 
2002). Scholars have also described the provision of shelters as a process of 
dehistoricization and depoliticization of displaced populations (De Lauri 2016; 
Malkki 1996). These critics emphasize how humanitarian organizations focus 
on abstract standards rather than involving displaced communities in the 
“process” of sheltering.
The bureaucratization of sheltering has led to a progressive focus on the 
shelter as a product. In 2005, unhcr and some non-governmental organiza-
tions arranged the “Shelter Cluster” to set common standards of sheltering, 
involving experts such as architects and designers. In 2017, the ikea refugee 
shelter was awarded “Design of the Year.” However, this standardized shelter, 
very similar to a tent in size and functions, was criticized by humanitarian or-
ganizations as a finished product that did not leave rooms for local appropria-
tion (Scott-Smith 2018). The lack of an agency focusing on shelter contributes 
to the fact that tension between the idea of shelter as a process and the need of 
standardized tools remains unsolved. In recent interventions connected to 
Syria’s crisis, the use of alternative shelters in the camps increased. In Greece 
(Dicker 2017), Italy, Germany and Turkey (Feyzi et al. 2018) there are experi-
ences of sheltering models based on urban housing and self-settlement. These 
models are criticized because they are not seen as temporary solutions by host 
societies and they make displaced people more difficult to protect. The remov-
al of refugees from the Italian town of Riace (2018) and the evictions of refu-
gees spontaneously sheltering in the Athenians neighborhood of Exarchia 
(2019) show the frequent resistance of state authority toward these alternative 
models. However, solutions like this help the unhcr to reach its formal target 
to reduce the percentage of people living in camps (Culbertson et al. 2016; 
Dicker 2017). The tensions between the temporariness and quality of the shel-
ters, as well as issues of security and freedom of displaced people, remain the 
main concerns in humanitarian sheltering, and frequently erupt in tensions 
between state authorities and different civil society actors.
Valerio Colosio
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Solidarity
Solidarity derives from the French word solidarité, which refers to a commu-
nion of interests and mutual responsibility. In this sense, “social solidarity is 
regarded as the glue that keeps people together, whether by mutually identify-
ing and sharing certain norms and values, or by contributing to some common 
good, or both” (Komter 2004: 2). The questions of mutuality and communal-
ity, either as an accomplished fact or as an end towards which social action is 
required, are prevalent in the different definitions of solidarity provided over 
time and across disciplines and sectors. In his seminal work The Division of 
Labor in Society, first published in 1893, Émile Durkheim made the distinction 
between mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. According to Durkheim, 
mechanical solidarity is characteristic of traditional, undifferentiated societies 
and is based on similarity and homogeneity between people, in terms of val-
ues and beliefs; whereas organic solidarity stems from diversification and the 
complex division of labor that characterizes modern societies. Therefore, soli-
darity in modern societies springs from functional interdependency and com-
plementarity (Durkheim 1997 [1893]). Despite the limitations of Durkheim’s 
functionalist theory and the emphasis on social cohesion, Durkheim’s concep-
tualization of solidarity sheds light on the historical development of humani-
tarianism as a feeling of connectedness that is based on a common and shared 
identity. In particular, humanitarianism as a moral imperative and  action that 
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programmatically seeks to alleviate the suffering of distant strangers was his-
torically enabled by the solidification of shared humanity as a common and 
all-encompassing category during the Enlightenment. Solidarity among dis-
tant suffering strangers as fellow humans has thus been the underlying force 
of modern humanitarian sensibility and cosmopolitan humanitarianism.
In her work on humanitarian solidarity and communication, Lilie Chouli-
araki (2013) traces the transformation from this other-oriented morality, which 
was grounded on the principle of a shared humanity, to a self-oriented moral-
ity. The changes in the aesthetics of humanitarian communication reflect 
changes in the very ethics of solidarity. The contemporary times of post-hu-
manitarianism that Chouliaraki locates in the post-Cold War world are marked 
by the shift from a “solidarity as pity” to a “solidarity of irony.” The “spectators” 
of distant suffering are motivated by a self-centered moral imperative to help 
(in order to feel good themselves) while they are dominated by a skepticism 
against the efficacy of any humanitarian solidarity action.
This egalitarian essence of solidarity brings to the fore the tensions between 
solidarity and humanitarianism, albeit from a different perspective. The depo-
liticizing effects of humanitarianism, criticized by much literature on humani-
tarian relief, show how humanitarianism is a particular form of intervention 
grounded on inequality between the “giver” and the “receiver” of aid (Fassin 
2007; Feldman and Ticktin 2010). This tension between solidarity and hierar-
chy, control and care, domination and aid, is constitutive of humanitarianism 
as a particular form of government and reason (Fassin 2012).
Nevertheless, novel forms of humanitarianism that embrace a solidarity 
ethos overtly challenge the political foundations of Western humanitarianism. 
In the European context, the so called 2015 “migration/refugee crisis” formed 
the ground for the emergence of a disparate humanitarian field that apart from 
large-scale humanitarian organizations included grassroots groups and inde-
pendent humanitarian volunteers. This vast arena has been described, for in-
stance, as solidarity (Rozakou 2017), volunteer (Sandri 2018), or grassroots hu-
manitarianism (McGee and Pelham 2018). These semantic inventions and the 
coinage of new terms illustrate the researchers’ need to describe a humanitar-
ian milieu that is exemplified by informal and often ad hoc groups and indi-
viduals. Moreover, the field of “solidarity humanitarianism” pushes us to criti-
cally reflect upon and revisit our perspective of humanitarianism and the 
relationship of humanitarianism with the state. In fact, very often it is the “in-
dependent volunteers” or “solidarians” themselves who powerfully contest the 
modus operandi, logics, and structure of traditional humanitarian organiza-
tions (Rozakou 2017), promoting an egalitarian ethos (Cantat and Feischmidt 
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2018; Millner 2011). Solidarity humanitarianism not only challenges established 
modalities of humanitarian action by endorsing a horizontal,  anti-bureaucratic 
and political form of assistance, but it also sets coexistence and being with the 
refugees/asylum seekers/migrants at its core (Rozakou 2016). In that sense, 
solidarity humanitarianism has solidarity as its key formative feature, and it 
poses the question of connectedness under a new egalitarian light.
Katerina Rozakou
References
Cantat, C., Feischmidt, M. (2018) Conclusion: Civil Involvement in Refugee Protection: 
Reconfiguring Humanitarianism and Solidarity in Europe. In: Feischmidt, M., Pries 
L., Cantat, M. eds. Refugee Protection and Civil Society in Europe. Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Chouliaraki, L. (2013) The Ironic Spectator: Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarian-
ism. Polity.
Durkheim, É. (1997) [1893] The Division of Labor in Society. Free Press.
Fassin, D. (2007) Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life. Public Culture, 19: 499–520.
Fassin, D. (2012) Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present. University of 
California Press.
Feldman, I., Ticktin, M. eds. (2010) In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat 
and Care. Duke University Press.
Komter, A. (2004) Social Solidarity and the Gift. Cambridge University Press.
McGee, D., Pelham, J. (2018) Politics at Play: Locating Human Rights, Refugees and 
Grassroots Humanitarianism in The Calais Jungle. Leisure Studies, 37(1): 22–35.
Millner, N. (2011) From “Refugee” to “Migrant” in Calais Solidarity Activism: Re-Staging 
Undocumented Migration for a Future Politics of Asylum. Political Geography, 30: 
320–328.
Rozakou, K. (2016) Socialities of Solidarity: Revisiting the Gift Taboo in Times of Crises. 
Social Anthropology, 24(2): 185–199.
Rozakou, K. (2017) Solidarity# Humanitarianism: The Blurred Boundaries of Humani-
tarianism in Greece. Etnofoor, 29(2): 99–104.
Sandri, E. (2018) “Volunteer Humanitarianism”: Volunteers and Humanitarian Aid in 





The United Nations Office for South–South Cooperation (unossc) defines 
South–South cooperation in its broadest sense as political, economic, social, 
cultural, environmental, and/or technical collaboration in the forms of knowl-
edge, skills, expertise, and/or resource sharing between countries in the Global 
South. It can involve one or more of the so-called “developing countries” and 
the cooperation can occur on bilateral, regional, intraregional, or interregional 
basis (Lengyel and Malacalza 2011; unossc 2018).
The word “South” in South-South cooperation refers to an arguably contest-
ed term of Global South, which broadly refers to the regions of Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, and Oceania. The term generally excludes Europe and North 
America, signifying geopolitical difference and global and historical relations 
of power (Dados and Connell 2012).
Historically, the forms and modalities of South–South cooperation vary 
contextually to a high degree. Some milestones of broad South–South cooper-
ation include the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the First Session of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 and the follow-
ing Buenos Aires Plan of Action in 1978. Furthermore, countries of the Global 
South have significantly increased their participation and leadership in hu-
manitarian action and peacekeeping missions in the 20th century (Amar 2013).
The role of non-traditional (new or re-emerging) actors in the wider spec-
trum of development cooperation has expanded in the last two decades, in-
creasingly diversifying and challenging traditional approaches to development 
assistance and humanitarianism (De Renzio and Seifert 2014; Pickup 2018). For 
example, some South–South cooperation providers reject the labels of “donor” 
and “recipient” countries, and rather focus on mutually beneficial peer rela-
tionship with partner countries and emphasize the exchange of technical 
skills  (Zimmermann and Smith 2011). South–South cooperation can be 
seen as creating a new developmental narrative that contests the traditional 
 conditionality-given narrative, which focuses on advancing the donors’ ideo-
logical interests. Notable Southern donors such as China and India tend to re-
fuse to enter into donor arrangements so they do not interfere with other 
states’ sovereign affairs (Mawdsley 2012). The general focus of South–South aid 
is in non-tied autonomous development, where strategic priorities are shaped 
by the countries at the receiving end (Quadir 2013).
Criticism of South–South cooperation cautions against generalizations and 
assumptions of ubiquitous and unanimous approaches of solidarity between 
the Global Southern states, and questions the acritical use of the notion of 
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“Global South” itself. The diversity of the countries of the Global South, in ad-
dition to their different relative positions in international relations, requires 
contextual analysis of the cooperation (Pacitto and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013). 
Humanitarian and development aid provided by the Global South has been 
fragmented owing to the lack of national aid strategies and clear organization-
al structures to coordinate, manage, monitor, and evaluate new and existing 
aid programs and needs (Quadir 2013). Further, some scholars argue that the 
South–South cooperation paradigm faces similar challenges to its North–
South counterpart, as both are characterized by involving countries’ hetero-
genic policies, institutional arrangements, and engagements in international 
initiatives and forums (De Renzio and Seifert 2014).
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South–South Cooperation – Sovereignty
Zimmermann, F., Smith, K. (2011) More Actors, More Money, More Ideas for Interna-
tional Development Co-Operation. Journal of International Development, 23: 
722–738.
Sovereignty
Sovereignty is a type of power usually ascribed to an actor who can determine 
the behavior and actions that are permitted within a given territory. In human-
itarian arenas, sovereignty may be temporary and unclear as different actors 
fight for power over the same territory. Sovereignty may also be layered, with 
different actors controlling different elements of life. For example, religious 
authorities may hold sovereignty over questions of marriage, child custody, 
and inheritance, while the regional land registry holds sovereignty over the 
distribution of seeds and tools. It is very important for humanitarian actors to 
understand who holds sovereignty over their area of operations. Whoever 
holds sovereignty is the actor that humanitarian negotiations will take place 
with as they determine whether and what kind of humanitarian activities are 
permitted (Fast, Freeman, O’Neill and Rowley 2013).
Commonsense understanding of sovereignty attributes it to states and their 
regional and local institutions. However, in many places the state only holds 
nominal sovereignty, while effective sovereignty is exercised by non-state ac-
tors (Denham and Lombardi 1996). For humanitarian actors, it is important to 
understand this distinction between nominal and effective sovereignty be-
cause humanitarian work often requires interactions with both levels. While, 
for example, visa and official permissions are obtained via the state, they may 
be useless in the actual area of operations if actors who do not recognize state 
sovereignty exercise effective sovereignty in that region.
The ability to hold on to sovereignty is not only related to brute force, but 
also to whether the population believes in the legitimacy of the sovereign. This 
means it is important to understand that while sovereignty is held or exercised 
it is also embodied in people, institutions, and, of course, deities. To under-
stand better the distribution of power, and the strength of a sovereign actor in 
their area of operations, humanitarian actors should gather an understanding 
of whom sovereignty is invested in by recipients of aid.
The question of whether humanitarian agencies can develop into sovereign 
actors is contested (Hoffmann 2011). A research paper argues that “many 
gaps in the protection of refugees can be connected to a de facto transfer of 
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 responsibility for managing refugee policy from sovereign states to United 
 Nations agencies” (Kagan 2011: 1). The humanitarian aid system is designed to 
cover a short-term inability of states to protect their populations. However, to-
day there is a growing phenomenon of protracted humanitarian crises. There-
fore, humanitarian aid can develop into a permanent substitute for public ser-
vices that should be provided by the state. In the case of a refugee crisis, for 
example, if a state lacks relevant administrative bodies, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees decides whether someone receives refugee 
status or becomes eligible for aid. In certain crises, therefore, humanitarian 
actors may well hold the “power over life and death” of aid recipients, which is 
another famous definition of sovereignty (Foucault 1977).
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Stabilization
Stabilization is ambiguous in its definition and highly politically oriented in its 
practice. Therefore, it is one of the most controversial notions in the humani-
tarian vocabulary. The term became popular in the 1990s, around the same 
time as civil–military cooperation (cimic). Both cimic and stabilization have 
been criticized for curtailing the neutrality, impartiality, and independence of 
the humanitarian community. The ideological and operational meaning of 
 stabilization is embedded in American (US) military doctrine concerning 
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combating insurgencies with the involvement of either the country’s interna-
tional allies in the Western world (e.g. the Philippines, 1898–1902; Vietnam, 
1967–1975; and Afghanistan, 2001–present) or national allies in the regions of 
insurgency (e.g. Colombia, 2004–present) (Fishel 2008; Barakat, Deely and 
Zyck 2010). The term has been given multiple names in US army manuals since 
the early 20th century, including “small wars,” “counterinsurgency or COIN,” 
“low intensity conflict,” “operations other than war,” and “stability and support 
operations,” but has come to refer to the civil–military operations of US and 
Western governments in asymmetric warfare with the aim of creating sustain-
able conditions for their own version of indigenous government and political 
order (Fishel 2008). After the Cold War, the notion of stabilization has been 
associated with state fragility. It has been defended with reference to the ur-
gency to stabilize so-called “failed states” through international military inter-
vention and to save human lives in the aftermath of military operations (e.g. in 
Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of Congo).
Stabilization always involves military operations, especially in countries 
and regions seen to be infested with what are variously referred to as “chronic 
insecurities,” “fragilities,” “protracted conflicts,” and “uncertainties,” which are 
almost always defined without reference to the broader historical and political 
contexts and are framed as if domestically driven and created (e.g. Colombia, 
Haiti, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq) (Manyena and Gordon 2015).
Stability operations mostly include security reform, good governance, insti-
tution building, public service delivery, humanitarian assistance, and develop-
ment (Jackson and Gordon 2007). The increasing number of stabilization op-
erations and their expanding scope of activities are an indication of the 
changing stance of the international community and the United Nations (UN) 
towards the principle of state sovereignty. The most recent examples of stabi-
lization operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria represent the radical diver-
gence from the principle of state sovereignty in the international regime that 
has taken place in the 21st century. The discourse of stabilization, coupled with 
peace-building, reconstruction, and state-building, has justified military inter-
ventions in states that are seen to be failing to protect the lives of their citizens 
owing to institutional collapse, while disassociating the root causes of state 
failure from the conditions created by the political and military conduct of the 
intervening states. For example, the state failure or fragility in Iraq was partly 
the result of the UN sanctions of the 1990s and the military intervention in 
2003. However, the stabilization operations to combat insurgency, ethnic strife, 
and isis that followed the Anglo-American invasion assumed that the root 
causes of the violence were internally driven.
There has been a growing trend to integrate humanitarian assistance into 
stabilization operations, and this has raised questions not only about the 
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 militarization of humanitarian activities, but also the ambiguous role of hu-
manitarian assistance in terms of security benefits and conflict resolution (Bai-
ley 2011). Stabilization operations have repeatedly failed to demonstrate any 
solid link between humanitarian and development aid and peace and conflict 
resolution. However, the deteriorating humanitarian situation in conflict zones, 
especially in countries such as Somalia and Yemen, means that humanitarian 
and development assistance are an integral part of stabilization efforts (Bara-
kat, Deely and Zyck 2010). The UN has followed the same trend of integrating 
emergency and stabilization operations to achieve “coherence” across political, 
security, and humanitarian priorities. The UN’s humanitarian assistance activi-
ties tend to overlap with and be integrated into stabilization operations (i.e. 
integrated operations). In theory, the UN’s stabilization operations are expect-
ed to respect the humanitarian space. In practice, however, stabilization priori-
ties conflict with humanitarian concerns and introduce security-mindedness 
and politicization into integrated UN operations (combination of military, hu-
manitarian, and diplomatic engagements) (Muggah 2010; Bailey 2011).
Different Western states have theorized, designed, and prioritized their sta-
bilization operations differently, depending on their level of intervention and 
the nature of geopolitical interests in the stabilization zones (Gordon 2006). 
Alternatively, stabilization operations, especially those authorized by nato 
and the UN, provide mechanisms of involvement other than deployment of 
armies to those states that are unwilling to send conventional armed forces, 
but are willing to contribute to reconstruction and development efforts.
Consent-building appears to be a key aspect of stabilization programming, 
as opposed to a commitment to mobilize national and local capabilities, and 
systems and instruments to formulate stabilization priorities (Jackson and 
Gordon 2007). Both consent-building and development aspects of stabiliza-
tion have been accused of being militarily led and economically defined by the 
intervening states and donors, rather than designed by locally driven political 
dialogues and social contracts.
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State-building
Since the end of the 20th century, state-building became an overall framework 
and objective of peace-building. By then, peace-building had consolidated 
into a large scale, standardized, and externally led transformation of war-torn 
societies deemed necessary to prevent the recurrence of conflict. The estab-
lishment of state-building as its overall goal was the peace-building enterprise 
at its most ambitious heights. As it turned out, levels of ambitions would soon 
waver and the goal of state-building was more or less abandoned.
State-building grew out of at least two different academic discourses and 
policy fields. One was a political science preoccupation with state failure—
both a cause and a consequence of the inability of some states to upheld the 
monopoly of violence and other basic functions (Jackson 1991; Zartman 1995). 
With the post-9/11 war on terror, such state failure became framed as a threat 
to global, and in particular Western, security, specifically as a haven for terror-
ist groups but also as a more generalized source of destabilization of the world 
order. Another backdrop to the emergence of the peace-building as state-
building doctrine originated in development studies and international aid 
practice, with the so-called Post-Washington consensus holding economic 
growth to be contingent on a specific kind of state, characterized by efficient 
and capable institutions able to implement and support liberal economic 
policies.
As a space where development agencies, military forces, and political mis-
sions now found themselves working alongside each other, postwar societies 
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became a meeting ground for these two strands of state-building, both concep-
tually and physically. For some time, all aspects of state-building (marketiza-
tion and economic liberalization, democratization, and the rebuilding or re-
structuring of the security apparatus, legal frameworks, the judiciary, and the 
state administration more generally) came to be seen as mutually constitutive. 
This idea was articulated perhaps in its purest form in the notion of “vicious” 
and “virtuous” cycles, which was coined by Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, and 
Michael Carnahan (2005). The authors argued that failure to perform one or 
many of the core functions of the state such as security will undermine other 
core functions (such as market formation or the rule of law) in a vicious circle, 
and vice versa.
This line of thinking was criticized by scholars for being ahistorical, being 
based on flawed liberal assumptions of linear progress and “all good things go-
ing together” (Milliken 2003). Some pointed out that actual state formation in 
the West was driven by specific political and economic elite interests rather 
than functional convergence. Others questioned the legitimacy or possibility 
of imposing external Western frameworks on non-Western settings (Suhrke 
2011). Arguably, however, the fatal blow to state-building as a guiding principle 
for humanitarian intervention in postwar or conflict countries came from po-
litical and strategic quarters. Since 2001, the international peace-building re-
gime, and consequently humanitarian aid, have coexisted uneasily with, and 
increasingly merged with, the “war on terror,” which has had the effect of align-
ing the former closer to Western security interests—and exposing it as such. 
The two initial sites of the war on terror—Afghanistan and Iraq—were also 
sites of multilateral state-building and large humanitarian theatres. Here, the 
idea of a mutually reinforcing virtuous circle was extended to include military 
operations, as commanders sought to coopt development and humanitarian 
aid for the purpose of shoring up support for their counterinsurgency cam-
paigns. Certainly, many development and humanitarian agencies resisted be-
ing made part of the war effort by “winning hearts and minds” for the military, 
but largely ended up being associated with it nonetheless. In turn, the rather 
spectacular failures of United States-led attempts at pacification in these two 
countries undermined the expansive visions of state-building everywhere. By 
the beginning of the 2010s, the narrowing of objectives and pragmatism was 
observable across the pillars of state-building: security, administrative reform, 
democratization, and the justice sector. Military operations shifted their focus 
from providing security to the population and ensuring states’ monopoly of 
violence to more selective, “enemycentric,” missions. United Nations peace en-
forcement operations increasingly worked alongside and resembled Ameri-
can-led counter terrorist missions (Karlsrud 2019). Some suggest that new 
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forms of “liquid warfare” made the control of territory (and thus state-build-
ing) abundant and counterproductive (Demmers and Gould 2018). A more 
minimalist, pragmatic, and decisively less liberal approach also took place in 
other fields of state-building. Increasingly, it was proposed that the public 
 provision of security and justice be relegated to informal and “traditional” ac-
tors, such as militias and religious or traditional councils, and ambitions for 
democracy and “good governance” were downscaled or abandoned. Some saw 
this as a corrective to the imposition of Western frameworks and a belated 
recognition of “the local” (Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan 2009), whereas 
others saw parallels to colonial templates of indirect rule and constructions of 
the Other as unfit for modern statehood (Wimpelmann 2013). A return to 
strongman politics and its denunciation of liberal intervention (and often lib-
eralism per se) in many Western countries added to the sense that the histori-
cal moment of state-building as a framework for Western-led intervention 
might have passed. Humanitarian agencies have struggled to emerge from the 
lingering shadow of state-building. In most of the contexts where humanitari-
an action is implemented, it remains tainted by perceptions that it serves oth-
er, more transformative, political agendas.
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Suffering points toward experiences of physical or mental pain. Suffering, and 
the act of reflecting on the nature of suffering, are central issues in philosophy, 
religion, psychology, and the social sciences. On the one hand, suffering is a 
deeply personal and individual experience that escapes easy definitions and 
representation (Wilkinson 2005). On the other hand, however, social suffering 
points to suffering as a societal experience, and in such instances it is the result 
of what political, economic and institutional powers do to people (or other 
sentient creatures) (Kleinman, Das, and Lock 1997). In humanitarian contexts, 
suffering is a mobilizing force: witnessing the suffering of others triggers com-
passion, empathy, and emotion-driven ethical responses, which sometimes 
leads to humanitarian responses and action (Wilson and Brown 2008).
Jeremy Bentham (2012 [1789]) identified the ability to suffer as the precondi-
tion for protection against exploitation and exposure to cruelty as a require-
ment for (human) rights. He famously proposed that the question is not “Can 
they reason? or, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” In The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, Adam Smith (2007 [1759]) described compassion for the suffering 
other as one of the “original passions of human nature.” Compassion towards 
the suffering of others is undoubtedly as old as human culture, but the idea of 
a universal humanity and a global human community with transboundary 
moral obligations—and, therefore, obligations to alleviate the suffering of 
 others—is often traced back to the Enlightenment era. During the Enlighten-
ment, a cult of sensibility and fascination with suffering prompted a surge in 
“humanitarian” thinking and action. At the time, the rise of secular thinking 
helped sow the seeds of modern humanitarian thinking and gave voice to the 
idea that people themselves could, and should, intervene in the suffering of 
others—even unknown, distant people who remain anonymous to us. The rec-
ognition of a shared human condition, one bound by bodily precarity and vul-
nerability to suffering, formed the basis for ideas of a common human com-
munity and the obligation of people to safeguard fragile humanity themselves 
(Sliwinski 2011; Wilson and Brown 2008).
According to Hannah Arendt, humanitarianism builds on a “politics of pity,” 
and it divides us into those who suffer and those who do not, those in need of 
help and those able to help. Therefore, humanitarianism is dependent on the 
spectacle of suffering, on mediating representations of the suffering of others 
in the awareness of distant, able-to-help spectators (Arendt 1963). Witnessing 
the suffering of another person, recognizing it as suffering, reacting to the suf-
fering in a compassionate manner, and having the will to help are at the core of 
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humanitarianism. The evolution of transboundary humanitarianism, and its 
institutionalism and expansion, may be traced through episodes in which ex-
treme suffering has been witnessed and benevolent, humanitarian responses 
to it have been organized (Kotilainen 2016; Sliwinski 2011; Wilson and Brown 
2008).
The birth of modern organizational humanitarianism is often dated to 1859 
and the aftermath of the Battle of Solferino. Deeply impacted by the suffering 
that he saw and heard during the battle, Henry Dunant wrote A Memory of 
Solferino in 1862. Inspired by the ideas presented in the book, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross was founded in 1863. Similarly, the anti-slavery 
movement led to recognition of slaves as humans capable of suffering and of 
their suffering (Sliwinski 2011; Hochschild 2005). Perhaps most famously, the 
horrors of World War ii, and the witnessing of the immense suffering of those 
affected by the Holocaust, prompted the codification of international humani-
tarian laws and the implementation of conventions that aimed to protect hu-
manity from future atrocities and rights violations. More recently, driven by 
the genocide in Rwanda and the atrocities committed during the Yugoslav 
wars of the 1990s, the principle of the Responsibility to Protect was signed in 
2005 by all United Nations member states.
A critical question arises about what it is that counts as a life able (in our 
understanding) to suffer, a life we feel compassion for, a life worthy of grief and 
mourning (Butler 2004). This question is pertinent today with respect to, for 
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Technology
Technology can refer to at least two different things: a particular equipment/
machinery or the application of knowledge. In the humanitarian realm, this 
implies that technology can refer both to the application of logistical, medical, 
or other expertise for practical humanitarian purposes, and to such things as 
off-grid solar power in refugee camps, humanitarian demining devices, or 
“Plumpy’Nut” (Scott-Smith 2017), to mention a few. Despite this broad mean-
ing, in recent years the term has mostly been used with reference to new tech-
nologies, such as blockchain, drones (Sandvik and Lohne 2014), biometrics 
(Jacobsen 2017), satellites, and information and communications technology 
more broadly.
This current trend in usage of the term reflects the fact that numerous hu-
manitarian actors have introduced a range of new technologies into different 
aspects of their work, examples being biometrics for refugee registration, satel-
lites for crisis mapping, drones for the delivery of medical aid, apps for refu-
gees, and mobile phones for cash transfers. These and other uses of new tech-
nology in humanitarian work have given rise to debates that mainly center 
around two core themes: (1) benefits versus risks and (2) agency, politics, and 
accountability.
(1) Benefits versus risks. Accuracy, empowerment, and the link between 
technology and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals are 
benefits that have been emphasized in discussions about the possibilities and 
promises of technology. For example, in response to allegation of fraud, the 
World Food Programme called for the use of new technology to reduce theft of 
food aid in Yemen. More broadly, debates have emerged about the potential of 
technology to revolutionize humanitarian action (Read, Taithe and Mac Ginty 
2016). The numerous expectations invested in the use of new technology in 
various humanitarian settings have given rise to debates about techno-opti-
mism in the humanitarian community, possibly involving the appreciation of 
potential risks ( Duffield 2016). One of these is technology failure, and harm 
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stemming from such a failure. Debates about “experimental” technology are re-
lated to this issue. This links to the gap between laboratory and humanitarian 
field use, the effects and implications of using humanitarian technologies in 
volatile aid settings (Kalkman 2018), and how to limit risks, referring to revital-
ized discussions about the principle of “do no harm” (i.e. delivering aid without 
causing harm) in the context of humanitarian technology (Sandvik, Jacobsen 
and McDonald 2017).
(2) Agency, politics, and accountability. A second central theme in recent 
debates about humanitarian technology has been the question of agency. In 
short, debates have centered on the question of whether technology is best 
understood as a “neutral means” (a tool through which to achieve predefined 
humanitarian objectives) or as having the potential to generate productive 
effects beyond what humans intend when they deploy it. One example of a 
productive effect is that many of the technologies mentioned here have pro-
duced enormous amounts of new and sometimes very sensitive data. This 
has certain benefits, but comes with new challenges, including data protec-
tion, privacy, and access questions. Accordingly, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross notes that guidance on “the interpretation of data protec-
tion principles” is particularly relevant when new technologies are employed 
(icrc 2017). Another example is the impact of connectivity, not only on 
how humanitarian assistance is practiced, but also, importantly, on how it is 
conceptualized.
More broadly, these debates suggest that technology cannot easily be un-
derstood in isolation from broader questions of politics, power, ethics, and 
accountability. It is, for example, difficult to grasp the implications of us-
ing new technology in humanitarian work without considering the politics 
of humanitarian actors’ relations with other actors, such as host countries, 
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Training
Training can be defined as the “systematic acquisition of knowledge and skills 
with the goal of developing competencies necessary for effective performance 
in work environments” (Nazli, Sipon and Radzi 2014: 576). Humanitarian train-
ing aims to build the skills of volunteers, staff, participants, and the manage-
ment of a team to improve preparedness and response at all levels before, dur-
ing, and after emergencies (ifrc 2019). Several types of training are aimed at 
humanitarian professionals, including humanitarian negotiation, advocacy, 
and diplomacy (Centre of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiation 2019); 
humanitarian logistics and supply chains (noha 2019); human resources and 
finance management, program management, and coordination (Centre for 
Education and Research in Humanitarian Action 2012); security training in 
hostile environments (nrc 2019); generic and technical trainings concerning 
water, sanitation, and hygiene (Centre for Affordable Water and Sanitation 
Technology 2019); nutrition project management (Bioforce 2019); and cash-
based interventions (noha 2019).
Humanitarian response comprises various professional disciplines, exper-
tise, and work experiences. As such, the education of staff operating in 
 humanitarian emergencies integrates “task-related, profession-specific, and 
cross-disciplinary competencies” (Ripoll Gallardo et al. 2015: 430), where 
knowledge is coproduced by educators and practitioners. This form of copro-
duction results in an exchangeable role between educators and practitioners 
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in the teaching of humanitarian action, in which humanitarian “experts” act as 
educators who intermediate and translate the humanitarian discourse into lo-
cal concerns through academic and applied scientific degrees, open and tailor-
made diplomas, summer schools, and program modules, for example. At the 
same time, the teaching curricula are simultaneously the learning curricula in 
terms of what humanitarianism is and how it should be. One critical element 
here is that this coproduction of knowledge, although dynamic and adaptive, 
is primarily characterized as either discipline or multidiscipline-centric, large-
ly leaving aside non-American/European perspectives with “limited success as 
an evidentiary basis for policy improvements” (Weichselgartner and Pigeon 
2015: 109).
In the disaster risk management cycle, for example, the preparedness stage 
is intended to increase readiness and knowledge among staff and community 
(Nazli, Sipon and Radzi 2014). This comprises a complex sequence of planning, 
equipment, training, exercises, and improvement, with emergency prepared-
ness exercises often viewed as the most important component (Skryabina et al. 
2017). These exercises aim to test the workability of emergency planning with 
four main purposes: learning the emergency plan, learning to collaborate dur-
ing emergencies, providing collective training, and gaining input from stake-
holders (Watts 2016). In disaster preparedness, training exercises can be broad-
ly divided into two major groups: discussion-based exercises, including table or 
desk exercises, workshops, or seminar-based activities, and operation-based 
exercises, such as drills, functional exercises/command post exercises, and 
fieldwork training. The first category is used to familiarize participants with 
their plans, roles, and procedures. It can also involve allowing participants to 
practice their role through simulated emergency situations. The format is led 
by facilitators and presenters who check whether participants meet the de-
sired objectives. The second category usually involves responding to a scenario 
where a more realistic emergency is imitated. For example, fieldwork training 
looks at replicating as closely as possible a response to an actual emergency 
event, allowing for the testing of various “tools, plans, procedures, resources, 
interagency coordination, and command centres” (Skryabina et al. 2017: 
274–275).
In all circumstances, training in humanitarian settings implies knowing in 
practice, where “work-practice-knowing” is formed through regular interac-
tions between various types of persons with specific roles, materialities, insti-
tutions, and discourses. Thus, the knowledge attained is not “fixed” but is 
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Transitional Justice
Since the 1980s, transitional justice has moved away from being a peripheral 
concern to become a ubiquitous feature of societies that are recovering from 
mass conflict or repressive rule—and is now a key component of humanitari-
an and development interventions. It is informed by a liberal and redemptive 
teleology of history as progress, according to which the reparation of past 
harms produces a non-violent future characterized by “sustainable peace” 
© Agathe Mora, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004431140_100
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
Transitional Justice�16
<UN>
(UN 2012: 3), democracy, a culture of human rights, and respect for the rule of 
law (UN 2012; UN 2004).
Transitional justice refers to a range of instruments (often used in combina-
tion) that are enshrined in both domestic and international (human rights and 
humanitarian) law, including truth-telling and truth commissions, public apol-
ogies and forgiveness, memorialization and commemoration, pardons and 
amnesties, compensation, restoration, restitution (of land and property), in-
ternational and regional criminal courts and tribunals, lustration and vetting, 
and legal and institutional reforms. Among the best-known transitional justice 
processes of the last decades are the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, Argentina’s reparations to victims of its military regime, the pros-
ecution and conviction for crimes against humanity and war crimes of Liberi-
an ex-President Charles Taylor, by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
The paradigm of “transition,” embedded in the concept of transitional jus-
tice, is a product of the late 1980s to mid-1990s and the unfolding “worldwide 
democratic revolution” triggered by the end of the Cold War, and the “triumph” 
of economic and political liberalism (Hazan 2010: 50; Carothers 2002). While 
its legitimation can be traced back to the post-World War ii war crimes and 
Holocaust trials (Teitel 2000), the “justice” of transitional justice was shaped by 
a renewed emphasis on human rights and judicial remedies to mass violence 
(Palmer, Clark and Granville 2012). In the post-Cold War period, the moral im-
perative propagated by human rights discourses combined with humanitarian 
action to defend individual (and, to a lesser extent, collective) rights.
The demarcation between “conflict” and “post-conflict” and the conception 
of a “toolbox” approach for managing mass crimes are central to this moral 
imperative. Such a toolbox approach has been widely criticized, notably for its 
over-reliance on legalistic, institutionalized measures and a top-down method 
(Palmer, Clark and Granville 2012) as well as its entrenching of a disconnect 
between international legal norms and localized priorities and practices (Shaw, 
Waldorf and Hazan 2010). Even in supposedly informal truth-seeking settings, 
such as the Rwandan gacaca (a mechanism of community justice), the un-
equal equation of culture, power, and the influence of international actors 
shapes how mass violence and memory are handled. These critiques demand 
a question about whose transitional justice measure should be considered; by 
whom, for whom, and for what (Jansen 2013).
The increased emphasis on global security after 2001 was accompanied by 
the normalization, institutionalization, and bureaucratization of transitional 
justice through various judicial fora (e.g. international criminal courts and tri-
bunals, but also mass claims and quasi-judicial procedures) and increased 
United Nations involvement (most notably in East Timor and Kosovo) (Rubli 
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2012; Teitel 2014). Transitional justice shifted from a moral and legal duty to an 
instrumentalized tool of peace-building (Subotić 2012; Vinjamuri 2010), oper-
ating as a short-term technical and legal reform unfolding mainly at the insti-
tutional level of politics (Arthur 2009). Such transitional justice mechanisms 
often lose sight of their initial moral impetus and broader objectives. The te-
leological premise of transition becomes an end in itself, legitimating both ex-
ceptional measures and their perpetuation.
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The word trauma stems from the Greek word traûma, meaning wound. The 
definition of trauma as a physical wound first appeared in the 1650s in medical 
practice. The 1890s saw the emergence of trauma as a psychic wound, thus pav-
ing the way for psychology and psychiatry. The popularization of these ideas 
has influenced the study of humanitarianism, particularly since the anthropol-
ogy of suffering has spread as a concept. Regarding trauma as a medical cate-
gory and as a social norm entered humanitarian work in the second half of the 
20th century (Fassin and Rechtman 2009). Trauma as a medical category be-
came popular with the definition of post-traumatic stress disorder (ptsd). 
ptsd was applied to both victims and perpetrators of the Vietnam War (1955–
1975) and contributed to the depoliticization of war crimes (Young 1995). De-
constructing the idea of soldiers as either heroes or war criminals, war veterans 
increasingly became mental health sufferers. Through this representation, 
trauma as diagnosis turned into a tool that allowed sufferers to gain a new sym-
bolic identity in order to receive compensation (Fassin and Rechman 2009). 
This logic of reasoning has since been applied to all victims of violence who 
are seeking support from humanitarian organizations, whether because of 
rape, torture, or persecution. Even humanitarian relief workers are being diag-
nosed with ptsd in emergency situations (Connorton et al. 2012).
Despite being a medical category, trauma has also been used to define a so-
cial norm. Several generations of African Americans in the United States have 
drawn attention to the trauma of slavery as the collective memory of suffering 
in the public sphere (Eyerman 2011). Building on this legacy, trauma as histori-
cal injustice has turned into a tool that is used to gain public recognition for 
perished victims and to demand the state’s political accountability, so that the 
descendants of slaves can be compensated through legislation and repara-
tions. This has evolved into a call for humanity, solidarity, and compassion 
transnationally through the work of humanitarian organizations on behalf of 
victims of violence. These organizations work within the framework of human 
rights and draw on past injustices perpetrated by one nation or social group on 
another, whether based on mass colonization, slavery, or genocide (Fassin and 
Rechtman 2009).
In addition to asking what trauma does to individuals and societies (Fassin 
and Rechtman 2009), humanitarian studies also consider how experiences of 
violence manifest themselves in everyday life and the cultural meanings that 
people give them (Das 2015). In this case, it might be worth going beyond the 
concept of trauma, because it is neither “a concept with hard boundaries” nor 
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“a malleable category that becomes saturated with context” (Das 2015: 108). On 
the one hand, people who have survived multiple displacements as refugees 
may not even develop trauma; rather, they may think of their past experiences 
as “the currency with which they can buy the right to move elsewhere” (Das 
2015: 109). On the other hand, people might develop trauma as a result of their 
constant suppression of emotions in times of crisis. This is the case for men 
who respond to social expectations of heroism by performing in a convention-
ally masculine manner. Instead of regarding medical diagnoses as tools that 
can be used to claim benefits (Fassin and Rechtman 2009), men might con-
sider medical treatment as providing a safe space in which they can demon-
strate weakness without fear of social judgment (Das 2015). While the case of 
refugee displacement demonstrates that “trauma is not found where it is ex-
pected to be” (Das 2015: 107), where gender expectations in conflicts are con-
cerned, trauma may exist where it is not searched for.
Our understanding of trauma in humanitarianism, therefore, depends on 
who has the authority and voice to publicly speak about human suffering. Ex-
perts and institutions define what trauma is and how it should be treated (Fas-
sin and Rechtman 2009). As a result, survivors embody and act upon an insti-
tutional definition of trauma, such as ptsd, unable to speak for themselves. At 
the same time, expert definitions of trauma are limited because survivors’ ex-
periences are broad and complex (Das 2015). Instead of universalizing human 
suffering under the concept of trauma, it is worth understanding war or disas-
ter experiences in the terms that are articulated by survivors themselves.
Ekatherina Zhukova
References
Connorton, E.M., et al. (2012) Humanitarian Relief Workers and Trauma-related Men-
tal Illness. Epidemiological Reviews, 34: 145–155.
Das, V. (2015) Beyond Trauma, Beyond Humanitarianism, Beyond Empathy: A Com-
mentary. Medicine Anthropology Theory, 2(3): 105–112.
Eyerman, R. (2011) Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African American 
Identity. Cambridge University Press.
Fassin, D., Rechtman, R. (2009) The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the Condition of 
Victimhood. Princeton University Press.





Humanitarian action is characterized by a tension between the universality of 
its pretensions and the particularity of the contexts of its realization. The no-
tion of “humanitarian” builds on the concept of “humanity” and signals the 
universality of its outlook—implying that it relies on a universal human incli-
nation and also that it applies to humanity as a whole (Fast 2016).
As a variation on an old theme, this universality was emphasized in the 
United Nations report One Humanity: Shared Responsibility, which was pre-
pared for the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. It is stated that effective 
action requires a “unified vision”: “In a globalized world, this vision needs to be 
inclusive and universal and to bring people, communities and countries to-
gether, while recognizing and transcending cultural, religious or political dif-
ferences.” It is maintained that this vision must rely on a notion of “our com-
mon humanity”; “that there is inherent dignity and worth in every individual 
that must be protected, respected and given the opportunity and conditions to 
flourish” (Ki-Moon 2016: 15–16).
In the humanitarian principles defined by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (icrc), “humanity” and “universality” appear separately. In this 
instance, humanity, combined with neutrality, impartiality, and independence, 
pertains to how humanitarian law and assistance should be conceived and ap-
plied, while universality refers to the global scope of their application (icrc 
2015). The icrc currently has a near universal reach in this respect, and while 
most headquarters of large international humanitarian organizations are 
based in Europe, international and local organizations doing humanitarian 
work are a global phenomenon (unocha 2018). That said, there is a tension 
between the ideal of universal reach and the reality of “forgotten crises” and 
trends in humanitarian action, where certain crises are overfunded and over-
represented. Moreover, the desired universal outreach might be limited by ac-
cess denial—as reflected in debates about constraints on the humanitarian 
space.
Surprisingly, humanitarian law and assistance are criticized both for not be-
ing sufficiently universal and also for their universal attitude. For instance, 
Costas Douzinas reminds us that the notion of humanity is itself an invention 
of modernity, with no universalist equivalent in Greek or Roman thought 
(Douzinas 2007: 1). Contrary to this universalist image, Didier Fassin describes 
how humanitarianism as we know it today is integral to broader social and 
political developments in Europe over the past few decades, and is not a time-
less manifestation of empathy and care (Fassin 2011).
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Yet there is a universal dimension to the basic humanitarian objective of 
assisting people in desperate need, independent of their identity or self-inter-
est. This objective does not rely on a particular notion of humanity or humani-
tarianism but rather on inclinations towards charity and compassion. The 
ways in which humanitarian practices turn these inclinations into ideas and 
actions are nonetheless always formed by their cultural and political settings, 
both at the sending and receiving ends. Jacinta O’Hagan and Miwa Hirono 
(2014), for instance, describe how the emergence of new humanitarian actors 
and arenas in Asia has resulted in new “cultures of humanitarianism,” without 
necessarily undermining international humanitarian cooperation (O’Hagan 
and Hirono 2014). Others have demonstrated how any humanitarian practice 
involves a degree of political instrumentalization when being realized, entail-
ing a great diversity in political features and consequences of humanitarian 
governance (Dijkzeul and Sandvik 2019). Indeed, the supposed universality of 
humanitarianism lends itself well to the facilitation and justification of politi-
cal agendas.
Moreover, bureaucratic and technological rationales form humanitarian en-
gagement. On the one hand, this contributes to the universality of the assis-
tance, given its reliance on universal rules and standards. On the other hand, 
bureaucracy and technology represent a non-universal modern rationality 
that may depart from predominant political rationalities and technologies in 
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Utopia
Is humanitarianism a feature of modernist utopias? Does international hu-
manitarian law express utopian designs? Certainly, global consensus about 
humanitarian interventions, namely of the military kind, does not exist, and 
these interventions have always involved strategic, normative, and empirical 
considerations. Still, humanitarianism is deployed in the name of humanity 
(Feldman and Ticktin 2010), and different routes are open to us if we wish to 
explore its links with the utopian trope: the religious moorings of humanitari-
anism that instruct us to help those in need, the idea of the sacredness of hu-
man life, a secular common humanity that transcends all nationalities and 
boundaries, the core principles of humanitarian action, or the universality of 
human rights. All are symbolic horizons that inform a myriad of humanitarian 
configurations and gestures on the ground. No doubt, when seen as an ethos, 
humanitarianism has had sweeping ambitions, propelling the end of the slave 
trade, the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the 
so-called “laws of humanity.” The humanity that grounds humanitarian law, 
and the humanness that informs humanitarian moral reasoning, have sanc-
tioned all sorts of saving interventions in post-disaster and conflict settings 
(Fassin 2011). Discursive and visual tropes have also been deployed at great 
length to galvanize global compassion and the “gift” of aid. The constellation 
that emerges from this cursory review is quite extraordinary, but this is not to 
say that institutional humanitarianism is devoid of all sorts of self-interested, 
neo-imperialistic, hypocritical, and power-driven ambitions. However, this is 
not the point. The idealistic, universalizing, and aspirational contours of hu-
manitarian reasoning are readily identifiable; what needs to be elucidated here 
is its relation to utopia.
In common parlance, utopia refers to a desirable yet impossible state. One 
could argue that were we to live in a fully realized utopia, there would be no 
© Alicia Sliwinski, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004431140_103
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
��3Utopia
<UN>
need for humanitarianism because suffering and injustice would have been 
eradicated. Conversely, qualifying humanitarian goals as utopian stresses their 
unrealistic features. This stance adopts a partial and reductionist view of uto-
pia’s theoretical, political, symbolic, and affective potential, and ignores the 
vibrant scholarship around utopia’s semantic reach and practices of collective 
engagement. The gist of the matter lies partly in utopia’s relation to the real. 
Recent works seek to pull the concept of utopia back to the everyday, not to 
re-enchant the world, but rather to revitalize intellectual imagination. Key pro-
posals reconsider utopia as an analytical category of experience of time, space, 
and relationality that brings to the fore those frictions between the desired and 
the concrete that shape specific encounters (Cooper 2014; Gardiner 2013; 
Maskens and Blanes 2018). Methodologically, utopia becomes a non-essential-
ized evaluative term that is apt to characterize the qualities and configurations 
of future-oriented projects or praxis (Levitas 2013). Intentional neo-rural com-
munities come to mind as an example of this, along with many other social 
projects that seek to foster human betterment. The proposal of empirical uto-
pias is not to ascertain utopian achievements, but rather to reveal the politics 
of possibility, and this often entails an ethical orientation toward a shared be-
coming (Wright 2010). Ultimately, the utopian trope seeks to galvanize the 
politics of social critique.
These comments invite us to shift our analytical gaze away from the (unre-
alistic) end goal of humanitarianism’s (flawed) ethics of care, and to consider 
instead localized encounters, where, as a frame of mind that guides action, 
humanitarianism’s aspirational gestures toward better futures are rendered 
visible, however imperfect they may be.
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Vernacular Humanitarianism
Vernacular humanitarianism refers to aid provided by various local actors in 
tune with their socio-historically specific ideas of humanness, as a response to 
an emerging need that cannot be adequately addressed through conventional 
channels of help. It encompasses practices of helping that follow the universal 
humanitarian logic, but in a different form to the international humanitarian 
organizations.
A range of new terms has been offered recently to analyze these small-scale 
practices of helping. For instance, Anne-Meike Fechter and Anke Schwittay 
(2019: 1769) speak about “citizen aid” and “grassroots humanitarianism” in or-
der to encompass “forms of aid and development … which are not orchestrated 
by large donors or aid agencies, but are initiated by ordinary citizens, from the 
Global North and South.” Elisa Sandri (2018) suggests that volunteers helping 
the refugees in France who refused any financial or other support from the in-
ternational aid agencies and national governments enacted “voluntary hu-
manitarianism.” Darragh McGee and Juliette Pelham (2018) discuss “grassroots 
humanitarianism” in the context of the Calais “Jungle” in France as an alterna-
tive to the large-scale, professionalized forms of aid delivery. Katerina Rozakou 
(2017) writes about “solidarity humanitarianism” in Greece, referring to the 
work of the volunteers who helped the refugees and, in doing so, established a 
clear opposition between their solidary and self-reflective work and that of the 
professional humanitarian and state workers. Alexander Horstmann (2017) 
discusses “everyday humanitarianism,” which emerged at the intersection of 
grassroots, local, and international humanitarian practices after a violent con-
flict in Myanmar.
The term vernacular humanitarianism was also coined (Brković 2017) as a 
way to capture under the same conceptual umbrella the diverse forms of help-
ing that combine local notions of gift, duty, and responsibility with a universal-
izing claim to aid humanity. A good example of this is an orphanage in India 
that was “at once, a realm of Hindu dan; a form of nonreciprocal giving that 
does not demand a return; a site of state welfare, where citizens enjoyed cer-
tain rights; and a place where volunteers responded to social obligations and 
© Čarna Brković, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004431140_104
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
��5Vernacular Humanitarianism
<UN>
the impulse to help others” (Bornstein 2012: 11–12). Other good examples are 
the small-scale experiments in helping refugees that exist throughout the West 
and do not fit neatly with more traditional forms of support (Feischmidt, Pries, 
and Cantat 2018). These practices show the junctures as well as the tensions 
between humanitarianism, philanthropy, development, public welfare, reli-
gious charity, and political activism.
These vernacular ways of providing aid have several things in common. 
First, all instances of vernacular humanitarianism posit a universalizing no-
tion of humanity. Just like international humanitarianism, its vernacular coun-
terparts are grounded in the idea that all people deserve help simply because 
they are human beings, irrespective of their particular identities (including, for 
example, their race, class, citizenship, ethnonationality, gender, age, and sexu-
ality). Secondly, vernacular humanitarianism interweaves this universalizing 
notion of humanity with socio-historically situated frameworks of giving, such 
as French ideas of how a good citizen ought to behave towards others (Sandri 
2018); Greek understandings of hospitality (Rozakou 2017); relational empathy 
in India, which “challenges liberal models of humanitarian activity oriented 
towards the needs of strangers” (Bornstein 2012: 149); and post-Yugoslav ideas 
about what a state ought to give to its citizens (Brković 2016). The interweaving 
of different frameworks of giving forges new responses to these novel needs. 
Thirdly, vernacular humanitarian practices are ad-hoc, non-professional, non-
bureaucratized forms of helping that tend to ignore legal distinctions between 
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Victim
The fundamental prerogative of humanitarian organizations is to ensure that 
protection and relief are provided to the most vulnerable: victims of war, ill-
ness, genocide, natural disasters, torture, displacement, famines, rape. As part 
of this endeavor, media-friendly portraits of “the victims” and their rescuers 
are deployed globally to arouse empathic responses, foster solidarity, legiti-
mize military interventions, and raise funds. Taxonomies of victimhood are 
also developed on the ground as map charts and classificatory tools, in order to 
plan, monitor, and execute humanitarian programs in favor of the “eligible vic-
tims.” In practice, bureaucratic transactions, paperwork, and official artifacts 
such as medical reports documenting “trauma” (Fassin and Rechtman 2009) 
mediate the formal allocation of “victim status.” Experts and practitioners such 
as lawyers, physicians, police officers, cultural mediators, and mental health 
professionals thus have the final responsibility for certifying an individual as a 
victim in a number of areas.
While the humanitarian production of the victim is based on naturalistic 
assumptions of objectivity, universality, and equality, a set of moral, political, 
and ethical dilemmas continuously arise at the interface between theory and 
practice, self-definition, and external impositions of victimhood. Notions of 
victimhood vary enormously across time and space and are differently framed 
and contested by a range of actors, religious practices, socio-political, and gen-
der norms (Ronsbo and Jensen 2014).
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Outside legalistic frameworks that take victims’ identities for granted, aca-
demics have criticized the primacy of “pathetic” representations of victim-
hood (the passive victim) that simultaneously fetishize, dehistoricize, and in-
dividualize suffering masses: in the process, victims’ experiences are removed 
from their socio-political, cultural, and economic contexts, their agency ob-
scured, and their identities reduced to mute bodies. In order to be recognized 
as refugees, for instance, migrants must convince experts that they are “pure 
victims” (Meyers 2011): if they do not reduce themselves to anything but dam-
aged biological life, they can be suspected of engaging in victimhood 
performances.
While the humanitarian victim is normally construed as helpless and pas-
sive, the givers—humanitarians, individual donors, wealthy benefactors, 
 celebrities—are endowed with agency to save others. This salvific capacity is 
invested with a “god-like power” to make decisions over life and death, which, 
according to several critics, historically reflects colonial and post-colonial rela-
tionships between “the victim” and the “good-man,” that is to say the “white-
man” (Badiou 2001: 12–13).
While not all victims are accorded the same moral value, humanitarian at-
tempts to stabilize individuals in certain typologies of victimhood can be dif-
ferently contested by eligible candidates. A recent report published by the In-
ternational Centre for Transitional Justice (Kapur and Muddell 2016), for 
example, shows that male victims of sexual violence have few opportunities 
for recognition and compensation owing to the prevalent narratives of female 
victimhood that identify sexual violence as a women’s issue. Categories of vic-
timhood are also appropriated and repoliticized by affected stakeholders, as 
demonstrated by the rise of victims’ organizations. Here, private suffering is 
turned into collective public action that deindividualizes victimhood and 
molds it according to externally established legal formulations while, at the 
same time, increasing victims’ chances to access reparation (Druliolle and 
Brett 2018).
Recently, humanitarians have attempted to overcome the victim– benefactor 
dichotomy by promoting victims’ participation in bottom-up processes of pro-
gram design and implementation. Yet the primary focus on victimhood as a 
legal and natural condition tends to push affected communities’ changing 
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Voluntary Work
“Voluntary work” is a broad term that encompasses a wide range of human 
activity, including animal and environmental protection, social and medical 
care, and refugee relief. The adjective “voluntary” refers to the non-compulsory 
and unpaid character of work. Nevertheless, in practice voluntary work may 
entail some financial compensation for the volunteer involved. Whereas the 
distinction between the terms “bénévole” and “volontaire” in French is more 
informative, as the first explicitly indicates the lack of payment while the sec-
ond refers to paid work, in English as in other languages such a distinction 
does not exist. This blurring of the categories echoes the moral content of the 
volunteer as a disinterested subject and the epitome of a modern citizen work-
ing for the good. The moral values of the gift and altruism lie at the heart of 
civic volunteerism and the volunteer as a moral subjectivity (Rozakou 2016). 
Such an analysis of voluntary work helps us to grasp the compatibility between 
volunteerism and neoliberalism, which, at first glance, seems antithetical to 
the principle of morality. In fact, zones that stand outside the logic of market 
exchange and individual self-interest and areas of social  interaction that are 
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grounded in disinterestedness and giving are both  compatible with and essen-
tial to the formation of responsible neoliberal citizens (Muehlebach 2012).
Voluntary work is a key element of humanitarianism, not only because vol-
unteers form a significant labor force, but also because of the moral character 
associated with this specific kind of labor. The distinction between benevo-
lence and interest is also relevant to critiques of humanitarianism that have 
brought to the fore discrepancies between expatriate and national humanitar-
ian staff. While the mobile international expatriate personnel is perceived as 
selfless, the national and locally recruited staff are seen to be potentially cor-
rupt and selfish (Redfield 2012) or merely as paid employees (Fassin 2007). 
 Didier Fassin (2007) further highlights this distinction as part of the inherent 
contradiction in humanitarianism, specifically the inequality between those 
who disinterestedly risk their lives, and as such deserve the utmost protection 
of their humanitarian organization (international volunteers), and those who 
are only accorded limited protection (national personnel).
Much literature on humanitarianism focuses on Western liberal humani-
tarianism and the workings of large-scale traditional humanitarian organiza-
tions. However, recent ethnographies of grassroots humanitarianism(s) illumi-
nate a different facet of voluntary work and one that directly challenges the 
modus operandi of established humanitarian organizations. Two such exam-
ples draw upon the recent so-called “refugee crisis” that has taken place since 
2015 in Europe and the broad and diverse informal humanitarian responses to 
it that are composed largely by independent and untrained volunteers. It is no 
coincidence that researchers have felt the need to come up with new terms to 
describe this landscape. Based on her fieldwork at the makeshift camp at Cal-
ais in France, Elisa Sandri (2018) coins the term “volunteer humanitarianism” 
to describe an informal body of volunteers who provide humanitarian aid, and 
at the same time overtly challenge and oppose the border regime. In the set-
ting of this volunteer humanitarianism, humanitarianism and activism are in-
separable. In a similar vein, Katerina Rozakou (2017) notes that largely infor-
mal grassroots groups made up of volunteers consciously differentiate 
themselves and their work from large-scale humanitarian organizations. These 
groups emphasize egalitarian, non-professionalized, and horizontal relation-
ships in contrast to the vertical provision of aid administered by humanitarian 
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Vulnerability
Vulnerability in humanitarian emergencies is the result of class, gender, age, 
ethnic, racial, able-bodied, and religious inequalities and hierarchies that pre-
vent the individual from satisfying basic needs, accessing resources, and exer-
cising their rights (Bankoff 2001). Humanitarian crises, such as armed conflicts 
or disasters, can either exacerbate pre-existing structural vulnerabilities (e.g. 
economic inequalities, social roles, and cultural stereotypes) or create new 
ones (e.g. injuries, diseases, losses, displacements, poverty, violence, and exclu-
sion). For example, owing to unequal gender relations in a family and society, 
women may lose their social status because of the death of their husband, be 
subjected to sexual violence, have no access to basic hygiene during pregnancy, 
be burdened by carrying small children, have restrictions on clothing when 
fleeing, become victims of human trafficking, or have limited legal status and 
rights to claim benefits (Ní Aoláin 2011). People may also lack necessary sur-
vival skills during rescue operations, such as being able to read government 
announcements or swim during floods. In these circumstances, vulnerability 
becomes an obstacle for human agency, and this can reinforce conservative 
attitudes, as well as control of and discrimination against certain social groups.
The concept of vulnerability has received particular attention in the study 
of disasters. This has enabled understanding of “why disasters in the develop-
ing world [a]re so much worse than in the developed world” (Faas 2016: 15). 
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Disaster vulnerability is viewed as a result of a person’s characteristics (e.g. 
a lack of an individual or group capacity to protect themselves), poor decision-
making (e.g. social construction), an unequal socio-economic situation (e.g. 
a  lack of resources and entitlements), geographical proximity to danger 
(i.e.  exposure of places and populations), historical or distal causes (e.g. colo-
nialism, inability to access land, clientelist politics), and the outcomes and fre-
quency of the hazard itself (Faas 2016).
As the concept of vulnerability is primarily applied to those who are consid-
ered the most vulnerable groups, such as women, children, the elderly, or peo-
ple living with disabilities, it can contribute to rendering victims passive, inevi-
tably justifying humanitarian intervention (Bankoff 2001). This is particularly 
the case when the state fails to provide, or is reluctant to engage in providing, 
assistance to affected groups. In this case, humanitarian response runs a risk of 
undermining local capacities and knowledge in responding to emergencies, 
turning affected people into objects to be governed by external bodies and spe-
cialists, or even reinforcing harmful coping strategies. External experts can 
also ignore “the particular histories and power relations of a given place” (Faas 
2016: 22) and instead “import their own stereotypes of cultural roles and pow-
ers” (Ní Aoláin 2011: 8).
However, people affected by humanitarian emergencies are not passive vic-
tims and can respond to vulnerability differently, either by recognizing and 
engaging with it or by denying and ignoring it (Faas 2016: 20). Survivors may 
recognize and engage with vulnerability if their understanding of it correlates 
with definitions used by national and international actors who do not restrict 
survivors’ agency. On the contrary, affected people may ignore and deny vul-
nerability as it is applied to them by institutions if the concept prevents them 
from accessing resources and limits their agency. Thus, vulnerability becomes 
a bargaining chip in accessing humanitarian aid and turns into an opportunity 
for human agency. As such, vulnerability can positively change social behav-
iors, invite more openness, and permit access to the public sphere for margin-
alized groups during humanitarian emergencies, especially when an affected 
population is organizing collectively to rebuild their community. Here, vulner-
ability is understood as a condition of inevitable human interdependency, re-
lational existence, ties to others, and common humanity (Gilson 2014). It rep-
resents a critique of the liberal notion of autonomous subjects responsible for 
their own lives. At the same time, the vulnerability of people affected by hu-
manitarian emergencies is closely tied to the vulnerability of those who come 
to their rescue (Cavarero 2009). On the one hand, representatives of aid orga-
nizations are vulnerable to resisting the structures of neoliberal governance, 




vulnerable to a poor knowledge of local culture and language, a lack of infra-
structure and necessary equipment to perform their tasks, and violent attacks 
such as kidnapping and rape. In this way, vulnerability combines both humani-
tarian violence and care.
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Water
Access to water, human welfare, and economic development are indisputably 
and fundamentally linked. Access to fresh clean water is critical to human life; 
it preserves health, enables food production and security, and ensures equality, 
education, and economic development. It is also crucially related to gender 
roles and human dignity (UN Water 2015). There is an intensifying competition 
for water supplies between water “uses” and water “users” (UN Water 2015), 
with the most vulnerable and marginalized groups usually being those who 
lose out and cannot claim or ensure a safe and sustainable access to water. 
Thus, there is a close relation between access to water and social inequality. 
People around the world suffer from floods, droughts, and contamination from 
pollution caused by industries, mining, and urban sewers, the privatization of 
water and sanitation services, and displacement by dam projects (Perreault, 
Boelens, and Vos 2018). The ongoing impact of climate change has intensified 
droughts and other natural phenomena, reducing the availability of fresh 
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 water. Therefore, water has become a central catalyst for some of the bloodiest 
conflicts around the world, to the extent that it is common to refer to “water 
conflicts” (Kliot 1994; Selby and Hoffmann 2014).
Conflicts over water have triggered the development of legal frames at both 
international and national levels. In 2003, the United Nations (UN) Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issued General Comment 15: this out-
lined that the human right to water “entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, ac-
ceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic 
uses.” In 2010, the UN General Assembly approved the adoption of Resolution 
64/292, which recognizes access to clean water and sanitation as an indepen-
dent human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human 
rights. In 2015, the UN included the improvement of access to water and sani-
tation among the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
In times of crisis, war, and natural disasters, the issue of water access creates 
different and major challenges. Humanitarian activities and politics (De Lauri 
2016) have developed towards comprehensive interventions that include pro-
viding access to clean water and sanitation, as well as purification of water 
sources, temporary irrigation projects, and livestock watering. These water, 
sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) priorities increasingly include research as a 
key step to help improve interventions (D’Mello-Guyett et al. 2018). Interven-
tions in contexts such as refugee camps have shown the need to understand 
access to water beyond physical access or provision, and to include social di-
mensions such as sex, age, ethnicity, class, and religion that could be affected 
by limiting or changing the traditional use of and access to water.
The lack of understanding of and the value placed on the social aspects 
around water in the design of WASH interventions has caused conflict between 
donors, humanitarian organizations, and local communities. One example of 
this is the top-down prioritization of water and sanitation over other uses of 
water; for example, the use of water for livestock. This is a very typical conflict 
between nomadic pastoralists living in arid and semi-arid environments and 
humanitarian agencies (Harvey and Reed 2006; Betti 2018).
Humanitarian actors have been collaborating with existing state and inter-
national institutions to safeguard the right to access to water for vulnerable 
groups and to adopt policies, plans, and legislation that can protect such rights. 
The development of legal frames, diplomatic collaborations, and targets (e.g. 
coverage targets) can be placed under the umbrella of “water governance.” This 
has moved from exclusively monitoring household access to also prioritizing 
the monitoring of institutional settings, such as schools, health care facilities, 
and workplaces (who and uncf 2017b).
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Despite these developments, hundreds of millions of people still lack access 
to safely managed drinking water services and continue to live without access 
to safely managed sanitation services (who and uncf 2017a).
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